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INTRODUCTION 
 
The papers in this volume were delivered at a one-day colloquium in November 2010 
entitled ‘Actio – Hypokrisis – Delivery’, held under the auspices of the Centre for Oratory 
and Rhetoric at Royal Holloway, University of London. As it turned out, the papers 
focussed as much on the profession of oratory as on the delivery of speeches – to use the 
terminology of linguistics, on competence as well as performance – and this shift of 
emphasis has been reflected in the title of the volume. 
 The question what constitutes professional competence in a public speaker has been an 
important one both in ancient times and in the modern world. It can be examined from 
several angles. To start with, one cannot ignore the social and historical question of 
whether, to what extent and at what periods the practice of oratory constituted a 
‘profession’, whether in the sense of a career choice, a source of livelihood, an identifiable 
group of practitioners with or without formal membership of an organisation or a shared 
code of ethics, or a pool of those who have received a particular kind of education or have 
been trained in a particular set of skills. It is relatively easy to trace institutional changes, 
such as the establishment and rise of the rhetorical schools in early imperial Rome, or the 
gradual supplementation and eventual replacement of rhetoric by law as the approved 
training for practitioners in the late Roman courts. More complex is the task of tracing 
changes in attitude, and one always has to be on one’s guard against two dangers in 
particular: the imposition of modern categories, and the temptation to construct 
oversimplified narratives of evolutionary development. 
 In classical Athens, it is tempting to speak of a ‘profession’ of oratory as soon as 
speeches start to be composed for a fee by logographers for their clients.1 Bers in this 
volume writes of the linguistic standards observed in ‘professionally composed’ 
fourth-century Attic oratory. But as is well known, practising Athenian orators were not 
themselves professionals in the modern sense of the word, except in so far as they may 
have made money from producing written speeches for other people to deliver.2 To 
appear in court for a fee was against Athenian law, while the man who addressed the 
 
1 In this volume, the discussions of Greek oratorical practices in the classical period are limited to 
Athens. Although there is a wealth of sources for the importance of both symbouleutic and forensic 
oratory in other Greek poleis (democracies and oligarchies alike) during the fifth and fourth 
centuries, most of the surviving contemporary literary evidence has been written by Athenians, who 
may consciously or unconsciously have applied Athenian norms and conventions even when 
representing oratory performed abroad. Very little of the epigraphical evidence that can be used to 
throw further light on non-Athenian practices is earlier than the last quarter of the fourth century. 
2 H.-J. Wolff, Demosthenes als Advokat: Funktionen und Methoden des Prozeßpraktikers im 
klassischen Athens. Schriftenreihe der juristischen Gesellschaft e.V. Berlin (Berlin 1968) is still a 
classic discussion of this issue. It has since been published in an English translation in Oxford 
readings in the Attic orators, ed. E. Carawan (Oxford 2007) 91-115.  
1 
2 PROFESSION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
as ‘a professional orator’.  
 
assembly or the Council of 500 in return for pay (other than the stipend, misthos, paid 
from the public treasury to assembly-goers and councillors) laid himself open to charges 
of bribery and even treason. This in itself may not have deterred a good number of 
Athenian citizens who were skilled in oratory from generating a substantial income from 
their activities in the public sphere. Nevertheless, the fact that it was illegal to turn the 
practice of oratory into one’s livelihood meant that no Athenian would have wanted to 
admit to the designation of himself 
 However, if the Athenians were not prepared, legally or ideologically, to tolerate 
openly ‘professional’ orators, their attitudes towards oratorical expertise were more 
ambiguous. Although modern discussions have often emphasized passages in the Attic 
Orators where litigants profess their own lack of experience in speaking, it is nevertheless 
suggestive that this ‘topos of inexperience’ is deployed most frequently in the context of 
private legal disputes,3 but only rarely by defendants in public actions,4 or by litigants 
who were volunteering as prosecutors in public actions.5 The avoidance of the topos by 
the second and third categories is undoubtedly due to the close connection between certain 
types of Athenian public legal procedure and the political life played out in the Athenian 
assembly and, to a lesser extent, in the Council of 500.6 Citizens who chose to involve 
themselves in prosecutions concerned with, for example, illegal decree-proposals, treason 
or embezzlement of public funds are frequently known themselves to have been active as 
speakers in the assembly and the Council of 500.7 If such litigants were known already 
from previous appearances on the platform in the assembly and in the courts in other high-
profile public actions, professions of oratorical inexperience on their part would most 
likely fail to carry conviction.  
 By contrast, a litigant who referred to his lack of experience in the context of a private 
action may have been entirely honest in making this claim. The modern reader may 
perceive a glaring contradiction between the speaker’s profession of his lack of oratorical 
3 Lys. 17.1, 23.1, Is. 1.1, 8.5, 10.1, Dem. 27.1-2 (Demosthenes’ debut as a speaker), 29.1, 34.1, 41.2, 
[44].4, 48.1, [52].1-2 (delivered by Apollodoros son of Pasion at the young age of 25, soon after the 
death of his father), 54.1, 55.2. 
4 Lys. 7.1, 18.1 with 18.25, 19.1-3. 
5 Exceptions are Lys. 12.3, delivered by Lysias who, as a non-Athenian, would not have been in a 
position to build up a reputation in the Athenian assembly, [Dem.] 58.1-3, delivered by a very 
young man, and [Dem.] 59.14-15, where Theomnestos, who is only nominally the main prosecutor 
of Neaira, hands over to his synegoros Apollodoros.  
6 Note that the types of public action in which the surviving speeches were delivered are not 
representative of the entire range of Athenian public procedures. The overwhelming majority of the 
surviving speeches were delivered in trials in which the community as a whole was construed as the 
victim of the defendant’s crime, and which involved no individual victim. The exceptions are Dem. 
21 Against Meidias and Is. 11 On the estate of Hagnias which was delivered as a defence speech in 
an eisangelia for maltreatment of an orphan. It is possible that prosecutions brought by or on behalf 
of individual victims may have been more likely to have involved citizens who were not otherwise 
heavily engaged as speakers on the platform of the assembly.  
7 For illustration, see the convenient inventory in M. H. Hansen, ‘Rhetores and strategoi in 
fourth-century Athens’, in The Athenian ecclesia II. A collection of articles 1983-89 (Copenhagen 
1989) 25-72 (34-69). 
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skills in his prooimion and the often very highly polished written speech that is to follow.8 
Yet, it is a distinct possibility that the speaker’s true lack of experience would be clear to 
his audience because of the way in which he delivered his speech, a style of delivery that 
would have contrasted strongly with the style of more seasoned oratorical performers.  
 Unfortunately, this proposition is extremely difficult for the modern observer to verify, 
not least because no theoretical treatments of delivery have survived from the fifth or 
fourth centuries. The fact that techniques of delivery were discussed by Thrasymachos of 
Chalkedon in the late fifth century and by Theophrastos in the late fourth or early third 
suggests that, from quite early on, these techniques were recognized not only as an 
important aspect of the orator’s craft but also as techniques that could be systematically 
taught and acquired.9 On the other hand, the loss of treatises of this type means that for 
classical Greece in general, and for classical Athens in particular, we know only very little 
about actual performative techniques, including voice control, hand-gestures and 
body-movements more generally, let alone how exactly their deployment would have 
contributed to distinguishing the ‘expert’ orator from the novice.  
 Because of the loss of classical Greek systematic discussions of delivery (hypokrisis), 
modern scholars have been forced to rely almost entirely on comments on and references 
to performative techniques in the surviving works of the Attic Orators, often combined 
with the later philosophical and biographical tradition.10 The use of evidence gleaned 
from the Attic Orators presents a number of methodological problems. A particularly 
serious difficulty is due to the fact that most of these comments, as has previously been 
noted by Easterling,11 pertain to the style and mode of delivery adopted by the speaker’s 
opponent: it is extremely rare to find a speaker commenting explicitly on aspects of his 
own performative style.12 As a result, the explicit references to oratorical performance in 
8 See e.g. J. Hesk, Deception and democracy in classical Athens (Cambridge 2000) 208 with 
references to previous scholarship. 
9 On Theophrastos’ lost work On delivery and on his predecessors in this area, see 
W. W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastean studies (Stuttgart 2003) 253-71. Fortenbaugh points out that 
Theophrastus’ treatise may well have treated not only oratorical performance but also performance 
on the musical and dramatic stages. 
10 Although some of the anecdotes incorporated in the philosophical and biographical traditions may 
go back to the classical period, there is a considerable risk that the material relating to oratorical 
performance may have been distorted in the process of the later authors’ adaptation and presentation 
of it to their contemporary audiences. The peripatetic tradition may have been particularly important 
in shaping Demosthenes’ later reputation as an orator, as has been argued by C. Cooper, 
‘Philosophers, politics, academics: Demosthenes’ rhetorical reputation in antiquity’, Demosthenes. 
Statesman and orator, ed. I. Worthington (London 2000) 224-45. Cooper argued that much of the 
tradition that emphasises the similarities between Demosthenes’ style of delivery and hypokrisis on 
the dramatic stage may have its origin in the hostile evaluation made by Demetrios of Phaleron.  
11 See P. Easterling, ‘Actors and voices: reading between the lines in Aischines and Demosthenes’ 
in Performance culture and Athenian democracy, ed. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge 1999) 
154-66 (159).  
12 In Dem. 18.143, Demosthenes recalls how he himself, in a moment of acute desperation 
‘protested and shouted’ in the assembly, while the elected prosecutor involved in the apophasis 
against Aristogeiton uses the verb anaboao, ‘shout aloud’ in connection with the performance by 
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the Attic orators are nearly always negative. Whereas a rhetorical handbook, or technē, 
would have been likely to focus mostly on the ‘do’s’, albeit with occasional warnings on 
what to avoid in specific situations,13 the evidence of the Attic orators concentrates 
overwhelmingly on the ‘don’ts’. But while the context of these comments leaves no doubt 
that they were meant to denigrate certain characteristics of the opponent’s performance, 
our lack of a contemporary coherent prescriptive and descriptive theoretical framework 
means that it is most often extremely difficult to identify precisely why it was that a 
particular aspect of the opponent’s performance could be held up to censure, occasionally 
combined with ridicule.14  
 An equally important problem is how to determine the extent to which the evidence 
gleaned from the orators offers a representative picture of Athenian norms of delivery 
generally. As noted by both Edwards and Bers in the present volume, modern scholarship 
has, especially since the early 1990s, emphasized the affinity between the techniques of 
delivery that formed part of the orator’s craft and the techniques employed by actors on 
the tragic and comic stages.15 Indeed, it has often been observed that there is 
incontrovertible evidence for the political participation of Athenian actors both as 
speakers addressing the ekklēsia and as members of ambassadorial teams sent out to speak 
for Athens abroad. Among these, Aischines son of Atrometos of Kothokidai is of course 
the most famous, and it is probably no coincidence that nearly all contemporary Athenian 
comments on the parts played by actors in the city’s political and diplomatic life are to be 
found in just the four speeches where Aischines and Demosthenes confronted each other 
directly in court: the paired speeches Demosthenes 19 and Aischines 2 on the False 
Embassy, and the pair Aischines 3 and Demosthenes 18 delivered in Aischines’ 
prosecution of Ktesiphon for proposing an honorary decree for Demosthenes.16  
 What is more, if we leave aside the frequent comments pertaining specifically to 
performance by defendants and their supporters who were expected (by their prosecutors 
himself and the rest of the prosecution team (Din. 2.6). In Dem. 45.47, Apollodoros refers to his 
own lamentations (apodyramenos) in court and so does the young Alkibiades, son of the famous 
general, in Isoc. 16.49. The speaker of Dem. 25 (probably but not necessarily Demosthenes himself) 
refers with the verb rhapsōdein to the performance by himself and his fellow-prosecutors lined up 
against Aristogeiton (25.1), the same verb as is used by Demosthenes in 14.13 about futile speeches 
delivered by Athens’ envoys. On this metaphor and on the possibility that Dem. 25 may be a 
logographic work, see G. Martin, Divine Talk (Oxford 2009) 199-202. 
13 For an example of ‘do’s’ combined with ‘don’t’, see Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1427b1-10 on how 
to formulate a defence strategy. 
14 The most famous example is probably Aischines’ description of Timarchos’ wild performances in 
the assembly (1.26 and 33), but see also e.g. Dem. 25.47 on Aristogeiton (a description that bears a 
certain resemblance to Demosthenes’ description of Aischines’ assembly performance in 19.209). 
15 The bibliography is vast; see e.g. W. J. Slater, ‘The theatricality of justice’, Classical Bulletin 71 
(1995) 143-57; E. Hall, ‘Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic oratory’ 
BICS 40 (1995) 39-58; A. Chaniotis ‘Theatricality beyond the theatre. Staging public life in the 
Hellenistic world’ in De la scène aux gradins. Thêatre et représentations dramatiques après 
Alexandre le Grand dans les cités hellénistiques, ed. B. Le Guen (Toulouse 1997) 219-59.  
16 For a seminal discussion of the references to oratorical performance in these speeches see 
P. Easterling, ‘Actors and voices’ (n.11, above). 
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and presumably also by their dicastic audiences) to engage in tearful speaking and 
lamentation, the majority of explicit remarks on oratorical performance are concentrated 
in precisely these four speeches.17 Both Bers and Edwards observe that the high 
concentration of explicit comments on delivery made by Aischines and Demosthenes 
respectively is almost certainly due to Aischines’ reputation as an actor and, as Bers 
suggests, also to Aischines’ own desire to project, partly through his style of delivery, his 
persona as Aischines the Orator – a persona who differed significantly from that of 
Aischines the Actor.  
 The fact that modern discussions of classical Athenian delivery are forced to rely so 
heavily on Demosthenes’ and Aischines’ comments on each other’s performative styles 
means that we should be wary of using this material as a basis for generalisations on 
delivery in fourth century Attic oratory. As Edwards points out, the famous reference to 
Hypereides’ style of performing his speeches ‘without acting/delivery (hypokrisis)’ 
constitutes a clear warning against the assumption that Aischines and Demosthenes were 
in any way ‘typical’ in terms of their style(s) of delivery. Not only does the example of 
Hypereides – who may very likely have deliberately cultivated an ostentatiously 
understated mode of delivery as his personal trademark – suggest that the styles of 
performance adopted by experienced orators were highly individual. Edwards also 
reminds us that the Athenian courts were not by any means monopolized by these 
‘experts’. Even if most of the speakers who delivered the surviving forensic orations did 
belong to the most prosperous section of the Athenian population, they were not 
necessarily to be counted among those who volunteered on a regular basis as speakers in 
the assembly or in the courts as prosecutors in public actions.18 
 As noted earlier, it is extremely hard to determine on the basis of the extant forensic 
orations precisely how delivery by an inexperienced litigant of a written text purchased 
from a logographer would have differed from delivery by an experienced orator 
performing his own script. In his contribution, Edwards suggests that successful 
logographic products may have been devised in such a way that they reduced the need for 
‘acting’ to a minimum. Even stylistic features such as prosōpopoeia, which may often 
have been performed with a good deal of histrionic art by experienced performers, may 
still have been effective if performed rather more ‘artlessly’ by less experienced speakers. 
As for non-verbal communication, Edwards draws attention to apostrophē as one example 
17 For anticipation of the tearful appeals made by defendants and their synēgoroi, see the discussion 
in S. Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy, (Austin, Texas 1999) 109-25. In addition to the copious 
references to performance in Aeschin. 2, 3, Dem. 18, 19, comments on the opponent’s style of 
delivery are also found in Is. 6.59; Aeschin. 1.26, 33; Dem. 20.166; 21.138, 200, 201; 22.68, 24.13, 
25.9, 47, 49, 64; 26.19; 36.61; 40.53, 61; 42.20; 45.30; 57.11; Lycurg. 1.31. The overwhelming 
majority of these passages refer to the loudness of the opponent’s voice (sometimes combined with 
the derogatory noun kraugē, ‘bawling’, or its cognate verb). It is suggestive that nearly half of the 
comments (those highlighted above in bold) relate to the opponent’s performance on the platform of 
the assembly rather than that of the court.  
18 Note that several of the surviving speeches were delivered by men who were not Athenian 
citizens and therefore excluded from appearing on the bēma in the assembly. In addition to Antiph. 
5 mentioned by Edwards, Isocr. 17, Dem. 34, and [Dem.] 56 are among our surviving logographic 
works composed for delivery by non-Athenians.  
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of a body-movement which was clearly signalled in the litigant’s script itself: the change 
of the speaker’s addressee would almost certainly have been accompanied by the 
speaker’s physically turning to face his opponent on the opposite platform. Like 
prosōpopoeia, apostrophē may have been most effective if performed by an ‘expert’, but 
the figure may still also have worked for the ordinary litigant. What is important to note is 
that, as far as Athenian forensic oratory is concerned, the different levels of expertise 
possessed by different types of litigant as well as different individual styles deliberately 
adopted by experienced speakers are likely to have produced considerable diversity in 
performance techniques, which make generalisations extremely difficult.  
 Bers’ contribution, like that of Edwards, also discusses the extent to which we should 
expect significant variations in performance styles between different speakers; Bers’ main 
focus, however, is on the question whether modes of delivery varied according to the 
genre of the speech itself. Bers is concerned particularly with the possible differences 
between the performance of symbouleutic and of dicanic orations. He suggests a number 
of ways in which we, as modern readers, may be able to identify stylistic differences, 
relevant to the question of delivery, between the two genres on the basis of the written 
texts that have survived. Such differences include the choice of vocabulary and not least 
the use of particles. A comparison between the use of particles in Demosthenes’ 
symbouletic oratory and in his forensic speeches does indeed suggest that Demosthenes 
may have adopted different modes of delivery depending on whether he was addressing a 
crowd in the ekklēsia or a panel of dikastai and spectators in the courtroom.  
 The question addressed by Bers is directly related to Edwards’ observations on the 
varying degrees of expertise and experience possessed by individual speakers, for while 
the courts (at least those judging private actions concerned with inheritance, return of 
dowries and other oikos-related disputes) were very likely populated by litigants with very 
diverse levels of oratorical proficiency, the bēma in the assembly probably was less so. 
While it may have happened several times during the lifetime of an ordinary Athenian that 
he would have been forced by circumstances to appear as a litigant in connection with 
private disputes or inheritance claims,19 no citizen was ever compelled in the same way to 
address the assembly or the Council of 500 with a symbouleutic speech. Indeed, there is a 
broad consensus among modern scholars that the bēma in the Athenian assembly was 
dominated by a small number of extremely active citizens, although Hansen has suggested 
that, in the fourth century at least, rather more Athenians may have been actively involved 
in assembly debates than has traditionally been assumed.20 But even if participation was 
somewhat wider than the more pessimistic modern assessments have suggested, it is still 
most probable that the vast majority of speakers addressing the assembly during the fourth 
century, as well as the fifth, possessed a level of rhetorical expertise that set them apart 
from most of their fellow citizens. 
 As is to be expected, neither the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum nor Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
offer much advice on how to tailor oratorical performance to suit the two different genres. 
19 See the discussion in V. Bers, Genos dikanikon: amateur and professional speech in the 
courtrooms of classical Athens (Cambridge MA 2009) esp. 10-24. 
20 See ‘The number of rhetores in the Athenian ecclesia, 355-322 B.C.’ in M. H. Hansen, The 
Athenian ecclesia II. A collection of articles 1983-1989 (Copenhagen 1989) 93-127, (122-27). 
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 the logos dikanikos. 
 
However, Bers draws attention to the important observation made by Aristotle in Rhetoric 
1414a8-17 that high stylistic finish is less effective the larger the crowd that is being 
addressed, and, more importantly, that the need for ‘dramatic delivery’ (hypokrisis) and 
powerful voice projection increases with the size of the audience, in part as a result of the 
speaker’s physical distance from his listeners. As Bers points out, the symbouleutic and 
dicanic genres were each associated with physical settings that differed markedly from 
one another, and he suggests that these differences may have had led to a differentiation, 
de facto, between the styles of delivery associated with each of the two genres. At Athens, 
symbouleutic orations would have been associated first and foremost with the open-air 
setting of the Pnyx and with audience sizes of 6000 men or more. Forensic speeches, by 
contrast, were associated first and foremost with roofed courtrooms and typically with 
audience sizes of between 201 and 501 judges, except for certain public actions of 
especial importance where audience numbers in the fourth century are known to have 
reached 2501.21  
 The match between oratorical genre and physical setting is, of course, not by any 
means a perfect one. Until ca. 360 BC some forensic speeches (and not the least important 
ones!) were delivered in impeachment trials, eisangeliai, heard by the assembly. Even 
after ca. 360, when the hearings in chief of all eisangeliai appear to have been referred to 
the ordinary dikastēria, the initial stage of an eisangelia was still conducted in the 
assembly. The evidence suggests that this stage, like the initial stages of probolai and 
perhaps also of some apophaseis, bore a close resemblance to a regular trial with speeches 
made by the accuser(s) against the accused and, if the latter was present, with an 
opportunity for the accused to defend himself.22 Likewise, a large number of 
symbouleutic speeches were delivered in the roofed venue of the Council of 500, the 
bouleutērion, where the audience size was the same as that of a dicastic panel hearing a 
standard public action. This, however, does not weaken the case in favour of assuming 
that the physical environment on the Pnyx may have contributed significantly to a 
development of modes and conventions of symbouleutic delivery that set this genre apart 
from the genre of
 Bers’ contribution builds on C. Lyle Johnstone’s discussion of the acoustic conditions 
that may have prevailed on Pnyx I, which functioned as Athens’ ekklesiastērion until 
404/3 BC, and the problem of audibility on the site. There can be little doubt that, in the 
fifth century especially, there was most likely a marked contrast between the demands 
made on speakers who addressed the assembly and those who addressed dicastic 
21 For a collection of the evidence relating to different panel sizes, see M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia. 
The sovereignty of the people’s court in the fourth century B.C. and the impeachment of generals 
and politicians (Odense 1975) 10 n.14. Hansen notes that And. 1.17 suggests that in 415 a panel of 
6,000 judges heard a graphē paranomōn; this is unparalleled in the evidence for the fourth century. 
22 See for instance Hyp. 1 For Lycophron 3; here the defendant himself was abroad when his 
prosecutors made accusations against him in the assembly. The close resemblance of the adversarial 
debate preceding the vote by the assembly in probolai to a regular trial can be illustrated by the fact 
that even here assistance by synēgoroi appears to have been a regular occurrence (e.g. Dem. 
21.206).  
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audiences in the regular, roofed courts, where audibility was almost certainly far better.23 
Bers discusses the possible implications of the acoustic problems on Pnyx I for the 
performative styles adopted by the speakers on its bēma and for their interaction with their 
audiences. Here it may be noted that Andokides 2 On His Return, delivered at some point 
between 410 and 406 BC, is our only surviving assembly speech to have been performed 
on Pnyx I. The style of that speech, which M. Edwards has characterized as seeming, at 
first sight, ‘to be poorly ordered, and to consist of a series of short topics delivered in 
almost staccato fashion’,24 may indeed add further support to Bers’ contention that the 
challenges presented to speakers on Pnyx I had a direct and discernible influence on their 
style of delivery and use of language  
 As conceded by C. Lyle Johnstone,25 audibility on the Pnyx may have been improved 
considerably with the construction of Pnyx II and the re-orientation of the auditorium and 
the speaker’s platform. In the new setting, the speakers would have addressed their 
audiences with the prevailing north-easterly wind blowing from behind them, which may 
have made it easier for them to make themselves heard. But even though the acoustic 
conditions may well have been significantly better in Pnyx II and III,26 where all the rest of 
our surviving assembly speeches were delivered, it is highly likely that any performative 
techniques developed in response to the physical conditions of Pnyx I lived on in the fourth 
century, because they had by now become an intrinsic part of the genre.  
 Moreover, the challenges presented by the sheer size of the audience would have been 
just as important in the fourth century as they had been in the fifth. The distance between 
23 That audibility was considered a priority in the choice of venue for Athenian trials is strongly 
suggested not least by the allocation to the Periklean Ōdeion of cases belonging to the jurisdiction of 
the Eponymous Archon. This building was designed primarily for musical performances (see 
A. Boegehold, The lawcourts of Athens: sites, buildings, equipment, procedure, and testimonia. The 
Athenian agora XXVIII (Princeton, New Jersey 1995) 94. It may be no coincidence that the trials 
taking place in this building both in the fifth and the fourth century were first and foremost those 
relating to the oikos sphere, in which ordinary Athenian citizens – with little or no oratorical 
experience – were most likely to become involved.  
24 M. Edwards, Greek orators IV: Andocides (Warminster 1995) 89. 
25 C. Lyle Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings and the problem of the Pnyx: rethinking the 
Athenian political process’ in Theory, text, context. Issues in Greek rhetoric and oratory, ed. C. Lyle 
Johnstone (Albany, New York 1996) 97-127 (116). 
26 Unfortunately, too many uncertainties surround the reconstruction of the second and third stages 
of the Pnyx to permit the kind of acoustic assessment that C. Lyle Johnstone carried out for Pnyx I. 
See for example the contributions by G. R. Stanton and J. McK. Camp jr. in The Pnyx in the history 
of Athens, ed. B. Frösen and G. Stanton (Helsinki 1996). Of particular interest here is Camp’s 
suggestion that the auditorium of Pnyx III was either level with or sloping downwards away from 
the raised bēma, rather than upwards as has conventionally been assumed, and thus that ‘the orators 
literally, if not figuratively, looked down on their audience’ (J. McK. Camp jr., ‘The form of Pnyx 
III’, in The Pnyx in the history of Athens, ed. B. Frösen and G. Stanton (Helsinki 1996) 41-46 (45)). 
It is possible that only one of the surviving symbouleutic speeches in the Demosthenic corpus, 
[Dem.] 17, was performed in Pnyx III, but since the third stage of Pnyx III can be dated only 
approximately to ca. 340, it cannot be ruled out that Demosthenes’ speeches from the late 340s were 
also delivered there. 
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the speaker and the part of his audience sitting furthest away from the bēma had not been 
reduced as a result of the reorientation of platform and auditorium. Thus, the performance 
of speeches there (and, for that matter, in the theatre of Dionysus which served as one of 
the alternative assembly venues in the fourth century) would almost certainly still have 
required more exaggerated gestures and body-movement along with greater volume than 
speeches performed in the courtroom.27 Improved audibility may have made it more 
feasible for experienced orators to develop and perfect more distinct, individual styles of 
symbouleutic delivery in the fourth century, but there can be little doubt that the platform 
in the assembly largely remained the preserve of oratorical ‘experts’. 
 The absence from this volume of a chapter on the Hellenistic period does not in the 
least imply that we subscribe to the view that oratory in that period was in decline: rather, 
it is clear that oratory of various kinds (political, diplomatic, forensic) persisted vigorously 
even though the speeches, by and large, were not recorded in extenso, or, if they were, 
have not survived as written texts as those of the classical Athenian orators did. This 
period has been treated in a previous volume,28 and our next chapter shifts the scene to 
Ciceronian Rome. 
 As a result of the accessibility of the texts of Cicero’s speeches and rhetorical works, 
this period has been relatively well studied from the point of view both of ‘profession’ and 
‘performance’. However, one still finds over-simplified statements of the contrast between 
the Athenian court in which the litigant spoke for himself, and the court of the Roman 
Republic in which advocacy was the norm. In fact, there is less difference than might be 
supposed. The role of the supporting speaker (synēgoros) in the Athenian courts was 
examined in detail by one of the present editors in 200029 and it is clear that, although it is 
true that on a formal level litigants spoke in person, the presentation of either side of a 
case at Athens was in many if not most cases a team effort, and in some cases the chief 
burden fell on the synēgoros rather than the litigant. Furthermore, although it seems to be 
historically true that the practice of advocacy grew out of the older Roman system of 
patronage (hence the word patronus applied to the advocate), in fact the relationship 
between Cicero and his clients was neither precisely that of a patron nor that of a modern 
professional lawyer-advocate. The Roman advocate in the Republic was still in principle 
unpaid; fees were forbidden by a law of 204 BC which was not repealed until the early 
Principate. Of the formal relationship of patron and client there remained, in this context, 
only the terminology, unless the advocate happened in fact to stand in some kind of 
protective relationship to the person on whose behalf he spoke (as for example Cicero did 
to Caelius). Most of Cicero’s ‘clients’ were his equals in social standing and in seniority, 
27 It is perhaps suggestive that in fourth-century oratory several of the negative references to 
screaming, shouting and exaggerated body-movements on the bēma pertain to the opponents’ 
performances in the assembly rather than the courtroom (n.17, above for references). Although, as 
noted earlier, these comments are almost invariably hostile, the evidence points to the conclusion 
that a more flamboyant and extravagant style of delivery was tolerated and perhaps even expected in 
connection with assembly speeches, also in the fourth century. 
28 C. Kremmydas and K. Tempest ed., Hellenistic oratory: continuity and change (Oxford 2013). 
29 L. Rubinstein, Litigation and co-operation: supporting speakers in the courts of classical Athens 
(Stuttgart 2000). 
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and it is evident that his relationship to them in many cases was not dissimilar to that of an 
Athenian synēgoros to the main litigant. He and other advocates appeared not as hired 
professionals but as themselves, speaking on behalf of a friend in trouble. Consequently it 
was often necessary for him to justify his appearance in court. 30  Additionally, many of 
his speeches do not represent the whole of the case he is pleading;31 those where he 
appeared alone, such as the prosecution speeches against Verres or the defence of Milo,32 
bear a greater resemblance to modern lawyers’ speeches than do those in which he is just 
one of a defence team, where often the main arguments had already been presented to the 
court by an earlier speaker and did not need to be gone over again. 
 However, there does appear to be a clear difference between the Attic orators and 
Cicero in one respect: their attitude to oratorical expertise. While the Attic orators were as 
ready as Cicero was to criticize the performances of their opponents negatively, any 
positive recommendations on how an orator ought to perform in court or in politics are (as 
we have already seen) usually very brief. Cicero, however, is unembarrassed both when 
he lays down the law about the qualifications needed in a successful orator, and when he 
lays claim to those qualifications himself. This feature is particularly evident in the speech 
known as the Divinatio in Q. Caecilium, in which he pressed his own claims to prosecute 
against those of a rival prospective accuser. Cicero had never prosecuted before, but this 
was no disadvantage in a world in which habitual prosecutors were distrusted; and he 
could nod in the direction of modesty by disclaiming any special natural gifts (ingenium) 
and stressing his nervousness in undertaking such a case. But of his general oratorical 
expertise, attributed to hard work, constant practice, and accumulated courtroom 
experience, we are left in no doubt. 
The negative points made against Caecilius also contribute to the picture: he lacks a 
metropolitan Greek or Roman education (§39), he has memorised clichés from old 
speeches (§43), and he speaks from a script (§§47 and 52) composed for him by a 
rhetorical teacher. His proposed subsidiary prosecutors also come under attack; one is 
inexperienced in the courts, another is ‘strong and practised in shouting’ (cf. above, p. 5 
n.17) but will be inhibited by speaking in third place. All this is in addition to Caecilius’ 
personal disqualifications as a former associate of the defendant Verres. Here an unwary 
modern reader might think that the issue is one of professional ethics, but this would be 
misleading: in the Republic the prosecutor was a volunteer,33 and it was not at all 
30 For discussion of these issues see J. Crook, Legal advocacy in the Roman world (London 1995); 
J. Powell and J. Paterson ed., Cicero the advocate (Oxford 2004) esp. the introduction and the 
chapter by C. Burnand. 
31 See J. G. F. Powell, ‘Court procedure and Rhetorical Strategy in Cicero’ in Form and function in 
Roman oratory, ed. D. Berry and A. Erskine (Cambridge 2010). 
32 He may formally have had one or more subscriptores for the prosecution of Verres, as was the 
norm, but it is not clear whether they said anything in court; for what seems to be an allusion to 
them see Div. in Caec. 50. Asconius’ account of the Milo trial makes it clear that although there 
were several advocates who appeared for Milo in court and took part in the examination of 
witnesses, Cicero alone was selected to make the formal reply to the charges. 
33 The system of volunteer prosecutors did not by any means die with the Republic; it is still very 
much alive in the early empire, hence the opprobrium attaching to the habitual delator. By Trajan’s 
reign it is clear that the Senate appointed independent prosecutors to accuse provincial governors (as 
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unknown for Roman officials to be prosecuted by their subordinates, who would often be 
in the best position to know the details of any corruption. But in doing so they laid 
themselves open to accusations either of disloyalty to their former superior, or of initiating 
a sham prosecution for ulterior motives;34 Cicero uses both of these insinuations against 
Caecilius to good effect. 
 Obviously, care is necessary here as elsewhere in interpreting the evidence, which can 
only give us an incomplete picture. What is called divinatio35 was no doubt an established 
part of the statutory procedure, but since we have only this one example of a speech of 
this kind, we cannot generalize about the kinds of arguments used in divinatio speeches. 
One may surmise that it could have been difficult to conduct this part of a case without to 
some extent dwelling on one’s own credentials (a likelihood which renders less plausible 
the supposition that we are just dealing with a manifestation of Ciceronian vanity). 
However, the manner in which Cicero turns the whole speech into a rhetorical manifesto 
for the qualities needed by a successful prosecution advocate is indeed noteworthy. 
Because it is a speech and not a theoretical treatise, the divinatio has been neglected as a 
source for the development of rhetorical theory; but on the question of how to conduct and 
deliver a prosecution, it is in some respects more informative than the De Oratore written 
fifteen years later.  
 Tempest’s chapter brings out this point, and then goes on to examine the prosecution 
speeches themselves to demonstrate how Cicero put his own prescriptions into practice. 
While we may suspend judgement on whether Cicero was right in his claim that Caecilius 
has none of the requisite skills and is incapable of conducting the prosecution as it 
deserves, we can at least accept that the repertoire of skills and competences required by 
advocates in major public trials at Rome was very considerable.36  As Tempest further 
demonstrates, the text of the second Actio against Verres provides numerous examples of 
precisely those oratorical skills. This speech (for it is a single speech in five sections, not 
five speeches as customarily presented) has been signally neglected in recent times as a 
source of examples of effective oratory, probably because of the common persuasion 
Pliny and Tacitus were appointed to prosecute Marius Priscus in 100 AD) and their position was 
evidently much more analogous to that of a modern prosecution advocate. 
34 Cicero suggests that Caecilius would use the quest for evidence as an opportunity to destroy the 
records of his own shady dealings in Sicily (Div. Caec. 28). Accusations of praevaricatio (i.e. being 
bribed or otherwise persuaded not to press charges) were apparently commonplace and need not 
always be taken at face value; Caecilius may genuinely have quarrelled with Verres but was in 
difficulties because of his former association with him.  
35 Divinatio was the name of the procedure for challenging another’s right to prosecute. The name 
suggests that originally the choice was made by appealing to divination, but in Cicero’s time it is 
clear that the decision was made by the jury empanelled for the case, after speeches had been heard 
on both sides; the challenger (in this case Cicero) spoke first. 
36 The juries were much smaller than at Athens: it is thought that the juries for Republican trials 
usually numbered between 30 and 50. It can still be argued that the Republican orator spoke not 
only to the jury but also to the numerous others present in and around the usually open-air court, and 
hence that a certain element of crowd control was still important. On Roman oratorical delivery in 
general see J. Hall, ‘Oratorical delivery and the emotions: theory and practice’ in Blackwell 
companion to Roman rhetoric, ed. W. Dominik and J. Hall (Oxford and Malden MA 2007). 
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(which is not in fact securely founded in the evidence)37 that it was never delivered but 
only circulated in writing. But for all that, it can still be treated as a text for performance, 
in which (as this analysis reveals) the phrasing itself often suggests a particular manner of 
delivery.  
 Our next chapter moves to the period of the Second Sophistic. The oratorical texts that 
survive from this period mainly belong to the genre of epideictic, i.e. display oratory for 
particular occasions. It has generally been assumed that the development of Roman law 
entailed that oratorical expertise became gradually less relevant in the courts; this 
assumption is often combined with the beliefs that Greek oratory went into decline after 
the end of democracy, and Roman after the end of the Republic. Thus it is easily taken for 
granted that this was a period in which both forensic and political oratory underwent 
eclipse, leaving only epideictic as an arena for the ‘sophists’ of the time to display their 
rhetorical prowess. That this picture is misleading is strongly suggested by Karambelas in 
his chapter. Drawing initially on an unexpected source of evidence – Artemidoros’ treatise 
on the interpretation of dreams – Karambelas argues for the continued importance of 
synēgoroi on the forensic platforms of Greek cities under the Roman Empire. The term 
now referred to advocates in Roman or local courts, who could be paid for their services 
after Claudius’ reform of the law on this point. Just as in earlier ages, there was a 
hierarchy of expertise in oratorical practice, and Karambelas’ chapter also performs the 
useful service of disentangling the terminology applied to oratorical practitioners of 
various kinds in this period. Advocacy in the courts, as it emerges, was just one of a 
number of functions that could be performed by a qualified orator; on the other hand, an 
expert orator might be at pains to distinguish himself from lower-level forensic 
practitioners, as Cicero had attempted to do. Those who have written histories of rhetoric 
and oratory have tended to take at face value the complaints of authors such as Tacitus (in 
the Dialogus) that by the end of the first century AD there were no more real orators, only 
hack legal practitioners or academic rhetoricians. But there is a mounting body of 
evidence to show that this was not necessarily the case either for Rome itself or for the 
Greek East;38 and the material discussed in this chapter indicates clearly that the active, 
quasi-professional synēgoroi of the second century were clearly neither low-grade 
lawyers, nor were they just a memory of the distant past. Their prominence and active 
engagement in contemporary society is reflected in their representation as ‘healers’ of the 
civic nosos.  
 It is probably safe to say that by this time, nobody became an orator without having 
attended a rhetorical school. The story of the rise of rhetorical education in the first two 
centuries of the Roman Empire is too familiar to bear repetition here. A new word for the 
graduates of the schools, or rather a new sense for an old word, makes itself known by the 
fourth century, when for example the Theodosian Code (8.10.2, quoting a constitution of 
Constantius in 344 AD) refers to scholastici who receive excessive honoraria for pleading 
in court. Evidently, these scholastici are advocates, qualified by their rhetorical training to 
37 We await publication of K. Tempest and J. Powell, ‘Who says the Verrines weren’t delivered?’, a 
paper delivered at the Cicero Awayday held at University College London on 30 May 2012.  
38 See especially Crook, Legal advocacy (n.30, above) drawing on both traditional Roman material 
and the evidence of the Egyptian court records on papyrus. 
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undertake the role; and as late as the sixth century, we find a little-known group of 
anonymous short stories about the fictional (or at least embroidered) exploits of one such 
scholasticus, by name Honorius. Although oratory itself (in the accepted sense of the 
delivery of continuous speeches) plays little direct role in the stories, Honorius is referred 
to as bonus orator and he lives up to the best traditions of the profession in his ability to 
persuade and influence a court or the general public, although by frankly unorthodox 
means. He is imagined as a well-known figure who appears as advocate, as judge, and as a 
bystander who is called upon to intervene to prevent a lynching; his propensity for coming 
to the rescue in difficult situations directly recalls the metaphorical ‘healing’ capacity of 
the synēgoroi of four hundred years before (see p. 12 above). One of his exploits is an 
adaptation of an anecdote about Anaximenes of Lampsacus, one of the founding fathers of 
ancient rhetoric, though separated from his time by nearly a thousand years; another is a 
version of a widely diffused Oriental folktale; yet another recalls a celebrated case of the 
Augustan advocate Asinius Pollio (better known to modern classicists as a historian and 
patron of Virgil), while the remaining two, less easy to parallel, raise questions about 
crowd psychology and the examination of material evidence. Powell’s discussion of these 
stories resists easy evolutionary narratives, and emphasises rather the continuity of ancient 
attitudes and their implications for the orator’s profession and performance both ancient 
and modern. 
Our five chapters by professional classical scholars, then, survey the competences of 
several related types of oratorical performer: the Athenian citizen-orator in the assembly 
and the courts, the Republican Roman patronus, the synēgoros of the Greek-speaking 
empire, and the late Roman scholasticus. In our introduction we have pointed to some 
continuities and some differences among all of these. The enquiry can be extended 
further, into the modern world. We should beware of the facile opposition of ancient and 
modern: again, there are continuities (or at least similarities) and there are differences, and 
it is not within the scope of the present volume to explore these systematically. However, 
we feel it appropriate to include a foretaste of the lines that such an enquiry might take. 
Although classical scholars have sometimes talked about oratory as a profession in the 
ancient world (despite the problems that lurk around the use of that word), it is uncommon 
to hear anybody nowadays described professionally as an ‘orator’. Instead, oratory is 
viewed as a natural gift or skill that may or may not be present in (for example) a 
professional politician, lawyer or lecturer; it is an optional rather than a core subject. Good 
speakers, we incline to believe, are born, not made; there is no exact modern parallel to 
the role of the rhetorical schools in the Roman Empire as the essential preparation for any 
public career. Yet in these days there is an increasing public interest in the arts of 
communication. The styles of rhetoric employed by politicians are debated vigorously in 
newspapers and on the internet. The art of the speechwriter (comparable with that of the 
ancient logographer) flourishes. University lecturers are now given training in how to 
lecture – though, it has to be said, not always very good training. And students are now 
more inclined than they used to be to take courses that explicitly develop oral presentation 
skills in preparation for a wide variety of careers. Anyone who has studied ancient 
rhetoric and oratory has a decided head start in this area. 
Even in what is now the relatively clinical world of the law, there is still a place for the 
‘alchemy of persuasion’ as our final contributor calls it.  Lord Justice Laws, a judge of the 
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British Court of Appeal, kindly agreed to address our November 2010 colloquium on 
oratorical delivery, and his lecture ‘The rhetoric of the common law’, which touches in 
equal measure on issues of professionalism and of performance, is here printed (with 
editorial changes kept to a minimum) as our sixth and last chapter. Not only does the 
chapter make a strong case for the continuing relevance of the rhetorical discipline in the 
world of the law – despite the differences in the system – but it also provides an example 
in written form of those powers of clear speech and persuasiveness which have 
distinguished the good speaker in all periods of history. 
 
 
L.R. 
J.G.F.P. 
C.K. 
October 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HYPOKRITĒS IN ACTION:  
DELIVERY IN GREEK RHETORIC 
 
MIKE EDWARDS 
 
It is not an easy task to find new things to write on the topic of delivery in Greek rhetoric, 
for two reasons in particular. First, because our evidence for what was apparently a key 
element of rhetorical training is meagre; and secondly because what evidence there is has 
been pored over again and again, recently, for example, by Victor Bers in his excellent book 
Genos dikanikon.1 But I think there is more to be said, and I offer what follows as a small 
contribution to the subject. I am going to start with the theory of delivery in Greek rhetoric, 
but this will inevitably be brief since the surviving theoretical material is preponderantly 
Romano-centric. I shall then concentrate on two aspects of delivery for which the texts of 
the Attic orators themselves seem to me to provide the evidence. 
There is, then, very little discussion of delivery that survives from the Athenian 
classical period. Nothing in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and only a few unsatisfactory 
chapters in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (3.1.3-10), as well as a few other brief pointers such as a 
reference to speakers shouting at Rhetoric 3.7.5. Hellenistic treatises are lost, yet in 
developed rhetorical theory, which begins for us in the early first century BC with the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, the training of an orator had five parts: invention, arrangement, 
style, memory, and delivery.2 Observe that delivery comes last, and this is the order also 
espoused by Cicero and Quintilian, who deals with memory in Book 11.2 and delivery in 
Book 11.3. Whether this was the order in which the five parts were introduced into rhetorical 
theory is another matter. Aristotle, who I note deals with style before arrangement in Book 3 of the 
Rhetoric, treats delivery very cursorily, commenting twice that no art of delivery had yet been 
composed, though it had been touched on by a few authors, including Thrasymachus, and that it was 
of great importance – but also that it was ‘a vulgar matter (φορτικόν) when rightly understood’ 
(Rhetoric 3.1.5); and he does not discuss memory at all. It appears that delivery was first dealt with 
extensively by his pupil Theophrastus in a lost treatise.3 With regard to memory, Harry Caplan, in his 
 
1 V. Bers, Genos dikanikon. Amateur and professional speech in the courtrooms of classical Athens 
(Cambridge MA 2009). 
2 Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.2.3: oportet igitur esse in oratore inventionem, dispositionem, 
elocutionem, memoriam, pronuntiationem ... pronuntiatio est vocis, vultus, gestus moderatio cum 
venustate (‘The speaker, then, should possess the faculties of Invention, Arrangement, Style, 
Memory, and Delivery ... Delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture’). 
Trans. H. Caplan, [Cicero] Ad Herennium (Cambridge MA and London 1954). Cf. Cicero, De inventione 
1.9, De oratore 1.31.142; Quintilian 1.22. On delivery see also Diog. Laert. 5.48 (Theophrastus). On 
mnemonics see Cic. De or. 2.351-54; Quint. 11.2.11-16. 
3 See W. W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Theophrastus on delivery’, Rutgers University Studies 2 (1985) 269-88. 
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note in the Loeb on the Ad Herennium passage, remarks that Theophrastus was the first to treat 
delivery and ‘when precisely in the Hellenistic period Memory was added as a fifth division by the 
Rhodian or the Pergamene school, we do not know’. Likewise, Thomas Cole contends that ‘delivery 
and memory [note the order] are two standard parts of the later rhetorical treatise which could not have 
been discussed except through analysis and precepts; but they are, significantly, almost completely 
ignored by early writers. Only Thrasymachus treated the latter [sic] ... Memory, aside from a few lines 
in the Twofold Arguments (9.1-6), is not certainly attested as a topic until the Hellenistic period’.4 
Again, Thomas Olbricht entitles his survey in Porter’s Handbook ‘Delivery and Memory’, noting 
that he ‘will follow the now traditional order’.5 Given the Aristotelian evidence, delivery/memory 
may be the correct temporal order, but note that, as Olbricht himself relates, the invention of 
mnemonics was attributed by both Cicero and Quintilian to Simonides of Ceos, whose floruit in the 
late sixth/early fifth century is considerably earlier than that of Thrasymachus of Chalcedon in the late 
fifth century, the only one of those Aristotle says tried to say something about delivery before him 
whom he actually names. So why does Aristotle ignore mnemonics? The first of the few lines from 
the Dissoi Logoi that are dismissed by Cole run as follows (Dissoi Logoi 9.1): 
 
μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὕρηται ἐς τὸν βίον μνάμα καὶ ἐς πάντα 
χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν. 
 
The greatest and finest discovery that has been made for our lives is memory; it is 
useful for everything, for intellectual pursuits (philosophia) and for wisdom (sophia). 
(trans. Gagarin and Woodruff)6 
 
This anonymous treatise was probably written around 400, and I would suggest that philosophia 
here very much includes rhetoric, as with the philosophia of Isocrates. But regardless of that, I should 
have thought that the mos maiorum evidenced by the Ad Herennium ought to be good enough for 
modern commentators: regardless of the date of introduction, delivery was the fifth part of rhetoric, 
and that is indeed where it should logically be treated. 
But because of the lack of evidence, it is with practical oratory that I am mainly concerned here. 
Theory about delivery was mainly concerned with two things, voice and gesture. I am going to look at 
two discussions which have previously covered these topics, and which do not feature in Bers’ 
bibliography: for voice, Edith Hall’s article in BICS 1995 on ‘Lawcourt dramas’;7 and for gesture, 
Alan Boegehold’s 1999 book, where he deals with oratory in chapter 7.8 I propose to take some of 
the themes Hall and Boegehold discuss where, for me, they may not quite have got the whole picture, 
and to suggest how study of certain rhetorical figures employed in surviving speeches might 
indeed enhance their accounts. 
Edith Hall, with her great expertise in Greek drama, adduces numerous parallels between the 
stage and the lawcourt, including their setting, various aspects of performance, and the subject-matter 
itself. The very term for delivery in Greek, hypokrisis, is of course the same as that used for acting, 
 
4 T. Cole, The origins of rhetoric in ancient Greece (Baltimore 1991) 88. 
5 T. H. Olbricht, ‘Delivery and memory’, in Handbook of classical rhetoric in the Hellenistic period 
330 B.C.-A.D. 400, ed. S. E. Porter (Leiden 1997) 159-67. 
6 M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, Early Greek political thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge 1995). 
7 E. Hall, ‘Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic oratory’, BICS 40 (1995) 39-58. 
8 A. L. Boegehold, When a gesture was expected (Princeton 1999). 
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and there is no doubt that many a deliverer of speeches, hypokritēs, was acting both in the 
sense of putting on a performance and with respect to the veracity of the material he was 
performing. Hall makes a very persuasive case, but one which is perhaps a shade overdone: 
in all this entertainment we may lose sight at times of the harsh reality of the courtroom in 
comparison with the mimesis of the theatre. 
Thus, Hall begins her section on ‘Delivery’ with the well-known anecdote about Demosthenes, 
that when asked what the most important things in oratory were, he replied ‘delivery, delivery, 
delivery’.9 Whatever the truth about this story and others concerning his stance and vocal 
training – fastening a dagger to the ceiling of his cave study to stop a twitch in his shoulder 
and standing in front of a full-length mirror to iron out his faults; shouting above the waves 
at Phalerum and putting pebbles in his mouth to cure a lisp like that of Alcibiades which 
produced lambda instead of rho – it is clear that at the end of the day when, Pytheas gibed, 
his lamp was still burning, Demosthenes was no ordinary speaker.10 Likewise his bitter 
rival Aeschines, the tritagonist as Demosthenes styles him, who learned in his youth from 
his prostitute priestess of a mother how to howl (ὀλολύζειν) at the top of his voice, but 
whose voice, in reality, was evidently far superior.11 But were all speakers on the bema and 
more especially in the dikasteria expected to perform like Demosthenes and Aeschines? 
Hyperides, for one, did not, at least according to the same, admittedly questionable source 
Pseudo-Plutarch (850a): 
 
λέγεται δ’ ἄνευ ὑποκρίσεως δημηγορῆσαι καὶ μόνον διηγεῖσθαι τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ 
τούτοις οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖν τοὺς δικαστάς. 
 
It is said that in addressing the public he did not employ the actor’s art (ἄνευ 
ὑποκρίσεως), that he merely related the facts of the case and did not bore the jurors 
even with these. (trans. Fowler)12 
 
Hyperides, we should remember, was ranked by the ancients behind only Demosthenes; 
indeed, again according to Pseudo-Plutarch (849d), ‘he is said to have excelled all in 
addressing the people; and by some critics he is ranked above Demosthenes’. I should point 
out, too, that this is the same Hyperides who, on defending his courtesan lover Phryne, 
allegedly employed the ultimate act of pathetic persuasion when the trial was going against 
her, of getting her to bare her breasts to the jurors while weeping piteously himself 
(Pseudo-Plutarch 849e; Athen. 13.590c). But what about the ordinary Athenian who found 
himself faced with the daunting prospect of defending himself before a jury of five hundred 
fellow-citizens? I emphasize the adjective ‘ordinary’, for while it is generally assumed that 
the speeches we have were written by expensive logographers for wealthy clients, not all 
litigants were wealthy and indeed not all of the ones we meet necessarily fall into that 
category. One obvious, well-known conundrum is how the blunt farmer Euphiletus of 
Lysias’ speech 1 could have afforded Lysias’ fees. It may well be that he was not in fact as poor 
 
9 Cic. Brutus 142, Orator 56; Philodemus, περὶ ῥητορικῆς 1.196.3 Sudhaus; [Plut.] Mor. 845b. The 
sources in fact say that he answered ‘delivery’ to three successive questions. 
10 Demosthenes’ training: [Plut.] 844e-f; Plut. Dem. 11.1 (8.4 for Pytheas). 
11 Aeschines’ howling: Dem. 18.259. 
12 H. N. Fowler, Plutarch’s Moralia vol. X (Cambridge MA and London 1936). 
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as he makes out – he has a house in Athens which he calls an oikidion (1.9), ‘a little house’, but 
it does have two floors; and he may also have had a place in the country (though that could have 
been more like a shed) – but the point is that he wants the jurors to believe he is an ordinary 
Athenian like them.13 Another example is the speaker’s opponent in Isaeus 4. The rival claimant to 
the estate of Nicostratus was a mercenary soldier called Chariades, whose character the speaker 
blackens by a classic piece of diabolē (4.28-29): 
 
ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον τούτους προσήκει κατὰ δόσιν τῶν χρημάτων τῶν Νικοστράτου 
ἢ Χαριάδην ἀμφισβητεῖν. οὗτος γάρ, ὅτ’ ἐπεδήμει ἐνθάδε, πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸ 
δεσμωτήριον ὡς κλέπτης ὢν ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ ἀπήχθη, τότε δὲ ἀφεθεὶς μεθ’ ἑτέρων 
τινῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἕνδεκα, οὓς δημοσίᾳ ἅπαντας ὑμεῖς ἀπεκτείνατε, πάλιν ἀπογραφεὶς 
εἰς τὴν βουλὴν κακουργῶν, ὑποχωρῶν ᾤχετο καὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου 
ἑπτακαίδεκα ἐτῶν Ἀθήναζε οὐκ ἀφίκετο, πλὴν ἐπειδὴ Νικόστρατος ἀπέθανε. καὶ 
ὑπὲρ μὲν ὑμῶν οὔτε στρατείαν οὐδεμίαν ἐστράτευται οὔτε εἰσφορὰν οὐδεμίαν 
εἰσενήνοχε, πλὴν εἴ τι ἄρα ἐξ ὅτου τῶν Νικοστράτου ἠμφισβήτησεν, οὔτ’ ἄλλ’ 
οὐδὲν ὑμῖν λελῃτούργηκεν. ἔπειτα τοιοῦτος ὢν οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων 
δίκην δώσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀμφισβητεῖ. 
 
So they could far more fittingly claim Nicostratus’ money as a bequest than could 
Chariades. He, when he lived here, was first of all arrested in the act as a thief and 
led off to prison, then released with some others by the Eleven, all of whom you 
publicly condemned to death; and when he was again denounced to the Council as 
a common criminal (kakourgos), he absconded and failed to appear. He didn’t 
return to Athens for seventeen years after that, until Nicostratus died. He has never 
served in the army on your behalf or paid any war-tax, except perhaps since he 
claimed Nicostratus’ property, nor has he performed any other public service for 
you. And then, such as he is, he is not content to avoid punishment for his crimes, 
but he actually claims other people’s property! (trans. Edwards)14 
 
Again, whatever exaggeration there may be in the rhetoric here, the speaker wants the jurors 
to believe Chariades is a lowlife trying to get his hands on somebody else’s inheritance. Did 
Lysias offer Euphiletus training in delivery as well as a speech to deliver? What help did 
Chariades receive from his logographer? I am not suggesting, of course, that there is any 
simple antithesis between ‘wealthy = skilled hypokritēs’ and ‘ordinary = unskilled 
hypokritēs’. For every Andocides, who was clearly a natural performer as well as being 
stinking rich, there were doubtless hundreds of less well-off members of the hoi polloi who, 
when they found themselves in court, had the ability to pull the wool over the eyes of the 
jurors. Further, there was a distinction, especially as the fourth century progressed, between 
the professional speaker (rhētor) and the rest; but this was primarily in the political sphere, 
and the trials involving Demosthenes and Aeschines were themselves major political events. 
But what I would suggest is that much of the performance aspect that we hear about in 
connection with prominent politicians, and which forms the core of Hall’s evidence base, 
 
13 Again, the social composition of Athenian juries is impossible to determine, even I think when they 
consisted of the ephetai, as here. On Euphiletus’ wealth see S. C. Todd, A commentary on Lysias speeches 1-11 
(Oxford 2007) 58-60. See in general Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.1, above) 10ff. 
14 M. J. Edwards, Isaeus (Texas 2007). 
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was achieved for the ordinary, unpractised litigant by the logographer’s skill at ethopoiia: the 
speech itself, in other words, with all those asides that give the impression of spontaneity, did 
most of the work of creating the requisite persona for the speaker. If he could act convincingly as 
well, so much the better. To that extent Aristotle’s greater emphasis on ‘what to speak’ than ‘how 
to speak’, which is noted critically by Hall,15 was indeed the right approach for the bulk of 
ordinary litigants. 
Most of these litigants were Athenian citizens. Hall notes the prejudice that existed ‘against 
those who spoke with a barbarian or non-Attic accent ... this is expressed especially in cases where 
the defendant has been accused of not being a full-blooded Athenian citizen’;16 and she refers to 
the example of Euxitheus in Demosthenes 57, who appeals against the decision of his deme to deny 
him citizenship and reduce him to the status of a metic. His opponent in court, the demarch 
Eubulides, had claimed that Euxitheus’ father spoke with a foreign accent (ὡς ἐξένιζεν, 57.18), 
and he is forced to reply to this slur.17 But the defendant of Antiphon 5, who by coincidence is 
usually thought also to have been called Euxitheus, unquestionably did speak with a non-Attic 
accent, since he was a Mytilenean from Aeolic Lesbos. In the aftermath of the Mytilenean revolt of 
428/7 a Mytilenean defendant in a popular court in Athens cannot have been competing on a level 
playing field with an Athenian. So did this Euxitheus have no chance of success in an Athenian court 
simply because of his nationality? However Antiphon may have trained him, I do not see that he 
can have disguised his accent any more than he could his background, and what kind of 
performance will the jurors have expected from him? Would they not have thought more consciously 
than normal that, if he gave a good one, this really was a performance? This is also a good case to 
use as possible evidence for a defendant in court having some kind of text as an aide-memoire – I 
still find it hard to believe that Euxitheus, after being arrested for murder, transported to a foreign city 
and thrown into prison, then being given a long speech to memorize that repeatedly argued on the 
basis of intricate aspects of Athenian law that he was being tried in the wrong court, can 
possibly have had the sangfroid to deliver the speech entirely from memory. We should 
recall, as does Bers,18 the fragment of Euripides describing the effects of fear on a man 
accused of homicide, and the comic version of Labes the dog in the Wasps being unable to 
bark in his own defence.19 The source usually cited as evidence for speaking without a text 
is Alcidamas, who in his On Those Who Write Speeches or On Sophists expresses the 
well-known opinion that ‘public speakers and litigants in court and those engaged in 
private discussions must necessarily speak extemporaneously’.20 But we should remember 
that Alcidamas is primarily thinking about professionals, as when he adds that ‘people who 
 
15 Hall, ‘Lawcourt dramas’ (n.7, above) 41. 
16 Hall, ‘Lawcourt dramas’ (n.7, above) 48. 
17 See further Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.1, above) 46-50. 
18 Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.1, above) 60-61. 
19 Euripides frg. 88 Kannicht: ‘when someone comes to speak at his trial for homicide, fear stuns his 
tongue and mind and keeps him from saying what he wants. For the one man [the defendant] there is 
danger, while the other [the prosecutor] is invulnerable. After all, I must elude this trial, since I see 
my life is the prize’ (trans. Bers); cf. Ar. Wasps 944-48. 
20 Alcidamas, On those who write speeches or On sophists 9: λέγειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραυτίκα καὶ 
δημηγοροῦσι καὶ δικαζομένοις καὶ τὰς ἰδίας ὁμιλίας ποιοῦσιν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι. (trans. Gagarin and 
Woodruff) 
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write speeches for the lawcourts avoid great precision of expression and imitate instead the 
style of extemporaneous speakers; and their writing appears finest when they produce 
speeches least like those that are written’.21 He also has an agenda – he opens the essay with 
a thinly veiled attack on Isocrates, who was a notoriously poor speaker: ‘Some of those who 
are called sophists are not concerned with inquiry or general education, and they are just as 
inexperienced in the practice of speaking as ordinary men’.22 So even he admits a few lines 
later: ‘Now, to speak appropriately, on the spot, on whatever topic is proposed, to be quick 
with an argument and ready with the right word, and to find just the right speech to match 
the current situation (kairos) and people’s desires – all this is not within the natural ability of 
everyone nor the result of whatever education one happens to have had’.23 We must always 
bear in mind the possibility that Euxitheus’ actual speech bore only a passing resemblance to 
the edited version that we call Antiphon 5: perhaps, rather like Cicero’s Pro Milone, the 
speech as preserved is the one that the speaker (in this case the young, doubtless frightened 
defendant himself rather than an experienced but nevertheless unnerved advocate) would 
have given if he had not been suffering from stage fright. But equally, perhaps he did say 
roughly what we have, with the aid of some kind of text, and in a Mytilenean accent; and 
even with success? Of course, the outcome of the trial is unknown, and we have no idea 
whether Euxitheus indeed won any votes at all. But were Athenian juries always prejudiced 
against foreign defendants? Even in the dedicated metics’ court, presided over by the 
polemarch? Antiphon 5 is unique in the preserved corpus in concerning a crime committed 
abroad, but in the heady days of the Athenian empire trials involving non-citizens cannot 
have been at all unusual. Thucydides indicates the contrary, and the historian has the 
Athenian speakers at Sparta claim that the Athenian courts were impartial (1.77.1): 
 
καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ’ 
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. 
 
For example, in law-suits with our allies arising out of contracts we have put 
ourselves at a disadvantage, and when we arrange to have such cases tried by 
impartial courts in Athens, people merely say that we are overfond of going to law. 
(trans. Warner)24 
 
He would, of course. But with Thucydides as my guide I have some amount of confidence, 
even if it is naive and misplaced, that a non-Athenian with a strange accent will not 
inevitably have lost a trial in Athens against a citizen; and it then seems to me that his 
 
21 Alcidamas, id. 13: οἱ γὰρ εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια τοὺς λόγους γράφοντες φεύγουσι τὰς ἀκριβείας καὶ 
μιμοῦνται τὰς τῶν αὐτοσχεδιαζόντων ἑρμηνείας, καὶ τότε κάλλιστα γράφειν δοκοῦσιν, ὅταν ἥκιστα 
γεγραμμένοις ὁμοίους πορίσωνται λόγους. 
22 Alcidamas, id. 1: ἐπειδή τινες τῶν καλουμένων σοφιστῶν ἱστορίας μὲν καὶ παιδείας ἠμελήκασι καὶ 
τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀπείρως ἔχουσι ... 
23 Alcidamas, id. 3: εἰπεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παραυτίκα περὶ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ἐπιεικῶς, καὶ ταχείᾳ 
χρήσασθαι τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐπορίᾳ καὶ τῷ καιρῷ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταῖς 
ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐστόχως ἀκολουθῆσασι καὶ τὸν προσήκοντα λόγον εἰπεῖν, οὔτε φύσεως 
ἁπάσης οὔτε παιδείας τῆς τυχούσης ἐστίν. 
24 R. Warner trans., Thucydides (Harmondsworth 1954). 
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performance, like that of any ordinary citizen, cannot in the sense discussed by handbooks 
and scholars have been the overriding factor in his victory. 
I suggest, therefore, that there is sometimes a tension between the theory and practice of public 
speaking. I am sure George Kennedy was right to declare that ‘probably no one would learn how to 
speak in the first instance from reading Aristotle, but any speaker might well profit from much of his 
advice’.25 An area where I feel a strong tension is in the training of the orator by use of poetry, on 
which the standard article is by North.26 Hall emphasizes the importance of poetry in this training and 
observes that ‘direct quotations from poetry in the extant corpus of speeches are therefore 
surprisingly infrequent’.27 As I have argued elsewhere, ‘infrequent’ is in fact an understatement, 
with six of the ten members of the canon not quoting from poetry at all in their extant speeches.28 
It makes one wonder. 
I suggested earlier that study of certain rhetorical figures might enhance the accounts of 
Hall and Boegehold. Hall’s missed opportunity for me is the use of the figure 
prosopopoeia, which Stephen Usher defines as ‘representation of absent or dead person(s) 
as interested observers of the present scene, or imagination of future scenes’.29 I would 
add that it also includes representation of inanimate objects, such as one’s country or the 
laws, the best known example of which is not in the orators, but Plato (Crito 50a ff.). 
Possibly the most famous prosopopoeia of all – or rather prosopopoeiae – is Cicero 
pretending to be Appius Claudius Caecus and then Clodius in the Pro Caelio, which was 
admired by Quintilian.30 Cicero, of course, had been trained by the comic actor Roscius 
and the tragic actor Aesopus.31 Now Aeschines was an actor, while Demosthenes was 
supposedly trained by Satyrus – Satyrus becomes Andronicus in Pseudo-Plutarch’s 
version,32 who also relates that Demosthenes paid ‘Neoptolemus the actor ten thousand 
drachmas to teach him to speak whole paragraphs without taking breath’ (844f). Aeschines 
uses prosopopoeia, or strictly speaking an eidolopoeia, when the absent person referred to 
is dead, in his prosecution of Demosthenes (3.259): 
 
Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τελευτήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ 
αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων οὐκ οἴεσθε στενάξειν, εἰ ὁ μετὰ τῶν 
βαρβάρων ὁμολογῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀντιπράττειν στεφανωθήσεται; 
 
 
25 G. A. Kennedy, The art of persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 123. 
26 H. North, ‘The use of poetry in the training of the ancient orator’, Traditio 8 (1952) 1-33. 
27 Hall, ‘Lawcourt dramas’ (n.7, above) 45. 
28 See M. J. Edwards, ‘Rhetoric and technique in the Attic Orators and Aristotle’s techne rhetorike’, in 
Inspiration and technique. Ancient to modern views on beauty and art, ed. J. Roe and M. Stanco (Oxford 
2007) 35-47. 
29 S. Usher, Greek oratory. Tradition and originality (Oxford 1999) 368. 
30 Cicero, Pro Caelio 33ff.; cf. Quint. 3.8.54, 12.10.61. 
31 Plut. Cic. 5. 
32 Plut. Dem. 7; [Plut.] 845a-b. 
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Don’t you think Themistocles and the men who died at Marathon and Plataea and 
the very graves of our ancestors will groan aloud, if a man who admits to plotting 
with the barbarians against the Greeks receives a crown? (trans. Carey)33 
 
Demosthenes has a striking prosopopoeia in his very first speech, the prosecution of his 
former guardian Aphobus (27.69): 
 
μέγα δ’ ἂν οἶμαι στενάξαι τὸν πατέρ’ ἡμῶν, εἰ αἴσθοιτο τῶν προικῶν καὶ τῶν 
δωρειῶν, ὧν αὐτὸς τούτοις ἔδωκεν, ὑπὲρ τούτων τῆς ἐπωβελίας τὸν αὑτοῦ υἱὸν ἐμὲ 
κινδυνεύοντα ... 
 
Loudly methinks, would my father groan, should he learn that I, his son, am in 
danger of being forced to pay the sixth part of the marriage-portions and legacies 
given by himself to these men... (trans. Murray)34 
 
There are other examples in Demosthenes (19.66; 20.55, 87; 39.31), including the famous 
scene in the De Corona of the description of the fall of Elateia (18.170): 
 
ἠρώτα μὲν ὁ κῆρυξ “τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται;” παρῄει δ’ οὐδείς. πολλάκις δὲ τοῦ 
κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνίστατ’ οὐδείς, ἁπάντων μὲν τῶν στρατηγῶν 
παρόντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, καλούσης δὲ τῆς κοινῆς τῆς πατρίδος φωνῆς 
τὸν ἐροῦνθ’ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας. 
 
The herald asked: “Who wishes to speak?” And no one came forward. The herald 
asked the question many times, but still not a man got up, though all the generals 
and all the regular speakers were present, and their country was crying out in her 
collective voice for a man who would speak to save her. (trans. Usher)35 
 
But the figure of prosopopoeia had been part of oratory as far back as one of the earliest 
speeches that have come down to us, Antiphon’s Against the stepmother,36 and it was 
especially employed, as Usher points out,37 towards the end of speeches in their epilogues, 
as in the Aeschines and first Demosthenes passages above. In Antiphon 1 the speaker ends 
his prosecution of the stepmother for homicide on a grave note with the image of the gods 
watching the outcome; and Lysias ends his prosecution of the tyrant Eratosthenes with the 
dead (12.100): 
 
οἶμαι δ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν τε ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς εἴσεσθαι τὴν ψῆφον φέροντας, 
ἡγουμένους, ὅσοι μὲν ἂν τούτων ἀποψηφίσησθε, αὐτῶν θάνατον κατεψηφισμένους 
ἔσεσθαι, ὅσοι δ’ ἂν παρὰ τούτων δίκην λάβωσιν, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τιμωρίας 
πεποιημένους. 
 
 
33 C. Carey trans., Aeschines (Texas 2000). 
34 A. T. Murray trans., Demosthenes IV. Private orations XXVII-XL (Cambridge MA and London 1936). 
35 S. Usher, Demosthenes. On the crown (Warminster 1993). 
36 Ant. 1.31. 
37 Usher, Greek oratory (n.29, above) 30. 
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I imagine them listening to us and that they will take cognisance of the verdict you 
give. They will consider that those of you who vote to acquit these men will have 
confirmed their own condemnation to death, but that those who exact justice from 
them have taken vengeance on their behalf. (trans. Usher)38 
 
Other examples may be found in Isocrates, Lycurgus, and the allegedly non-acting 
Hyperides.39 Again, many of these examples are from leading politicians, and I would 
suggest that experienced speakers would very much act the part, whereas less experienced 
litigants might speak the words with less acting but nevertheless with some effect. 
Let us turn now to Alan Boegehold, who in general terms is surely right to urge that an 
awareness of nonverbal communication, i.e. gestures such as a nod of the head or wave of 
the hand, is crucial to a full understanding of Greek poetry and prose. Quintilian had the 
theory of gesture off to a fine art,40 with advice on how to move the head, face, neck, 
shoulders, arms, hands, body, and feet; for example (11.3.79): 
 
vitium in superciliis si aut inmota sunt omnino aut nimium mobilia ... 
 
It is a fault of the eyebrows either to be completely immobile or to be too mobile ... 
(trans. Russell)41 
 
I cannot believe that the Greeks were less expressive than the Romans. I think, however, 
that Boegehold also goes a little too far at times with his thesis, particularly when discussing 
an unfinished conditional sentence in the Gortyn law code (IC 4.72.8, ll. 17ff.): 
 
καὶ μέν τίς [κ’ ὀ]πυίει ἐν ταῖς τριάκοντα ἔ κα ϝείποντι. αἰ δὲ μ<έ> ... 
 
And if anyone should marry her <it should be> within thirty days from the time 
they made the proclamation, but if not <...> (trans. Willetts)42 
 
Boegehold suggests that the words in the square brackets should be <GESTURE = well 
and good>, and then ties himself up in knots trying to explain how this ‘elliptical phrase, 
characteristic of the language as spoken, [found] its way into the published version of the 
Law Code of Gortyn’:43 some of the locals needed a literate reader or interpreter, who 
would gesticulate as they read. I would suggest that probably most, not some, of the locals 
would have had this need, but what about those who could read it for themselves – did 
they need to gesticulate at certain points? But Boegehold then goes a further stage back and argues 
that the person who first read the law to the scribe will have made a gesture, and the scribe wrote or 
inscribed the words as he heard them, knowing exactly what was meant. This is now, it seems to me, 
entering the realms of fantasy. With reference to the orators themselves, Boegehold picks out several 
passages which might imply that, in their original performance, a gesture was used to complete the 
 
38 M. J. Edwards and S. Usher, Greek orators I: Antiphon and Lysias (Warminster 1985). 
39 Isoc. 6.110, 19.42-47; Lyc. 1.150; Hyp. 6.39. 
40 Quint. 11.3.65-136. 
41 D. A. Russell trans., Quintilian. The orator’s education V, books 11-12 (Cambridge MA and London 2001). 
42 R. F. Willetts, The law code of Gortyn (Berlin 1967). 
43 Boegehold, Gesture (n.8, above) 91-92. 
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grammatical sense. I have my doubts about most of these, but will pick out one example only. There 
is an anacoluthon at Lysias 24.2, i.e. a sentence where the grammatical structure breaks down: 
 
καίτοι ὅστις τούτοις φθονεῖ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεοῦσι, τίνος ἂν ὑμῖν ὁ τοιοῦτος 
ἀποσχέσθαι δοκεῖ πονηρίας; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρημάτων με συκοφαντεῖ· 
 
Now tell me, what villainy do you think a man would shrink from, who envies those 
whom others pity? If it is for my money that he is slandering me...! (trans. Usher) 
 
In his commentary Usher wrote, following Adams and in line with the dash printed by Hude 
in the OCT,44 that the break here is an example of aposiopesis, that is (in Usher’s definition) 
an ‘abrupt silence in mid-sentence, to signal [a] speaker’s reluctance to talk about an 
inauspicious, unpleasant, or absurd subject’.45 In this particular case the desired effect was 
one of laughter, and Usher argues elsewhere that this parodic use of the figure fits his thesis 
that Lysias 24 is a paignion, or play-piece.46 Boegehold counters ‘but surely Lysias in 
composing the version of his speech that he finally published did not break his text off at 
that point because laughter had drowned out whatever the lame man had wanted to say. The 
break was a clear sign to his client to improvise with a gesture. The lame man for his part 
knew what gesture to make, given the condition expressed. If he did not know how to say 
“This is incredible” with his hands and head, he could be instructed at a rehearsal before the 
trial’.47 Now it is not at all certain that teaching his clients how to act their roles was 
necessarily a part of the logographer’s remit – it may, as Bers suggests, have depended on 
how much the client was able to pay;48 nor do I necessarily agree with Usher that Lysias 24 
was a paignion.49 But Boegehold surely misses the point here that any gesture will have 
supplemented the intended rhetorical effect, not supplanted it. 
The rhetorical trick I think Boegehold misses is that of apostrophe, in Usher’s definition 
‘turning aside to address someone or something other than the audience – usually one’s opponent in 
a hostile way’.50 The use of the pronoun σύ (‘you’) and its other forms is central here – surely that is 
literally the point in the speech when a gesture was to be expected? As in the following classic example 
from the rather less than cordial relationship between Demosthenes and Aeschines (Dem. 
18.199-200): 
 
ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολὺς τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἔγκειται, βούλομαί τι καὶ παράδοξον εἰπεῖν. 
καί μου πρὸς ∆ιὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν θαυμάσῃ, ἀλλὰ μετ’ εὐνοίας ὃ 
λέγω θεωρησάτω. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἅπασι πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντα γενήσεσθαι καὶ 
προῄδεσαν πάντες καὶ σὺ προὔλεγες, Αἰσχίνη, καὶ διεμαρτύρου βοῶν καὶ 
 
44 Edwards and Usher, Greek orators I (n.38, above) 264; C. D. Adams, Lysias. Selected speeches 
(New York 1905); K. Hude, Lysiae orationes (Oxford 1912). C. Carey in the new OCT prints a colon, 
Lysiae orationes (Oxford 2007). 
45 Usher, Greek oratory (n.29, above) 364. 
46 Usher, Greek oratory (n.29, above) 109. 
47 Boegehold, Gesture (n.8, above) 87-88. 
48 Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.1, above) 9-10. 
49 Bers does not, Genos dikanikon (n.1, above) 9. 
50 Usher, Greek oratory (n.29, above) 364. 
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κεκραγώς, ὃς οὐδ’ ἐφθέγξω, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀποστατέον τῇ πόλει τούτων ἦν, εἴπερ ἢ 
δόξης ἢ προγόνων ἢ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος εἶχε λόγον. νῦν μέν γ’ ἀποτυχεῖν δοκεῖ 
τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃ πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὅταν τῷ θεῷ ταῦτα δοκῇ· τότε δ’ 
ἀξιοῦσα προεστάναι τῶν ἄλλων, εἶτ’ ἀποστᾶσα τούτου Φιλίππῳ προδεδωκέναι 
πάντας ἂν ἔσχεν αἰτίαν. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα προεῖτ’ ἀκονιτί, περὶ ὧν οὐδένα κίνδυνον 
ὅντιν’ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν οἱ πρόγονοι, τίς οὐχὶ κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ; μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεως 
γε, μηδ’ ἐμοῦ. 
 
Since he lays so much stress on results, let me venture on a paradox. And by Zeus and the 
gods, if it seems extravagant, let none of you be surprised, but still give friendly 
consideration to what I am saying. Suppose that the future had been revealed to all of us, 
that everyone had known what would happen, and that you (σύ), Aeschines, had predicted 
and protested, shouting and storming – though in fact you never opened your mouth – 
even then the city could not have departed from that policy, if she had any regard for 
honour, or for our ancestors, or for the days that are to come. As it is, we seem to have 
failed, which is the common lot of humanity, whenever God so wills. But then, if Athens, 
after claiming primacy over the others, had run away from her claims, she would have 
been held guilty of betraying everybody to Philip. If, without striking a blow, she had 
abandoned the cause for which our forefathers flinched from no peril, is there a man who 
would not have spat at you (οὐχὶ κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ)? At you, not at Athens, not at 
me. (trans. Usher) 
 
Doubtless the last phrase too, ‘not at me’ (μηδ’ ἐμοῦ), was accompanied by a gesture. 
 At the end of the Rhetoric (3.19.6), Aristotle paraphrases Lysias, the third occasion on which 
Lysias is either quoted (2.23.19) or paraphrased (3.10.7) in the work, though he is never actually 
named. I leave it to the reader’s imagination how Lysias will have performed the immortal words ἀκηκόατε, 
ἑοράκατε, πεπόνθατε, ἔχετε· δικάζετε. 
 
University Of Wales, Trinity St Davids 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERFORMING THE SPEECH 
IN ATHENIAN COURTS AND ASSEMBLY 
ADJUSTING THE ACT TO FIT THE BĒMA? 
 
VICTOR BERS 
 
This paper starts with a call for caution in terminology, and then goes on speculate as to 
the differences between the performance of speeches in court and speeches at political 
meetings.  
My knowledge of the practice, and even more the theory, of dramatic performance is 
nugatory, but I know enough to be certain that it is important to stay alert for differences 
between the theatrical, in the narrow sense of the word, and the human activities theatre 
imitates. Much recent scholarship has, in my view, incautiously assimilated those two 
things. To a degree, the mistake has been falling into the trap of metaphor, a trap 
especially tenacious for the obvious reason that theatre is, one way or another, mimetic of 
humans, or to follow Aristotle’s qualification, not of humans but of humans’ action and 
life (Poetics 1450a16-17). The Athenian courts offered citizens of the right age and 
gender paid employment as dikastai as well as amusement to spectators and, as Stephen 
Usher has shown, to readers.1 The same was true of sessions of the Athenian assembly, 
the ecclesia, and the boule. Beyond that, the outcome of debates in these fora mattered 
very much to people’s lives, and decisions were made very quickly and often in full public 
view. It would be very strange indeed if these events were not, in the ordinary sense of the 
word, ‘dramatic’. For some of the modalities of forensic drama, the now classic work is 
Edith Hall’s 1995 article ‘Lawcourt dramas: acting and performance in legal oratory’, 
which should be consulted in the revised and expanded version in her 2006 book.2 Our 
sources are predominantly speech texts, which together with discursive treatments, 
anecdotes, and parodies allow some informed speculation on the speeches as they were 
actually given. Lying closest to the surface, in a sense, is the matter of how the words of 
what amounts to a considerable collection of texts became acoustic. Sound is a 
phenomenon of many dimensions, and the sounds came from moving bodies on bēmata. 
Sound, physical stance, and movement are constituents of delivery, a word that can do 
 
1 S. Usher, ‘Lysias for pleasure?’ in Law, rhetoric and comedy in classical Athens. Essays in honour 
of Douglas M. MacDowell, ed. D. L. Cairns and R. A. Knox (Swansea 2004) 113-21. 
2 The theatrical cast of Athens: interactions between ancient Greek drama and society (Oxford and 
New York 2006) 353-92. Perhaps relying on an incomplete statement at V. Bers, ‘Dikastic 
thorubos’, in Crux: essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday, ed. P. Cartledge 
and F. D. Harvey (Exeter 1985) 1-15(5) Hall (364) remarks ‘Aristotle’s Rhetoric strangely neglects 
thorubos, although there is a brief account of the demagogue Androcles dealing with it in the 
assembly (2.1400a9-14)’. There are other references at 1356b24 and 1419a16. 
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mischief when we think about ‘performance’. But try to ignore matters of delivery, and 
the ghost of Demosthenes will shout at you: μηδαμῶς, ὦ βέλτιστε· ὑπόκρισις, ὑπόκρισις, 
ὑπόκρισις (‘No, my good fellow! delivery, delivery, delivery!).3 Greek oratory in Athens 
while she was still a democracy could not be pried away from its performance. True, 
Aristotle insists that even when read, not performed, the script of a well-composed 
tragedy will do its work (Poetics 1450b18), but that was Aristotle in one of his rare 
iconoclastic and overly abstract moments. And we might also worry about Isocrates, a 
man who would probably resign the prime ministry rather than face the tumult of PMQs. 
The bulk of his oeuvre was of course ‘performed’ only in a much-etiolated sense of the 
word. Within a century of Isocrates’ death, Hieronymus (fr. 52a.5 Wehrli) declared it 
impossible to deliver an Isocratean oration as a public speech; he uses the verb 
δημηγορῆσαι. And yet Isocrates is useful insofar as his complaints of the rowdiness of 
political meetings give us some idea of the challenges facing a speaker in the ecclesia. 
  Inconveniently for my purpose here, the noun ὑπόκρισις and the corresponding verb is 
often used in unmistakable references to acting per se, that is, in plays performed in the 
literal theatre; but it can also mean ‘delivery’ in the speaker’s own persona. ‘Performing’ 
is, to my mind, a much safer word than ‘drama’. The words ‘dramatic’, ‘histrionic’, and 
‘theatrical’ have more potential for conceptual damage, but even with ‘performance’ we 
must be on guard to avoid homogenizing different tactics and different goals as we move 
among the texts. We can lose our footing as confusions arise between strict denotation and 
those connotations which cause us to slide on metaphors when we hear the ‘glib and oily 
art’, as Cordelia describes rhetoric.4 ‘Impersonation’ should be strictly excluded where 
what we really mean is that a speaker is excited or intense, his language ‘marked’, 
somehow distinct from his own normal speech style. In his very useful article 
‘Demosthenes Actor on the Political and Forensic Stage’, Craig Cooper adduces a remark 
of Eratosthenes, the third-century BC librarian of Alexandria quoted by Plutarch (FGrH 
241 F 32). Eratosthenes speaks of Demosthenes as πολλαχοῦ γεγονέναι παράβακχον, 
which Cooper translates: ‘[He] often …became frenzied or theatrical (parabakhon)’.5 In 
selecting ‘theatrical’ as one of two glosses of παράβακχον, Cooper agrees with LSJ s.v., 
which translates ‘Like a Bacchanal, theatrical’. That is an unjustified move from one 
category to another, perhaps triggered by an implicit reference to the patron deity of 
theatre in Athens, Bacchus (Dionysus), and then to actors in a theatre. Cooper goes on to 
remark: ‘we can well imagine the kinds of gesturing that accompanied the invective 
against Aeschines’ mother, who was nicknamed Empousa because she did it all and 
submitted to it all’.6 The gestures I can imagine as appropriate to the situation are crudely 
imitative, but by no means specifically theatrical.  
3 I adapt Demosthenes’ slogan in its most famous form: Quintilian, Inst. Orat.11.3.6, but see 
C. Cooper, ‘Philosophers, politics, academics’ in Demosthenes: statesman and orator, ed. 
I. Worthington (London and New York 2000) 224-45 (231-32). 
4 William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1. 
5 In C. Cooper ‘Demosthenes actor on the political and forensic stage’ in Oral performance and its 
context, ed. C. J. Mackie (Leiden and Boston 2004) 145-61, (158). 
6 Cooper ‘Demosthenes’ (preceding n.) 158. 
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The problem of terminology is complicated by an attested overlap of professional 
activities, acting, and diplomatic services. The reader will immediately think of the jibes 
Demosthenes throws out to disparage Aeschines, the howling actor, the tritagonistes as he 
calls him (18.129 et alibi). It is true that the Athenian state and Philip II of Macedon gave 
some professional actors diplomatic, we might say para-political, roles,7 but this cannot be 
called general practice, even at Athens. As for Aeschines, Demosthenes is very likely to 
have harped on Aeschines’ acting career as a tactic to disarm his own hard to overcome 
deficiencies in delivery; the famous anecdotes (pebbles on the tongue, shouting into the 
roaring surf, etc.) are likely to have originated in Demosthenes’ difficulty with breath 
control, volume, and loss of composure under stress. To counter, Aeschines makes pious 
remarks about the physical restraint of earlier speakers. His paradigm is the statue of 
Solon, with the great man’s hand decorously concealed under his cloak as he harangued 
the Athenians (1.26); Demosthenes’ retort (19.251-52) consists of claiming that the statue 
was made long after Solon’s death.8 As I see it, we should studiously avoid assuming that 
modification of normal gesture, stance, or even costume were basically aping that which 
happened on the stage. It would be silly to deny that in oratory meant for delivery before a 
large audience – 201 up to 6,000, or possibly more – there were any methods oratory 
shared with stage performance, particularly in vocal technique, but the repertory of the 
one was far from coextensive with the other. We make a serious mistake in 
underestimating what it would take to push away from the audience’s consciousness vast 
differences of meter, music, appearance, and the exploitation of space. Rhetorical 
performance was often mimetic, but only in a specific and very narrow sense: imitative of 
some notions – fluid notions – of how men should present themselves to achieve their 
goals in the fora established by the city for the purpose of judicial or political debate and 
decision making. Aeschines’ sanctimonious, and of course silly, claim (1.25) about how 
men used to talk, with an arm or hand ‘inside’, that is, within the himation, probably 
points to his own style on the bema. Though he says ‘now we all speak with our arm, or 
hand, outside’, I conjecture that Aeschines was especially austere in his physical 
movements to the point of rigidity, making it his practice to avoid flailing with his arm, 
perhaps even holding it within his cloak throughout his time on the bēma, hoping by this 
strategy to distinguish Aeschines the Actor from Aeschines the Orator, and thereby to 
undermine Demosthenes’ and other enemies’ ridicule of his acting career. At the 
dokimasia tōn rhētorōn for which Against Timarchus was written, the ex-actor counsels 
the jury not to imagine that ‘Furies pursue men guilty of impiety, as in the tragedies with 
blazing torches’ (1.190). As I read this, far from bringing his old career into his new one, 
Aeschines is flattering the jurymen, crediting them with the good sense to distinguish real 
and theatrical worlds.  
Now to the larger matter, the comparative performance styles of forensic and political 
speech. Following Aristotle’s own methodological default manoeuvre, we must be sure 
we have made the necessary distinctions; in this case, we need to consider how well 
7 A. Pickard-Cambridge, The dramatic festivals of Athens 2nd edn rev. by J. Gould and D. M. Lewis 
(Oxford 1988) 168, 278ff.  
8 C. Carey in his translation of Aeschines (Austin 2000) 10, suggests Demosthenes ‘also gives us to 
understand that the consummate actor Aeschines mimicked the statue’s posture at this point.’  
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conceived is his own division of rhetoric into three genē, paying especially close attention to 
his positing as separate things a genos dikanikon and a genos symbouleutikon. With the 
exception of Pericles’ epitaphios (see p. 38), I will leave practicalities of the genos 
epideiktikon to one side, although it could sit as easily as the other two in a discussion of 
oratorical performance. I remark only that it is curious that Aristotle, or more properly those 
who put together the work known as Aristotle’s Rhetoric from his lectures, did not point out 
that Isocrates’ compositions – excepting the forensic works – pose the greatest awkwardness 
to the tripartite division.9 Evidently Aristotle was not on good terms with Isocrates, so I 
would expect him or his people to get sarcastic, a tone we note from time to time in the 
Rhetoric. The relevant discussion at Rhetoric begins at 1358a36 with distinctions by 
audience; this turns immediately to distinctions of time relative to the speech event. Policy is 
selected for the future (but note Demosthenes’ jibe in 5.2 that the Athenians, unlike other 
men, deliberate after the fact). Aristotle swerves and wobbles a bit to take in distinctions of 
what we might call agenda: in deliberative speech, the subject matter is what actions the city 
should take, or not take, in the future; in forensic, prosecution, or defence of past actions. 
Some of the time Aristotle is categorical – for instance, the symbouleutic orator ‘does not 
deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place’ (1359a32);10 more 
often he allows for degrees and mixtures, as at 1358b, where he assigns as the telē of the 
three genres, the advantageous in political oratory, the just in forensic, and the beautiful and 
honourable in epideictic. This is the same trio we meet in the Nicomachean Ethics. But 
Aristotle allows for crossovers, such as consideration of the advantageous in a law court 
speech (1358b33). As an example of that mixture in a law court speech, one might think of 
Lysias 1, where the defendant, a supposedly cuckolded husband who killed a man he found 
in bed with his wife, both claims that killing his wife’s lover was just, and that convicting 
him would hand burglars a powerful weapon. If caught in someone’s house stealing a 
cooking pot, a burglar could, by the speaker’s logic, ward off the owner by claiming that he 
was after his wife, not his pot, and leave the premises scot-free. A bit later Aristotle allows 
that ‘deliberative speakers often grant other factors, but would never admit that they are 
advising things that are not advantageous [to the audience] or that they are dissuading [the 
audience] from what is beneficial’ (1358b33-36). Though the Rhetoric as we have it is 
certainly not the complete and authoritative work Aristotle would want it to be, the 
inconsistency of his remarks on delivery could well have risen from his distaste for the 
subject. This holding-of-the-nose is clearly seen in the opening of Book 3 of the Rhetoric 
especially 1403b35-37: οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν [aspects of delivery], ἐπεὶ καὶ 
τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι,καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. (‘A 
treatise on delivery has not yet been written, since consideration of style appeared late on.’) 
Those looking to the Lyceum for a treatment devoted to delivery had to wait for 
Theophrastus to do that job.  
From the standpoint of performance, is it sensible to follow the Aristotelian bipartite 
division: forensic/political? Are these really different rhetorical situations? In a short 
9 See D. Whitehead, ‘Isokrates for hire: some preliminaries to a commentary on Isokrates 16-21’ in 
Law, rhetoric, and comedy, ed. D. L. Cairns and R. A. Knox (Swansea 2004) 151-85 (159).  
10 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Rhetoric are taken from G. A. Kennedy, 
Aristotle: a theory of civic discourse (New York 1991). 
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while I will return to Aristotle himself, but it is prudent to see how some contemporaries, or 
near contemporaries, divide the terrain. First, Plato. At Phaedrus 261a-b Socrates floats the 
notion that everything rhetorical can be condensed into a single art, that of leading the soul, 
using the instrument of logoi, words, speeches, or arguments: τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ 
λόγων (‘the art is working on the soul by using words.’); moreover, this art is at play ‘not 
only in law-courts and all other kinds of public gatherings, but in private ones too’. Socrates’ 
young interlocutor balks: rhetoric, he says, is rather ‘a science of speaking and writing 
perhaps especially employed in lawsuits, though also in δημηγορίαι,’ (261b3-5), addresses 
to the people, normally in the assembly. But Socrates is impatient with these conventional 
distinctions, just as a little earlier in the dialogue (258a) he likens decrees to something like 
love-letters, adducing as a proof the standard prescript, where politicians put first the names 
of their admirers, the Council and the assembly: Ἔδοξέ … ‘τῇ βουλῇ’ ἢ ‘τῷ δήμῳ’ ἢ 
ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ ‘ὃς <καὶ ὃς> εἶπεν’ (‘The council or assembly, or both bodies, resolved, and 
so-and-so spoke’.). In the Sophist (222c) Plato goes further, having the Eleatic Visitor 
consolidate in a single τέχνη of persuasion the forensic, political, and the ‘conversational’ 
(προσομιλητική). Aristotle might have tolerated this manoeuvre in its context, but probably 
not the Visitor’s next move, which is to divide the τέχνη into public and private, since for 
Aristotle rhetoric does not truly apply if there is an audience of just one (1414a11-12). The 
highly practical Alcidamas, proponent of ex tempore speaking, is content with the bipartite 
division. For Isocrates, who wrote forensic speeches but then pretended otherwise (Antidosis 
46; Panegyricus 11-12), the division is between dicanic speech and that part of his own 
oeuvre he acknowledged. Anaximenes, thought to be the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, also has the tripartite division (1.1.1).11 
 Apart from discursive works on rhetoric, the preserved speeches themselves show the 
limited accuracy of Aristotle’s scheme of three genres. The Olympic oration of Lysias 
(Lysias 33), epideictic in its style and supposedly recited at the Olympic games, proposes 
military action against two figures on what today would amount to a global scale, 
Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse, and the Great King of Persia. If we can believe 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who preserves what we have of the speech (Lysias 31-32), the 
speech was meant to encourage an immediate attack on the lavish quarters built for 
Dionysius’ use during the game. The ostensible content, then, is unquestionably political. 
Demosthenes’ court speech against Leptines is a forensic speech with primarily political 
ends. The same is true of Aeschines 1 Against Timarchus and Demosthenes 19 On the 
false embassy. Indeed in Aeschines’ speech the potential connections of genres beyond 
the speech at hand is made explicit: Aeschines asks, ‘Is Demosthenes to get his comrades 
off in your court?… Some of his pupils have come to listen. For I’m told he declares … 
that without your noticing he will shift the ground of debate and your attention; that he 
will bring confidence to the defendant the moment he appears in court and reduce the 
accuser to panic and fear for himself; that he will summon such loud and hostile heckling 
11 The history of the question at hand in that text (and others) has been given an interesting treatment 
by D. Mirhady, ‘Aristotle, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and the tria genera causarum’ in 
Peripatetic rhetoric after Aristotle, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey and London 1994) 54-65.  
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from the jurors by dragging in my political speeches …that I will not even turn up in court 
to defend myself, when I submit to my audit for my service as envoy’ (1. 173-75; trans. 
C. Carey). There might also be distinctions to be drawn between private and public law 
cases (dikai and graphai), though I cannot say I have seen that this corresponds to 
probable differences in performance style. 
 Despite considerable leakage from category to category in the use made of these 
genres, I think that the division is more than an optical illusion reified by the overly 
abstract thinking of fourth-century Athenians. The audiences of the two types, and in 
particular those portions of the audiences which voted, were not identical, only partially 
overlapping. Politics at the highest level was sometimes the game (that term is, of course, 
also a metaphor) in the courts; nevertheless the citizens regarded courts, council, and 
assembly as distinct bodies. Long ago I was persuaded by Mogens Hansen’s argument 
that the Athenians conceived the dēmos and dikastērion as constitutionally distinct 
bodies.12 Venue, number, membership qualifications, and procedure were all different, 
and I think this must have reinforced the theoretical distinctiveness of the bodies. 
In the Rhetoric Aristotle issues a general warning to speakers to avoid a verbal style that 
is not appropriate, πρέπουσα (1404b4). Though Aristotle has not won my complete trust in 
the matter of style (his remarks about the diction of characters of different status seem 
inaccurate),13 we can believe his recommendation that ‘authors should compose without 
being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally. The latter is persuasive, 
the former the opposite; for if artifice is obvious people become resentful, as at someone 
plotting against them, just as they are at those adulterating wines’ (1404b18-22).14 Similarly, 
he warns speakers against falling into meter, for that will divert the listeners’ attention to the 
form and, presumably, endanger the speaker’s credibility (1408b21-26). Anti-rhetorical 
pressure, ‘rhetoric against rhetoric,’ well-described in articles by Schloemann15 and Hesk,16 
must have had some bearing on performance style.  
Also important would have been expectations at the start of proceedings that would vary 
with the nature of the event. There was certain to be confrontation between the parties at a 
standard trial; otherwise there would be no need for the procedure. At a dokimasia or 
euthuna there was a good likelihood of no confrontation whatsoever; only jurors or 
spectators with advanced word of a challenge would arrive expecting a heated atmosphere. 
In the political sphere, expectations will doubtless have varied from ennui among unwilling 
participants pushed into the Pnyx by the Scythian archers with their dyed ropes to intense 
excitement when there was a prospect of war breaking out. A classical Athenian audience 
12 ‘Demos, ecclesia and dicasterion in classical Athens’, GRBS 19 (1978) 315-30. Republished with 
addenda in M. H. Hansen, The Athenian ecclesia I (Copenhagen 1983) 139-60. 
13 1408a16-25, see V. Bers, Genos dikanikon: amateur and professional speech in the courtrooms of 
classical Athens (Cambridge, MA and London 2009) 95. 
14 Trans G. Kennedy, Aristotle on rhetoric: a theory of civic discourse (Oxford 1991). 
15 J. Schloemann, ‘Entertainment and democratic distrust: the audience’s attitudes toward oral and 
written oratory in classical Athens’, in Epea and grammata: oral and written communication in 
ancient Greece, ed. J. M. Foley and I. Worthington (Leiden 2002) 133-46, (139-42). 
16 J. Hesk, ‘The rhetoric of anti-rhetoric in Athenian oratory’, in Performance culture and Athenian 
democracy’ ed. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge 1999) 201-30. 
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on the alert for speakers’ tricks was, we can be sure, an audience prone to react, and 
though their reaction might not have risen to the level of cat-calls and hissing, even the 
subtler signs of opposition or agreement will have got them perceptibly keyed up. In their 
volume, pitch, phrasing, and bodily movements speakers surely reacted to the 
atmospherics. Explicit sensitivity to the ‘atmospherics’ was not new in Greek culture. One 
example from Homer: in the Iliad speakers are not heckled while they are talking, and 
after many speeches everyone falls into a stricken silence: ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες 
ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ (‘So he spoke and all were silent.’).17 
More advice from Aristotle’s Rhetoric: ‘The lexis will be appropriate if it expresses 
emotion and character and is proportional to the subject matter. Proportion exists if there 
is neither discussion of weighty matters in a casual way nor solemn discussion of trivial 
things, and if ornament is not attached to a trivial word. Otherwise, the result seems like 
comedy, like the [tragic] poetry Cleophon composes. Some of what he used to say is like 
addressing a fig as “Madame”’.18 The poet has slipped from one genre to another out of 
sheer ineptitude (contrast a controlled slide, as in Euripides’ parody in his Electra of the 
recognition scene in Aeschylus’ Choephoroi). Audiences at the plays and jurors and court 
tourists were, in all probability, ready to howl if they perceived a speaker’s verbal 
realization as incongruous. This could happen whether a speaker was cleaving to a text 
premeditated in leisure or improvised on the spot. The agon between speakers is very 
likely to have gained in intensity with the size of the audience. Moreover, this effect was 
probably not linear, directly and uniformly proportional to the size of the audience, but 
something of a rising curve.  
With an audience en garde against the artificial, one might expect that putting before a 
crowd the most faithful copy of people as they sound and look would have the best chance 
of winning them over. It is, then, something of a surprise that Aristotle is recommending 
something less than ‘faithful to the original’. But that is what he does if you mistrust the 
manuscripts and the Latin translation of the Rhetoric William of Moerbeke produced for the 
Greekless Thomas Aquinas.19 The first part is unproblematic: ‘Do not use all analogous 
effects [of sound and sense] together; for thus the hearer is tricked. I mean, for example, if 
the words are harsh, do not deliver them with a harsh voice and countenance. Otherwise, 
what you are doing is evident. But if sometimes one feature is present, sometimes not (i.e., if 
I understand the text correctly) within a single, rather short stretch of oratory you accomplish 
the same thing without being noticed’ (1408b4-9). Then we hit a crux. Adapting Kennedy’s 
translation it runs as follows: ‘If gentle things are said harshly and harsh things gently, the 
result is persuasive’. Unaltered, Kennedy translates these words: ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ 
σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, ἀπιθανόν γίγνεται (1408b9-10). I favour a 
nineteenth-century emendation by Charles Thurot that replaces ἀπιθανόν with its antonym, 
17 e.g. Il. 3.95, 7.92, 7.398, 8.28, and passim. 
18 Rhet. 1408a.10-16: Τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ παθητική τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις 
πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ᾽ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε 
περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον 
ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ‘πότνια συκῆ’.  
19 J. J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1974) 90. 
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πιθανόν.20 With this text, Aristotle makes this recommendation remembering what he says 
in the other passages, that the orators’ audiences suspect being gulled by the artificiality, 
as it were, of too perfect a copy. Hence I reject Kennedy’s translation, ‘but if, as a result, 
gentle things are said harshly and harsh things gently, the result is unpersuasive,’ both the 
‘unpersuasive’ and the ‘but’; ‘but’ seems to me an unjustifiable translation of οὖν as I read 
the text and Denniston’s treatment of οὖν in The Greek particles.21 I think we have 
Aristotle’s clear warning to avoid turning the bema into a branch of the theatron. The 
warning is issued not to report an unchallenged consensus on how things should be done, 
but because Aristotle must think at least some speakers are doing things wrong, much as 
the Poetics scolds contemporary tragedians for drifting far from Aristotle’s notions of how 
a play should be written. Less momentous, this interpretation is consistent with my 
general claim in Genos dikanikon that professional speech aimed at suppression of affect, 
for that technique would enhance the speaker’s perceived manliness. Here Aristotle makes 
no explicit differentiation of genos, and the passage cannot be adduced as evidence for a 
differentiation in the composition of court and political speech, but at the start of the 
second book of the Rhetoric, having returned to the threefold division of oratory declaring 
that the speakers of both forensic and political oratory must ‘construct a view of 
themselves as a certain kind of person and that their hearers suppose them to be disposed 
in a certain way’ (trans. Kennedy), a distinction follows: ‘For the speaker to seem to have 
certain qualities is more useful in deliberation, for the audience to be disposed in a certain 
way is more useful in lawsuits’ (1377b223-31; cf. 1378a6); then, more comprehensively: 
‘There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things 
we trust other than logical demonstrations: These are practical wisdom (phronēsis) and 
virtue (aretē) and good will (eunoia) (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια 1378a6-8). The 
joining of φρόνησις, a faculty very much at play in deliberation, together with εὔνοια, 
seems to me evidence that political speeches were delivered in an expansive style. A 
deliberative speaker who confined himself to a matter-of-fact argument for policy (γνώμη 
is the right Greek translation) would thereby harm his case; and Aristotle very soon 
(1378a18-19) assigns εὔνοια a place among the πάθη, a category that by its nature would 
have an effect on the performance dynamics of a public speech. 
Here I must confess to great simplification and to trusting Aristotle as a reporter and 
analyst. The proper description of a speaker’s qualities, the means by which they are 
assessed, and the relative importance of emotions on both sides – the audience’s and the 
speaker’s – were very likely the subject of arguments among those who offered advice. 
Reportage on the performance of forensic and deliberative rhetoric is far from abundant, 
especially if we narrow the focus in the hope of finding plausible signs of differences 
20 See also C. Cooper ‘Demosthenes actor’ (n.5, above) 158 n.57: ‘At 3.7 (1408b7) [Aristotle] warns 
against excessive correspondence between style and delivery; if the words are harsh, the voice and 
facial expression should not be’. The text I favour: Rhet. 1408b.4 ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα 
χρήσασθαι (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής)· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ 
φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ τοῖς ἁρμόττουσιν·εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν 
τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, 
πιθανὸν γίγνεται. 
21 J. D. Denniston, The Greek particles, 2nd edn (Oxford 1954) 464-66. 
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between them. The problem is that we have very little in the way of contemporaneous 
comparative material. Reaching back among the ‘chestnuts’ in descriptions of Greek 
oratory, we find a few scraps of some evidentiary value. In Antenor’s portrayal of 
Menelaus and Odysseus as speakers on a diplomatic mission to Troy on the subject of 
Helen (Iliad 3.205-24) there is no way of saying how large a crowd of Trojans assembled 
(3.209) to see Odysseus’ faux naïf clumsiness in handling the speaker’s staff. For the full 
effect, one would have to be close enough to see how Odysseus kept his eyes fixed to the 
ground, ‘like an idiot’ (3.219). At Iliad 9.443, where Achilles talks of what seems to be 
strenuous training he had from Phoenix in words and deeds, it is at least possible that the 
training included lessons not just in devising a piece of strategy, but in arguing for it. His 
richly metaphorical style is, of course, on display early in the first book, as is the simple 
choreography of speakers rising in turn. (It does not escape me that the word 
‘choreography’ has its natural home in theatrical contexts.) We meet an undoubtedly 
heated assembly of spectators at one moment in the extended description of the shield 
Hephaestus constructs for Achilles, the tableau vivant of the adjudication of a dispute over 
the paying of a blood price. Bailiffs need to restrain the crowd of observers (18.503) who 
evidently decide between or among the judges, not between the litigants themselves. We 
are very poorly informed about trials at Athens until late in the fifth century, from which 
we have Antiphon 1, 5, 6,22 and perhaps some speeches of Lysias. Still, the little that we 
hear about trials with an undoubted political dimension (granted that their institutional 
status was forensic) suggests that litigants and their supporters resorted to a sort of 
theatricality: Miltiades on his litter (Herodotus 6.136), Pericles weeping at the trial of 
Aspasia (Plutarch Pericles 32.5). Remarks on rhetoric – who did it best, who could teach 
it – go on to become a major topic of interest with ramifications in real and artistic life. 
That state of affairs is too well known to require demonstration here.23 The culture’s 
continuing and socially widespread exposure to rhetoric is presumably what explains what 
would otherwise be mysterious in Aristotle’s warning that too accurate a mimēsis of actual 
speech acts could trigger suspicion – that is, if we accept the reading I favour (see above).  
 The best strategy, as I see it, is to look first for simple, statistically significant 
differences among categories of texts, in part simply to confirm that we have divided them 
up correctly. I give pride of place to formal differences in that which is most directly 
accessible, the words on the page. Among verbal differences, the presence or absence of 
certain particles has the special value of simplicity. Does particle usage distinguish the 
two genē at issue? Denniston gives some evidence so suggesting. He notes that δῆτα, a 
word ‘far more at home in question and answer than elsewhere’ is found some thirty-four 
times in oratory, all but one in forensic; and the single political occurrence falls in a 
22 I regard the papyrus text of Antiphon’s defense speech as most probably a school exercise – not 
an especially good one – prompted by Thucydides’ admiration (see S. Hornblower, A commentary 
on Thucydides: 3 vols (Oxford 1997- 2008) III, 957).  
23 I cannot agree with my old colleague at Yale, Tom Cole in his claim that what he calls 
‘meta-rhetoric’, that is discursive theory rather than just sample speeches displaying the writer’s 
technē, begins only in the fourth century with Plato’s Phaedrus: see his The origins of rhetoric in 
ancient Greece (Baltimore 1991). 
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Demosthenic Proem, which might be only a late exercise.24 Perhaps the particle seemed 
not suited to the normally far larger actual (and notional) audience of the ecclesia. 
Regrettably, there is not the substantial chronological overlay of forensic and political 
speeches that would free us from the danger that we are, as it were, comparing the 
concentration of a single component of river water at the source, another at its mouth, as if 
we could be sure that no contaminant was entering somewhere in between; but we must 
play with the cards we have been dealt. We can be somewhat more confident in the case 
of τοίνυν, described by Denniston as ‘essentially an Attic, and a colloquial 
particle…conversational and lively’;25 it is about five times more common in 
Demosthenic court than political speech. At least that is the pattern found in one orator’s 
oeuvre, or to put it more accurately, the works collected under the name ‘Demosthenes’. 
Paired τε (τε...τε…) is never found in any of Demosthenes’ political speeches, but 35 
times in his forensic works.26 Denniston is puzzled: ‘Was τε...τε felt, perhaps, to be 
slightly colloquial?’.27 However, the distribution in Antiphon, where the language tends to 
the stiff and abstract, seems to point exactly the other way. A syntactical and lexical 
favourite of my own is emphatic denial expressed by the sequence οὐ μή followed by the 
future indicative or the subjunctive. This was almost certainly something you could hear 
all the time at the fish market or similar venues, but almost never in professionally 
composed Attic oratory.28 Most probably, professionals exercised a highly acute sense of 
propriety, sometimes prompted by the differing function of the two genres, that assigned 
different linguistic items to the two arenas, courts and deliberative bodies. Specific 
utterances could sometimes be momentous – remember the close attention to the mangled 
English that George W. Bush produced when speaking off-the-cuff; but even then the 
distinctions could arise from nothing more than simply ‘knowing how it’s done here’. 
This is what Freud famously dubbed ‘the narcissism of small differences’, a behaviour, 
verbal or otherwise, likely to have had a strong influence on the discourse of public 
meetings.29 Denniston speculated that ‘the budding speaker, at the turn of the fifth and 
fourth centuries, was recommended, as a kind of stylistic convention, to start off with a 
μέν, and to trust more or less to luck that he would and answer to it, and not to care greatly 
if he did not’.30  
 We can also exploit evidence for one aspect of these performances, the power 
exercised over the speakers by a boisterous crowd. This approach does not allow 
confident generalizations, but at least yields explicit indications over a long chronological 
stretch that speakers and audiences tugged back and forth for control of the situation. 
24 Denniston, Greek particles (n.21, above) 269. 
25 Denniston, Greek particles (n.21, above) 568ff. 
26 Denniston, Greek particles (n.21, above) 269. 
27 Denniston, Greek particles (n.21, above) 503 n.1 
28 Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.13, above) 114-18. 
29 Sigmund Freud, The Standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud 
(London 1957) vol. 21, 199. 
30 Denniston, Greek particles (n.21, above) 383ff. 
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There are many references to thorubos, organized or otherwise, at the ecclesia.31 If, as I 
have claimed,32 Thucydides has Cleon make an oblique reference to members of the 
assembly crowd calling out in the Mytilene debate, we have good reason to believe that at 
least as early as 427, and probably far earlier, a speaker sometimes had to fight the 
shouting of the crowd to be heard. The ‘Old Oligarch’ (1.6) complains that the Athenians 
allow ‘even the worst people to speak’, but in the Protagoras Plato has Socrates remark 
‘that when we convene in the Assembly and the city has to take some action on a building 
project, we send for builders to advise us…. And so forth for everything that is considered 
learnable and teachable. But if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to 
advise them, no matter how handsome and rich and well-born he might be, they don’t 
accept him. They laugh at him and shout him down until he either gives up trying to speak 
and steps down himself, or the Scythian archer-police remove him forcibly by order of the 
board. This is how they proceed in matters which they consider technical. But when it is a 
matter of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them’ 
(319b-c, trans. S. Lombardo and K. Bell). But one’s man’s ‘merely technical’ is another 
man’s notion of policy and the integrity of the system: Americans will immediately think 
of the disputed voting apparatus in Florida of the 2000 presidential vote and the arguments 
over voting machinery in some subsequent elections. My guess is that Plato, who 
probably attended very few meetings of the ecclesia, had no precise idea of how often 
speakers were heckled; it is, I believe, telling that a passage in the Laws shows him 
indulging a fantasy of audiences at theatrical and musical events sitting in perfect silence, 
awaiting word from certain educated, refined critics who would signal whether they were 
to applaud (700-01). Since that supposed Golden Age, Plato has the Athenian Visitor say, 
the city has deteriorated into a theatrokratia. To my knowledge, no orator makes 
reference to the relative power of speakers in courts and political meetings to control the 
floor, but we do have a comparison in the Theaetetus (172e3). Regrettably, the source is 
again Plato, not a man to trust very far when he speaks of the democracy at Athens. He 
has Socrates describe the freedom of the man engaged in philosophical debate as free to 
talk as long as he wants, free of the constraint of the water clock. The next part is very 
dubious: ‘the man of the law courts ... his adversary standing over him, armed with 
compulsory powers and with the sworn statement, which is read out point by point as he 
proceeds, and must be kept to by the speaker. The talk is always about a fellow-slave, and 
is addressed to a master, who sits there holding some suit or other in his hand’.33 Plato’s 
remark, tendentious and procedurally imprecise, is not credible in light of what we see, at 
least in the genos dikanikon outside the homicide courts, where there really may have 
been an enforced rule, or at least a strong tradition, against wandering very far from the 
charges at hand.34 The water clock was never, to my knowledge, disregarded by the 
31 M. H. Hansen, The Athenian assembly (Oxford and New York 1987) 71. 
32 Bers, ‘Dikastic thorubos’ (n.2, above) 5. 
33 Plato, Complete works, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis, Cambridge 1997) trans. Levett rev. 
Burnyeat. 
34 See P. J. Rhodes, ‘Keeping to the point’ in The law and the courts in ancient Greece, ed. 
E. M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (London 2004) 137-58, and in the same volume A. Lanni, ‘Arguing 
from “precedent”: modern perspectives on Athenian practice’, 159-71. 
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participants. Time limits must have played a large role in the atmosphere of the courts and 
served as something of a damper, probably more effective than the Speaker in the House 
of Commons intoning ‘Order! Order!’, when the parliamentary thorubos gets too long and 
too loud. 
 At Rhetoric 1414a8-17 Aristotle distinguishes among the sub-genres of oratory in 
general terms, starting with a visual metaphor: ‘The style of oratory addressed to public 
assemblies is really (παντελῶς) just like scene-painting.’ Then, somewhat more 
informatively: ‘The bigger the throng, the more distant is the point of view: so that, in the 
one and the other, high finish in detail (τὰ ἀκριβῆ) is superfluous and seems better away. 
The forensic style is more highly finished; still more so is the style of language addressed 
to a single judge…high finish is wanted least where dramatic delivery (ὑπόκρισις) is 
wanted most, and here the speaker must have a good voice, and above all a strong one’.35 
At a minimum, speakers in the Pnyx must have spoken – or shouted – louder than 
speakers in the courts, at least with a normal size jury in session, say 201 or 501, or in the 
bouleutērion, addressing 500 men. That seems obvious a priori, and Aristotle comes close 
to confirming that this was so.  
 We need at least to acknowledge an acoustic challenge. Difficulty hearing the speaker 
is mentioned just before the Funeral Oration at Thucydides 2.34. In S. Lattimore’s 
translation: ‘Pericles son of Xanthippos was chosen to speak. And when the moment 
arrived, coming forward from the tomb to a platform that had been elevated so that he 
could be heard by as much of the crowd as possible, he spoke as follows’.36 ‘As much of 
the crowd as possible’ certainly allows for the possibility that some mourners and others 
in attendance could not hear the epitaphios. In his important 1996 article, Christopher 
Johnstone treated ‘Greek oratorical settings and the problem of the Pnyx: rethinking the 
Athenian political process.’37 Johnstone took on a difficult propaedeutic: acquainting 
himself with the fundamentals of acoustical engineering, which allowed him to take in 
factors most of us would probably not think about at all, such as the effect of atmospheric 
conditions on intelligibility. He notes that ‘During most of the year Athens enjoys a 
relatively warm, dry climate’; 38 but ‘such conditions are not the most conducive to sound-
transmission. When the presence of the northeast wind is figured in (almost always a 
factor on the Pnyx), the difficulties confronting the orator and the audience are practically 
insurmountable. Speech articulation tests done in an open-air setting indicate a significant 
reduction in the area of intelligibility when a moderate wind (20-25 mph) is blowing. 
Indeed, when the results of these tests are applied to the Pnyx, the proportion of the 
audience within the area of 75 per cent ‘syllable articulation’ (regarded as satisfactory) 
falls significantly below half’.39 Johnstone then gives, citing a standard work, the 
35 τοῦτο δὲ ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης. 
36 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian war, trans. S. Lattimore (Indianapolis 1998)  
37 ‘Greek oratorical settings and the problem of the Pnyx: rethinking the Athenian political process’ 
in Theory, text, context: issues in Greek rhetoric and oratory, ed. C. L. Johnstone, (Albany, New 
York 1996) 97-127. I do not find a reference to the platform where I would expect it (his n.7), 
though it should count as evidence in favour of his argument. 
38 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 118. 
39 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 124. 
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conditions to be met if ‘all auditors are to hear without undue strain and if the actors are to 
speak without undue effort. The various factors leading to loss of intelligibility impose 
limitations on the size of open-air theatres; if certain standards of acoustics are to be 
maintained a seating capacity of about 600 should be regarded as the upper limit of size 
when the theatre, not equipped with a sound-amplification system, is to be used 
principally for spoken drama [and oratory], if all auditors are to hear without undue 
strain’.40 Alarmingly, 600 would be larger than the smallest possible jury panel assembled 
to hear Demosthenes speak in a graphē paranomōn, for instance, the most celebrated 
forensic speech occasion, for which he wrote the De Corona. At §52 we see – if the 
scholiast is to be trusted – a wonderful performance trick, the deliberate mispronunciation 
of μισθωτός as proparoxytone to provoke a resounding linguistic correction from the 
audience that confirmed Demosthenes’ substantive claim; the massed vox populi 
condemning the prosecutor as a lackey in the employ of Philip II. But the jury probably 
consisted of 1001, or even larger, an audience size that would, if Johnstone and his 
authorities are right, preclude many in the jury, to say nothing of the bystanders, catching 
the pseudo mistake. Clearly, the Pnyx did not conform to those specifications. ‘When the 
ekklesia met there during the fifth century, it is doubtful whether even half of the 5,000 
present could regularly understand what speakers were saying’.41 And he concludes: ‘If 
many or most of those in attendance could not understand speakers adequately, when it 
came time to vote on competing proposals, on what did they base their decisions? 
Apparently it cannot have been the eloquence of the speaker himself, nor the arguments – 
at least not directly. Perhaps the content of speakers' addresses was passed from the front 
to the rear of the auditorium by those who could hear clearly’.42 If this is so, then the 
noise level in the area would have been even greater than has already been suggested. And 
clearly, much would have been ‘lost in the translation’. Perhaps, alternatively, those 
citizens who could not hear clearly voted merely on the basis of the speaker’s name and 
reputation. ‘If this was the case, then the primacy of public address in public decision 
making at Athens must again be questioned’.43 M. H. Hansen has suggested (personal 
communication via Prof. Lene Rubinstein) that the ambient noise level of the classical city 
was far lower than in modern times, and this factor might have prejudiced Johnstone’s 
experiment more than he concedes.44 But if Johnstone’s acoustic analysis is even 
approximately right in its pessimism, we might be able to make a guess pertinent to 
performance in the Pnyx. The passage from the Theaetetus I quoted earlier ends with the 
word δρόμος, there denoting the trial process, but by a very nice coincidence the word 
appears in its the literal sense of ‘a run’ in Plutarch’s description of Cleon’s manner at the 
40 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 120. 
41 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 126. 
42 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 124-26. This reminds me of the Sermon on 
the Mount as portrayed in Monty Python’s ‘Life of Brian’. Those at greatest distance from the 
speaker are baffled by a phrase passed back to them, ‘Blessed are the cheesemakers.’ 
43 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 127. 
44 Johnstone, ‘Greek oratorical settings’ ( n.37 above) 111 n.7: ‘Even taking into account the greater 
ambient noise in modern versus classical Athens’. 
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podium: δρόμῳ μετὰ τοῦ λέγειν ἅμα χρησάμενος (‘running as he spoke’).45 I conjecture 
that Cleon was aiming to reach right, centre, and left sectors of the crowd. The same 
might be true of Demosthenes – recall the reports of his problems in delivery. Indeed, it 
might have been a manoeuvre performed by all experienced speakers. Accounts that have 
reached us attribute it explicitly to no orator besides Cleon, but that might reflect only the 
particular revulsion the oligoi felt for him.  
Putting together Aristotle’s remark about the politicians’ need to make spectacles of 
themselves, as it were, together with the acoustic challenge of the Pnyx, I am emboldened 
to make a few generalizations. When speaking in courts, for themselves or their friends 
and allies, professional orators took great care to appear composed, to be seen as speaking 
ex tempore, even if they had memorized all or much of their speeches.46 On the bēma of 
the Pnyx, the same men (again, I have in mind de facto professionals) were much louder 
and more flamboyant – unless, like Aeschines, they had been mocked for ludicrous 
histrionics associated with stage acting. If the issue up for debate was urgent and 
controversial, they spoke at their highest fortissimo, and possibly at whatever pitch they 
could manage that could best penetrate the noisy crowd, pretending, at least, not to 
respond to men heckling them at close range, while using their own partisans as amplifiers 
of their actual words, or at least claques. They made a tour of the bēma or, at least 
swivelled their heads and upper torsos. When the public speaker left the bēma he hoped 
for, but did not solicit, thunderous applause all would hear and some would admire.  
   
Yale University 
 
45 Nicias 8.5. The much earlier description, Ath. Pol. 28.3, says nothing explicitly about a δρόμος, 
but does mention his hitched-up clothing, which might facilitate that sort of a movement. Perhaps 
Aeschines took special pains to keep his hand beneath his garment, even while turning on the bēma. 
46 This is the central argument of Bers, Genos dikanikon (n.13, above). 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGING A PROSECUTION:  
ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE  
IN CICERO’S VERRINES 1 
 
KATHRYN TEMPEST 
 
Introduction 
Staging a prosecution at Rome was not an easy task.  To judge from the Divinatio speech, 
in which Cicero asserted his better aptitude to undertake the case against Verres over his 
rival claimant Caecilius, there were many qualities and skills a prosecutor ought to 
possess (Cic. Div. Caec. 27-39). But the largest demand of all he reserved for the moment 
of delivery (§39): 
 
Dicenda, demonstranda, explicanda sunt omnia, causa non solum exponenda, sed 
etiam graviter copioseque agenda est; perficiendum est, si quid agere aut proficere 
vis, ut homines te non solum audiant, verum etiam libenter studioseque audiant. 
 
Everything must be explained, established and exposed; the case should not just be 
presented, it must be delivered methodically and richly.  You need to make sure 
that, if you wish to finish or deliver anything, men are not just listening, but that 
they are listening willingly and eagerly (my emphasis).2 
  
Ample passages in the Graeco-Roman rhetorical tradition attest to the pre-eminence of 
delivery among the tasks of the orator.3 Yet, despite its stated importance, Cicero offered 
only summary discussions of actio in his rhetorical treatises, and nowhere did he comment 
explicitly on his own use of voice and gesture.4 Consequently, it used to be a common 
lament in Ciceronian studies that the aspect of delivery was an irrecoverable, though 
essential, feature of Cicero’s oratorical success: invariably any attempt to reconstruct the 
 
1 When referring to the Verrines corpus, I treat the collection as three speeches: (i) the Divinatio, (ii) 
the Actio Prima, and (iii) the Actio Secunda, which I count as one speech rather than five; see 
K. Tempest, ‘Cicero and the art of dispositio: the structure of the Verrines’, Leeds International 
Classical Studies 6.02 (2007) 1-25 (available online at: http://lics.leedsac.uk/2007/200702.pdf). 
Taken together, the speeches of the two actiones constitute the case In Verrem.  
2 All references to the text are to Peterson’s OCT edition; all translations are my own. 
3 For the importance of actio, see Cic. Orat. 56, where Cicero recalls and appears to agree with the 
anecdote that Demosthenes accorded it first, second and third place among the criteria for effective 
speaking (cf. Cic. Brut. 142). This saying is recorded by several ancient authors, e.g. Phld. Rh. 1.196 
(Sudhaus), Ps.-Plut. Vita X Orat. 845B, Quint. Inst. 11.3.6. 
4 The important passages are Cic. De or. 3.213-27, Orat. 54-60. 
41 
42 PROFESSION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
performance of a speech remains a subjective and partial enterprise.5 However, this 
reluctance to envisage the performance of a speech was not a problem shared by the 
ancient student of oratory. In a famous passage of the Institutio Oratoria, for example, 
Quintilian (Inst.11.3.47-51) recites the opening lines of the Pro Milone, offering a 
commentary on how Cicero would have delivered them. That is not to say that Quintilian 
had first-hand information or direct knowledge of Cicero’s performance, but that he could 
imagine it based on shared norms of oratorical performance.  
It is also in Quintilian’s work that we find the broadest extant treatment of actio, 
encompassing the art of performance, the modulation of the voice, and all the ranges of 
gestures and emotions.6 Primarily building upon this theoretical treatment of performance, 
studies of Roman oratorical delivery have become increasingly popular as a means of 
approaching the texts of Cicero’s speeches. Aldrete has documented and illustrated a 
whole range of gestures that would have accompanied the delivered speech,7 while Hall 
and Bond have opened our eyes to the potential means of persuasion that could be 
exploited through performance.8 These studies remind us that oratory was first and 
foremost a performative art. But the definition of performance should not be restricted to 
the delivery of a text alone; it should also be broadened to include the performative 
situation and the orator’s reaction to events as they arise, as Manuwald has convincingly 
demonstrated by using Cicero’s Philippics as a test case.9  
Scholars working in this field admit that certain problems of methodology arise in 
studying the texts as evidence for performance in Roman oratory.10 Not least among them 
is the question of how faithfully the published speech represents the words actually 
delivered in the court, assembly or Senate; although we know that Cicero edited his 
5 Thus e.g. M. L. Clark, ‘Ciceronian oratory’, Greece & Rome 14 (1945) 72-81 (81), concludes his 
survey of Ciceronian oratory with the reminder: ‘A modern reader cannot feel to the full Cicero’s 
spell. The fire and vigour of the delivery, the vibrant voice, the flashing eyes, the tears, the 
expressive gestures, are all lost. To recover the effect of his oratory we must imagine his vivid and 
expressive delivery.’ 
6 Quint. Inst. 11.3; also useful is the treatment at Rhet. Her. 3.19-27. For further discussion of actio, 
largely based on Quintilian’s theoretical treatment, see E. Fantham, ‘Quintilian on performance: 
traditional and personal elements in Institutio 11.3’, Phoenix 36 (1982) 243-63, U. Maier-Eichhorn, 
Die Gestikulation in Quintilians Rhetorik (Frankfurt am Main 1989), G. Wöhrle, ‘Actio: Das fünfte 
officium des antiken Redners’, Gymnasium 97 (1990) 31-46, F. Graf, ‘Gestures and conventions: 
the gestures of Roman actors and orators’, in A cultural history of gesture from antiquity to the 
present day, ed. J. Bremmer and H. Roodenburg (Cambridge 1991) 36-58, and A. Cavarzere, Gli 
arcani dell'oratore: alcuni appunti sull'actio dei romani, Agones. Studi, 2 (Rome 2011). 
7 G. S. Aldrete, Gestures and acclamations in ancient Rome (Baltimore and London 1999). 
8 J. Hall and R. Bond, ‘Performative elements in Cicero’s orations: an experimental approach’, 
Prudentia 34.2 (2002) 187-228. An experimental attempt to reconstruct the delivery of a passage of 
Cicero’s Pro Caelio  has also been made by S. M. Goldberg: http://cicero.humnet.ucla.edu . 
9 G. Manuwald, ‘Performance and rhetoric in Cicero’s Philippics’, Antichthon 38 (2006) 51-69. 
10 See the discussions by A. Vasaly, Representations: images of the world in Ciceronian oratory 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993) 8-10, Hall and Bond, ‘Performative elements’ (n.8, above) 187-
88, and Manuwald, ‘Performance and rhetoric,’ (n.9, above) 51-52. 
3  KATHRYN TEMPEST: STAGING A PROSECUTION                                  43 
 
 
 
speeches before publishing them, the extent of his revisions remains a matter of debate.11 
A consensus appears to be emerging that the published forensic speeches do reflect the 
delivered orations truthfully: Cicero would have been able to write up his speeches with a 
fair amount of accuracy as a result of his careful preparations before the trial; indeed, any 
later additions may have actually brought the text closer to the live performance by 
incorporating the twists and turns of the trial.12 But, if we also allow that Cicero had the 
oral performance of the text in mind throughout the process of its composition, what we 
get in the written version are literary traces of how the speech was, or at the least could 
have been, delivered in practice. While Cicero himself conceded the difficulty of 
accurately capturing the spirit of the performance in writing,13 the published orations 
nevertheless offer evidence of convincing and plausible oratorical performances by virtue 
of their having to represent the physical circumstances of a forensic speech. The 
imaginability of a text’s performance was thus arguably more important to the student of 
oratory than its actual delivery.14 Consequently, the question should not be how Cicero 
actually delivered a given oration, but what aspects of performance we can understand to 
have been effective, and what they contributed to the speech’s persuasive strategy.15  
Performative elements can thus be teased out from a close reading of all of Cicero’s 
published speeches. Even the Actio Secunda of Cicero’s Verrines, which, according to 
received tradition, was never delivered,16 may be treated as a script for performance and 
11 For Cicero’s editorial efforts on his own speeches, see e.g. Cic. Att. 1.13.5, 13.44.3. The opposing 
views are traditionally represented by J. Humbert, Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de 
Cicéron (Paris 1925) and W. Stroh, Taxis und Taktik: die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros 
Gerichtsreden (Stuttgart 1975); for recent summaries of the debate see M. C. Alexander, The case 
for the prosecution in the Ciceronian era (Ann Arbor 2002) 15-26, J. G. F. Powell and J. J. 
Paterson, ‘Introduction’ in Cicero the advocate, ed. J. G. F. Powell and J. J. Paterson (Oxford 2004) 
52-57, and G. Manuwald, Cicero: Philippics 3-9, 2 vols (Berlin and New York 2007) I, 54-90, with 
an extensive bibliography (54 n.148). 
12 Thus Alexander, Case for the prosecution (n.11, above) 18-19. 
13 See e.g. Cic. Orat. 130: ‘Whatever qualities are in me … are apparent in my speeches, even if 
books lack that breath of life, which usually makes them seem more impressive when delivered than 
when they are read.’ (‘Quae qualiacumque in me sunt … sed apparent in orationibus, etsi carent libri 
spiritu illo, propter quem maiora eadem illa cum aguntur quam cum leguntur videri solent’); cf. also 
Brut. 91-94. 
14 This is precisely how the ancient student approached the published text: for Quintilian, even the 
second Philippic was imaginable as a live performance (see Quint. Inst. 11.3.167 on the 
pronunciation of Cic. Phil. 2.63). 
15 This has been the approach of several scholars; e.g. A. Vasaly, ‘The masks of rhetoric: Cicero’s 
Pro Roscio Amerino’, Rhetorica 3 (1985) 1–20, considers the roles assigned to the main parties in 
the trial of Roscius of Ameria; H. C. Gotoff, ‘Oratory: the art of illusion’, Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology 95 (1993) 289-313, examines how Cicero adapts his argument to the 
circumstances of the trial. 
16 This belief is based on the evidence of the pseudo-Asconian scholia, although this account is 
heavily flawed and the evidence for Verres’ withdrawal before the actio secunda is nowhere else 
firmly attested: for further discussion of the evidence see Powell and Paterson, Cicero the advocate 
(n.11, above) 56. Several scholars have argued that the Actio Secunda betrays a more ‘literary’ 
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thus retain the quality of the spoken word.17 Fuhrmann calls this phenomenon ‘fictive 
orality’:18 the reader is the true addressee, and he is transposed into the ‘imaginary 
present’ of the trial so that he may learn by what means Cicero could influence the jury.19 
Yet Fuhrmann does not provide an analysis of these elements in the Verrines, nor does the 
concept of ‘fictive orality’ allow for an examination of how performative aspects may 
have contributed towards the orator’s rhetorical strategy in practice.20 For, as we shall see, 
aspects of performance do more than simulate the circumstances of a given speech; they 
actively contribute towards its overall success. 
This chapter will therefore examine the Verrines for the further light they shed on 
actio and performance in Roman oratory, based on the hypothesis that the Verrines may 
help us towards achieving a theory or, more precisely, a typology of prosecution 
techniques.21 This feature of the Verrines was particularly important for the ancient 
student of oratory, for, although it was generally expected that a young man should 
character; see R. L. Enos, The literate mode of Cicero’s legal rhetoric (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville 1988), accepted by A. M. Riggsby, Crime and community in Ciceronian Rome (Austin 
1999) 178-84, and M. von Albrecht, Cicero’s style: a synopsis followed by selected analytic studies 
(Leiden 2003) 206-17. Enos has suggested that there is a difference between the rhetorical form of 
the delivered speeches of the In Verrem (the Divinatio and the Actio Prima) and the published text 
of the Actio Secunda, while von Albrecht suggests that literary considerations influenced the 
arrangement of Cicero’s material, especially in the peroratio. S. Gurd, ‘Verres and the scene of 
rewriting’, Phoenix 64 (2010) 80–101, further argues that the Actio Secunda self-consciously 
reflects on its own fictionality. The most persuasive resolution to date, however, is that of 
T. D. Frazel, ‘The composition and circulation of Cicero’s In Verrem’, Classical Quarterly 54.1 
(2004) 128-42. Frazel argues that there is little difference in style between the speeches in the 
Verrines collection. Furthermore, he suggests that the speech would have been drafted long before 
Cicero could have known that Verres would escape into an early exile. Thus, he concludes, the Actio 
Secunda should not be treated as ‘fictive’ (142). As I have argued elsewhere, this conclusion is 
supported by an analysis of the structure of the Actio Secunda, which adheres more closely to the 
precepts for rhetorical dispositio than most scholars have been prepared to admit; see Tempest, 
Dispositio (n.1, above).  
17 For an exemplary treatment of Verr. II.5.92-95, illustrating how a Roman reader might have 
approached this particular passage, see R. G. M. Nisbet, ‘The orator and the reader: manipulation 
and response in Cicero’s fifth Verrine’, in Author & audience in Latin literature, ed. A. Woodman 
and J. G. F. Powell (Cambridge 1992), 1-18. 
18 M. Fuhrmann, ‘Mündlichkeit und fictive Mündlichkeit in den von Cicero veröffentlichten Reden’ 
in Strukturen der Mündlichkeit in der römischen Literatur, ed. G. Vogt-Spira (Tübingen 1990) 53-
62 (60): ‘Das kühnste Beispiel für fingierte Mundlichkeit ist die zweite Rede gegen Verres, die 
berühmte Actio Secunda.’ 
19 Fuhrmann, ‘Mündlichkeit und fictive Mündlichkeit’ (n.18, above) 61: ‘Der in die imaginäre 
Gegenwart der Verhandlung geführte Leser sollte glauben, er werde darüber belehrt, mit welchen 
Mitteln Cicero auf die Richter eingewirkt hatte; er sollte darüber vergessen, daß der Appell ihm galt, 
daß er also der wahre Adressat der Einwirkung war.’ 
20 On the limitations of the term ‘orality’ to describe all that was happening in a Ciceronian speech, 
cf. Manuwald, ‘Performance and rhetoric’ (n.9, above) 63. 
21 For a fuller exploration of this idea, see K. Tempest, Prosecution techniques in Cicero’s Verrines, 
unpublished Ph.D. diss. (London 2006). 
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undertake a ‘debut’ prosecution at the beginning of his political career, the theoretical 
literature contains relatively few specific guidelines for the trainee prosecutor.22 And 
where targeted advice for prosecutors does survive, such as in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and Cicero’s De Inventione, it pertains more to finding the right argumentative 
strategy, loci communes, and the presentation of argument than to questions of delivery 
and performance.23 The relative paucity of rhetorical advice devoted to the task of 
delivering a prosecution case suggests that this topic did not lend itself to the kind of 
taxonomical approach found in the theoretical literature.24 Rather it reminds us that there 
existed another mode of rhetorical instruction, the tirocinium fori: a kind of apprenticeship 
of the forum in which young students learned the tricks of the trade by observation and 
practical experience.25 Yet students could only be expected to take in a certain amount of 
information by observation, and practice was essential to hone their skills; to this end 
model orations served as a useful supplement to the school curriculum and one of Cicero’s 
main reasons for publishing his speeches was to instruct students in the art of oratory.26  
In publishing the Verrines, Cicero doubtless envisaged that his speeches would 
provide a model of prosecution techniques; indeed, when he refers to them simply as his 
‘accusationis septem libris’ and expects the speeches to be ‘well known’ (‘nota’) at 
Orator 103, his ambition had arguably been achieved even within his own lifetime.27 
Looking at the Verrines from a pedagogical perspective, then, it is possible to examine 
how performative features were embedded in the published text, or we can speculate as to 
how they may have contributed to the persuasive power of Cicero’s speech. It is also 
22 For a more comprehensive treatment of this problem, see Alexander, Case for the prosecution, 
(n.11, above) 8-15. 
23 See e.g. Rhet. Her. 1.24, 2.21-24; Cic. Inv. Rhet. 2.24, 32, 44-45, 53, 77-82, 88, 99-100, 108-09.  
24 As Cicero says of facial expressions and gestures at Orat. 55: ‘How an orator uses all these to his 
advantage can hardly be described’ (‘quibus omnibus dici vix potest quantum intersit quem ad 
modum utatur orator’). 
25 Cicero (Brut. 189) tells us that, in his youth, he observed the speakers in the forum; it also seems 
that it was a practice of which Cicero particularly approved: see J. G. F. Powell, Cicero: Cato maior 
de senectute, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 28 (Cambridge 1988) 122. On the 
custom of the tirocinium fori generally, see Tac. Dial. 34.1-2; cf. J.-M. David, Le patronat judiciaire 
au dernier siècle de la république romaine (Rome 1992) 336-41. 
26 This is the conclusion of several studies: see e.g. Stroh, Taxis und Taktik (n.11, above) 52-55, and 
the useful comments of C. J. Classen, ‘Ciceros Kunst der Überredung’, in Éloquence et rhétorique chez 
Cicéron, Fondation Hardt Entretiens, vol. 28, ed. W. Ludwig (Geneva 1982) 149-92 (185-86), and 
A. D. Leeman, ‘The technique of persuasion in Cicero’s Pro Murena’, also in Éloquence et Rhétorique 
(Geneva 1982) 193-228 (198-99). Classen and Leeman focus their discussions on the Pro Milone and 
the Pro Murena respectively. Of course, there were other reasons – e.g. self-promotion, political 
motivations, literary intentions – why Cicero published his speeches, and his reasons for doing so no 
doubt differed from case to case: good overviews can be found in J. W. Crawford, M. Tullius Cicero: 
the lost and unpublished orations (Göttingen 1984) 3-21, and, with a particular focus on the Verrines, 
S. Butler, The hand of Cicero (London and New York 2002) 71-84.  
27 Thus also Fantham, ‘Quintilian on performance’ (n.6, above) 247. 
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possible to explore what further evidence the speeches may yield for a study of 
prosecution oratory more generally.28  
This approach will inform one part of my discussion. But I shall also suggest that the 
basic structures and the procedural framework of the original trial, which included a 
Divinatio and the compulsory double hearing, enabled Cicero to reflect on the art of 
prosecution from a number of vantage points: in the Divinatio he had to prove that he was 
the better choice of prosecutor, while the two hearings of the In Verrem offered Cicero the 
chance to comment on his own successes at various stages of the trial. 29 This feature of the 
Verrines – appropriate to both the delivered and published oration – may in turn be used to 
supplement and expand Cicero’s treatment of actio in his rhetorical writings. In the first part 
of this paper I shall suggest that Cicero initiates a broad discourse on oratorical performance 
in the Divinatio; the second part explores, more tentatively, how Cicero put his precepts into 
practice in select episodes of the In Verrem. In a final section, I expand the discussion of 
performance to include the presentation of the evidence and the role of the jury within the 
Actio Secunda. Taken as a collection, it will be seen that the three speeches of the Verrines 
corpus cause Cicero’s audience, in its widest sense,30 to consider the role of performance in 
oratory while also exhibiting performative features in practice.  
 
I. Aspects of performance in discourse: the Divinatio in Q. Caecilium31 
 
Early in the year 70 BC, Cicero and Q. Caecilius Niger, who had both expressed their 
intentions to prosecute Verres under the lex Calpurnia de repetundis, presented their 
competing claims in a procedure known as the Divinatio. Caecilius had been educated in 
Sicily (§39), had served there as Verres’ quaestor (§4, §59), and claimed to have been 
personally wronged by his former governor (§52). But Cicero, speaking first, argued that 
Caecilius was complicit in Verres’ crimes and was thus not a reliable choice (§§29-35). 
28 For such an experiment cf. Alexander, The case for the prosecution (n.11, above), who uses the 
Verrines to help reconstruct the arguments of the prosecutors in the extortion trials of Fonteius, Flaccus, 
and Scaurus. The results of this approach are valuable. But as he admits, they are also relatively limited and 
methodologically problematic: it is difficult to reconstruct the prosecution’s speech on the basis of the 
defence speech because Cicero may well be misrepresenting his opponent's arguments (29). Furthermore, 
it means he leaves aside the problems involved in interpreting the Verrines themselves and the further 
evidence they offer for Roman prosecution techniques. 
29 On the broader question of how the procedural framework of the delivered speech determined its 
published counterpart, see J. G. F. Powell, ‘Court procedure and rhetorical strategy in Cicero’, in 
Form and function in Roman oratory, ed. D. H. Berry and A. Erskine (Cambridge 2010) 21-36. 
30 A word should be said here on my use of the word ‘audience’ in this paper. For Cicero’s own 
audience shifts between the direct addressee (e.g. Caecilius in the Divinatio, or Verres/Hortensius in 
the In Verrem), the jury (and by extension the corona) as the primary audience of the delivered oration, 
and the reader (ancient and modern) as the reader-addressee. In the interests of clarity, I shall use these 
terms when I wish to single out a specific recipient and consider the effect of the speech upon that 
individual or group of individuals. Otherwise, I shall use the term ‘audience’ in the broadest possible 
sense in line with Cicero’s own habit of addressing himself either to individuals or collective groups, 
and with his own awareness that the ‘audience’ of his published text was the reader.    
31 Unless stated otherwise, all references in this section refer to Cicero’s Divinatio in Q. Caecilium. 
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He added that, even if he had been wronged by Verres, Caecilius’ prosecution would 
violate the bonds between a governor and his quaestor (§§60-63). Cicero, on the other 
hand, presented himself as the Sicilian’s preferred choice of accuser (§§2-5), before 
turning to the criteria the court should apply in assigning a prosecutor (§§10ff.). It is 
within this context that we are presented with a rhetorical extravaganza, as Cicero assesses 
the oratorical credentials of each man, using the performative situation to corroborate his 
arguments. For although Caecilius is the prosecutor least desired by the Sicilians, he is 
Verres’ own personal favourite for the job (Div. Caec. 22): 
 
Sunt multa quae Verres in me esse arbitratur, quae scit in te, Caecili, non esse; quae 
cuius modi in utroque nostrum sint, paulo post commemorabo; nunc tantum id dicam 
quod tacitus tu mihi assentiare, nullam rem in me esse quam ille contemnat, nullam 
in te quam pertimescat. 
 
Verres thinks I have many qualities which he knows are lacking in you, Caecilius; 
how we are each qualified in these respects, I shall detail a little later; for now I shall 
say only – and you may support me in this without saying a word – that there is 
nothing in me which Verres can scorn, and nothing in you to make him shudder. 
 
In short, Caecilius does not look like an impressive speaker either: as he awaits his turn to 
speak in silence (‘tacitus’) his ineptitude is apparently already evident. Thus Caecilius’ 
oratorical performance has started even before he begins his speech, and first impressions 
evidently counted. It is with this condemnation that Cicero begins his demolition of 
Caecilius’ abilities as an orator. In order to manage a case at all, the good prosecutor, he 
argues, must possess ‘some command of delivery, some experience at speaking, and some 
grounding or training in the forum, the courts, and the laws’.32 
In fact, the central portion of the speech reads as if it represents Cicero’s doctrine on 
how to present a case for the prosecution as he first assesses the credentials of Caecilius 
(§§27-47a) and then his proposed subscriptores (§§47b-51); the didactic impression is 
further corroborated by the fact that Cicero takes on the role as Caecilius’ instructor, 
addressing him directly for the majority of the oration (§§27-63). Yet the imperative 
‘cognosce’ (§27), with which this section opens, serves simultaneously to guide the 
audience from passive into active participation. In other words, the speech (both delivered 
and read) instructs its audience in the oratory of public prosecution including aspects of 
performance: essentially this section is a list of do’s and don’ts for the would-be 
prosecutor.  
In terms of personal qualities, an effective prosecutor must have received a good 
education (§§40-41), experience and training (§35, §41), and possess natural ability (§35, 
§39), and a blameless character (§27, §29). As regards his oratorical talents, he must be 
able to narrate vividly (§27), arrange and develop his arguments effectively (§§38-39), 
arouse the audience’s hostility and indignation (§§38-39), and convince his hearers of the 
defendant’s guilt by detailing the whole history of his life (§27, §38). The advice 
presented here is largely generic. Yet, as he proceeds to critique both his own experience 
32 Div. Caec. 35: ‘aliqua facultas agendi, aliqua dicendi consuetudo, aliqua in foro, iudiciis, legibus 
aut ratio aut exercitatio.’ 
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and ability and to criticize that of his other opponents, Cicero overtly directs our attention 
to the importance of oratorical performance. 
To begin with, Cicero’s recollections of his own training and experience enable him to 
identify three key attributes which he personally has perfected: the diligentia necessary for 
preparing the trial, the memoria for delivering it, and the vox and vires necessary to sustain 
the performance (§§39-41). It is even tempting to imagine him confidently asserting his 
superiority as he strides through the long-winded syntax of the following sentence, which 
simultaneously describes and demonstrates the accomplishments of which he boasts (§41): 
 
Ego qui, sicut omnes sciunt, in foro iudiciisque ita verser ut eiusdem aetatis aut nemo 
aut pauci pluris causas defenderint, et qui omne tempus quod mihi ab amicorum 
negotiis datur in his studiis laboribusque consumam, quo paratior ad usum forensem 
promptiorque esse possim, tamen ita mihi deos velim propitios ut, cum illius mihi 
temporis venit in mentem quo die citato reo mihi dicendum sit, non solum 
commoveor animo, sed etiam toto corpore perhorresco. 
 
I am a man who, as everyone knows, has centered my activity round the forum and 
law courts so that at this age either none or few men have defended more cases, and 
who spends all the time I have left after dealing with my friends’ affairs consumed in 
the study and toil of this profession, so that I can be better prepared and fitter for 
forensic practice, yet still, so may the gods help me, when I think of the day of the 
trial and the moment when the defendant has been summoned and I must begin my 
speech, I am not only mentally disturbed, but my whole body begins to shudder. 
 
The full array of connectors in this sentence (‘ita…ut’, ‘aut…aut’, ‘non solum …sed 
etiam’), coupled with the repeated relative pronouns (‘qui…qui…quo’) and the change of 
thought progression signaled by ‘tamen’, all enable us to imagine how Cicero could lead 
into it, pause significantly before each new clause, and finally launch towards the 
surprising climax ‘non solum commoveor animo, sed etiam toto corpore perhorresco’.  
Yet anyone who tries to read this sentence out loud, as Cicero’s reader would certainly 
have done, will soon realize that it requires some gusto to reach that climax effectively. 
Since speeches had to be delivered before large audiences and in varying conditions, 
physical stamina and a powerful voice were essential for effective oratory;33 the ability to 
control both his breath and his composure were fundamental aspects of the overall 
delivery of his speech. Indeed, by his own admission at Brutus 318-19, Cicero was at his 
oratorical prime when he prosecuted Verres (cf. the confidence in his physical ability at 
Verr. I.35). Thus the injection of autobiographical elements in the Divinatio warns the 
would-be orator (both Caecilius and the student of oratory) of the demands placed upon 
33 Thus Cicero, at Brut. 317: ‘The great crowd of men and the noise of the forum call for an orator 
who is sharp, fiery both in delivery and voice’ (‘acrem enim oratorem, incensum et agentem et 
canorum, concursus hominum forique strepitus desiderat’); Quintilian Inst. 11.3.27 adds 
considerations of weather conditions: ‘Are we to desert our clients if we have to speak in the heat of 
the sun or on a windy, wet or warm day?’ (‘Ita, si dicendum in sole aut ventoso umido calido die 
fuerit, reos deseremus?). On the size of audiences in the forum and the difficulties of voice 
projection, see Aldrete, Gestures and acclamations (n.7, above) 78-82.  
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the body by public speaking while simultaneously arguing that Cicero possesses the 
experience and qualities lacking in Caecilius.  
Furthermore, in his focus on the live performance we are reminded of the great role 
Cicero attributes to the audience elsewhere in his theoretical works: the crowd is to the 
orator, what an instrument is to a musician.34 That is to say, a favorable crowd could be 
exploited to great effect by a skilled speaker; conversely, a hostile one might interrupt the 
orator and make it difficult for him to proceed with his case.35 This is the point Cicero 
stresses in the Divinatio too: to be an effective orator one must consider the performative 
situation (§42):  
 
Iam nunc mente et cogitatione prospicio quae tum studia hominum, qui concursus 
futuri sint, quantam expectationem magnitudo iudicii sit adlatura; quantam auditorum 
multitudinem infamia C. Verri concitatura, quantam denique audientiam orationi 
meae improbitas illius factura sit. Quae cum cogito, iam nunc timeo quidnam pro 
offensione hominum qui illi inimici infensique sunt, et exspectatione omnium et 
magnitudine rerum dignum eloqui possim. 
  
Even now in my mind’s eye, I picture the great keenness of the men who will gather 
to hear; how much expectation the importance of the trial will bring; how great a 
crowd of hearers the infamy of Gaius Verres will stir up; how much attention his 
shamelessness will direct towards my speech. Even as I think about all this, I am 
already afraid, for what can I say to satisfy the indignation of the men who hate and 
detest him, or what will be worthy of everyone’s expectations and the importance of 
the trial?   
 
Cicero’s ability to envisage the opening of the trial stands in contrast to the exordium he 
imagines Caecilius delivering: an old-fashioned and rehearsed appeal to Jupiter or the jury 
(§43). His main point, then, is that set speeches will not work in this environment, for the 
orator needs to improvise: to change his tone to suit the mood of the audience. The need to 
tailor a speech to the expectations and feelings of the orator’s audience may seem an 
obvious part of an orator’s performance, but it is a feature that Cicero repeatedly stresses in 
the De Oratore too.36 
Another important element of the live performance, however, was the opposing 
advocate: in the trial of Verres this would be Hortensius, then the leading speaker of his 
34 Cic. De or. 2.338: ‘the crowd has power of such a sort that, just as the flute-player cannot play 
without his flute, so an orator cannot be eloquent without a crowd of listeners’ (‘habet enim 
multitude vim quondam talem ut, quemadmodum tibicen sine tibiis canere, sic orator sine 
multitudine audiente eloquens esse non possit’). 
35 Cicero was famously interrupted at the beginning of his defence for Milo; thus Asconius (41-42C) 
reports that ‘when Cicero began to speak, he was interrupted by the jeers of Clodius’ supporters 
(Stangl 37: ‘Cicero cum inciperet dicere, exceptus acclamatione Clodianorum’). For the orator’s 
need to ‘work’ his audience carefully, see Gotoff, ‘The art of illusion’ (n.15, above) 290, Hall and 
Bond ‘Performative elements’ (n.8 above) 223, J. Hall, ‘Oratorical delivery and the emotions: 
theory and practice’, in Blackwell companion to Roman rhetoric, ed. W. Dominik and J. Hall 
(Oxford 2007) 218-34 (219). 
36 See e.g. De or. 1.223-30; 2.68, 131, 159, 337; 3.66. 
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day. As he stands in court, imagining what might happen if Caecilius were to face 
Hortensius in the main trial, he describes the power of an effective oratorical performance 
(§ 46-7):   
  
Quid? cum accusationis tuae membra dividere coeperit et in digitis suis singulas 
partes causae constituere? . . . Quid? cum commiserari, conqueri, et ex illius invidia 
deonerare aliquid et in te traicere coeperit? . . . Mihi enim videtur periculum fore ne 
ille non modo verbis te obruat, sed gestu ipso ac motu corporis praestringat aciem 
ingeni tui, teque ab institutis tuis cogitationibusque abducat. 
 
What about when he begins to dissect your prosecution speech, and to tick off the 
individual parts of your case on his fingers? . . . What about when he begins to excite 
compassion (‘commiserari’), to complain (‘conqueri’), and to lighten the load of 
prejudice against Verres by casting it onto you? . . . I can see where the danger will 
lie: he will not simply overwhelm you with his words (‘verba’), but dazzle your eyes 
and senses with a mere gesture (‘gestu ipso’) and the movement of his body (‘motu 
corporis’), and so lead you away from your intended line of attack.  
 
Here, in addition to the rhetorical arguments Hortensius might use, the individual aspects of 
actio receive attention as Cicero gives some clues as to what was expected in an oratorical 
performance: the use of fingers and hand gestures provided a ready source of non-verbal 
communication;37 Cicero’s emphasis on ‘commiserari, conqueri’ recalls that there was a 
close tie between delivery and emotional appeals based on pity and anger (Cic. De or. 217-
19). And the focus on Hortensius’ words, gestures, and bodily movements may reflect the 
basic division of actio into vox and gestus.38   
The focus on the correct use of the orator’s voice receives further attention in Cicero’s 
sketch of Caecilius’ supporting cast, whom he compares to a band of Greek actors 
(§§47-51). This insult in itself is significant, for it evokes the ambivalent relationship 
orators had with theatrical artists.39 But one of Caecilius’ subscriptores was Titus Alienus, 
37 cf. Quint. Inst. 13.92-106. For another description of Hortensius’ oratorical style, see Cic. Brut. 
301-03, where Cicero adds explicitly a point that is only made implicitly in the Divinatio speech; 
namely, that ‘his delivery and gesture were rather more artificial than was necessary for the orator’ 
(Brut. 303: ‘motus et gestus etiam plus artis habebat quam erat oratori satis’). Indeed, he was 
famous for his use of gesture: Aulus Gellius, for instance, records the anecdote that he was once 
nick-named ‘Dionysia’ after a female mime-artist (Gell. NA 1.5.1-3), while Valerius Maximus adds 
that Hortensius’ gestures were studied by Q. Roscius Gallus and Clodius Aesopus, who adapted 
them for the theatrical stage (Val. Max. 8.10.2). For a fuller overview of Hortensius’ oratory, see 
C. E. W. Steel, ‘Lost orators of Rome’, in A companion to Roman rhetoric, ed. W. J. Dominik and 
J. Hall (Oxford 2007) 237-49 (243-44). 
38 For the rhetorical handbooks’ traditional division of delivery into the two parts of voice and 
gesture, see Rhet. Her. 3.19-20; Cic. Orat. 55, De or. 3.213-14; Quint. Inst. 11.3.1-2. 
39 Allusions to this relationship are frequent in Cicero’s rhetorical works; see e.g. De or. 1.118, 125, 
128-29, 156, 251; 2.242, 244, 251-52; 3.83. Cf. Quint. Inst. 1.11.1, 11.3.178-83. For the relationship 
between oratorical and theatrical gestures, see Graf, ‘Gestures and conventions’ (n.6, above) 48-51, 
E. Fantham, ‘Orator and/et actor’, in Greek and Roman actors: aspects of an ancient profession, ed. 
P. Easterling and E. Hall (Cambridge 2002) 362-76, A. Corbeill, Nature embodied: gesture in ancient 
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who had begun his career as a claqueur: ‘I see that he is suitably robust and trained at 
shouting,’ Cicero mocked.40 His criticism is directed as much against Alienus’ background 
as it is against his style of speaking: both lack the required dignitas. Yet the important point 
here is that the prosecutor should not simply shout his case.41 Although a powerful voice 
was indeed necessary to succeed in oratory,42 the ideal voice needed to allow for far more 
flexibility, so that it could be sweet (‘suavis’) and sonorous (‘canora’) as the moment 
demanded.43 Furthermore, Alienus’ powerful voice will be of little use to Caecilius in the 
trial of Verres, for he will have to modify it so as not to overshadow the performance of the 
first actor, Caecilius (§48).44  
Throughout the Divinatio the figure of Caecilius is thus used as the vehicle through 
which Cicero projects the vignette of the failed orator: ‘he is a nobody, he can do nothing’ 
(§47: ‘ipse nihil est, nihil potest’) is Cicero’s damning conclusion. His inability to adapt to 
the moment and his over-reliance on model arguments both become key themes in Cicero’s 
critique of his opponent. This is the particular challenge Cicero raises against Caecilius (§ 
47): 
  
Si enim mihi hodie respondere ad haec quae dico potueris, si ab isto libro, quem 
tibi magister ludi nescio qui ex alienis orationibus compositum dedit, verbo uno 
discesseris, posse te et illi quoque iudicio non deesse et causae atque officio tuo 
satisfacere arbitrabor. 
 
For if you can reply to me and to what I am saying today, if in one single 
expression you manage to depart from that book composed out of other people’s 
speeches that some schoolmaster has given to you, then I shall grant that you might 
not be a failure in the trial too and that you can do justice to the case and your duty.  
 
Cicero of course has an agenda to fulfill throughout the Divinatio, namely to demonstrate 
that he is the better and more experienced of the two rival orators. To this end, Cicero 
shows that he is well-acquainted with the detailed theoretical techniques of an effective 
Rome (Princeton 2004) 115, and C. Panayotakis, ‘Nonverbal behaviour on the Roman stage’, in Body 
language in the Greek and Roman worlds, ed. D. L. Cairns (Swansea 2005) 175-94 (178). 
40 Div. Caec. 48: ‘in clamando quidem video eum esse bene robustum atque exercitatum.’ 
41 While Quintilian (Inst. 5.13.2-3) appears to suggest that the prosecutor’s task was easier for his 
speech required less vocal flexibility than the defence advocate’s, this was clearly not the case in 
practice; cf. Cicero’s criticism that Gaius Fimbria shouted everything at the top of his voice (Brut. 
233). 
42 Cf. Brut. 241, where Cicero compliments Publius Autronius on the grounds that he has a shrill 
(‘peracuta’) and loud (‘magna’) voice, even if he has nothing else to commend him as a speaker. 
43 Cic. Orat. 55-60; Cicero’s compliments of orators’ voices in the Brutus give some indication of what 
effects should be sought. Thus e.g. Gaius Lentulus was renowned for his delivery, which included an 
effective use of pauses, exclamations, and a sweet and sonorous voice (234: ‘suavis’ … ‘canora’ ); 
Publius Lentulus’ voice was strong and sweet (235: ‘magnitudo’ … ‘suavis’); Gnaeus Lentulus 
Marcellinus also had a sonorous voice (247: ‘canora’). 
44 For the notion that Greek actors chose their roles carefully, in accordance with their abilities, see 
Cic. Off. 1.114. 
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oral performance as he sets himself up as an expert vis-à-vis the naïve Caecilius. But that 
does not diminish the value of his ‘lessons’. As we have seen, many of Cicero’s 
comments about delivery actually correspond to the criticisms and comments we find in 
his later rhetorical writings; hence we find in the Verrines an early exposition of Cicero’s 
precepts. Moreover, some of the most interesting aspects of his analysis appear to be a 
result of his own practical experience in the school and forum.  
A particularly unique contribution appears in the way Cicero exploits the moment of 
the performance itself in the course of his speech. Cicero spoke first, and he could only 
portray his opponent in a manner that was conceivably consistent with his actual character 
or appearance.45 Had a charismatic and impressive Caecilius stood up to reply, Cicero’s 
speech would have spectacularly failed in demonstrating its central thesis. Only a member 
of Cicero’s original audience could fully appreciate this particular point in Cicero’s 
argument, which means that in the published text Cicero includes an element of 
performance that goes further than creating an ex tempore allusion: he invites his reader to 
imagine the possibilities and the pitfalls created by the live performance.  
Cicero even shows how an orator could draw strength for his arguments from the 
performative situation. Thus he concludes his section of advice to Caecilius with an 
alarming degree of circularity (§ 52):  
 
Verum ut ad te, Caecili, redeam, quam multa te deficiant vides: quam multa sint in te 
quae reus nocens in accusatore suo cupiat esse, profecto iam intellegis. Quid ad haec 
dici potest? non enim quaero quid tu dicturus sis; video mihi non te, sed hunc librum 
esse responsurum, quem monitor tuus hic tenet; qui, si te recte monere volet, suadebit 
tibi ut hinc discedas neque mihi verbum ullum respondeas. 
 
But to return to you, Caecilius: you see how many assets you lack; you must 
certainly now see how you have many assets which a guilty man would long for in 
his prosecutor. What can you say to this? For I do not ask what you are going to 
reply; for I can see that you will not reply to me in your own words, but rather from 
that little book which your teacher here is holding: he, if he wants to advise you 
rightly, will persuade you to leave this forum without saying a single word in reply.  
 
Cicero’s statement that ‘you [Caecilius] see how many assets you lack’ (‘quam multa te 
deficiant vides’) echoes his earlier insistence that ‘Verres thinks I have many qualities which 
he knows are lacking in you, Caecilius’ (§22: ‘sunt multa quae Verres in me esse arbitratur, 
quae scit in te, Caecili, non esse’). As he self-consciously marks off this section of advice 
from the rest of the speech (‘Verum ut ad te’), Cicero signals that he has demonstrated what 
he set out to achieve: to argue that Caecilius is Verres’ and Hortensius’ preferred choice of 
prosecutor because he lacks the qualities that Cicero possesses. In this way, Cicero also 
paves the way for his insistence elsewhere that Caecilius is, in fact, a collusive prosecutor: 
45 Such comments on an opponent’s behaviour or appearance formed part of the stock-in-trade of 
Roman invective; see R. G. M. Nisbet, M. Tullii Ciceronis in L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio 
(Oxford 1961) 192-97, and C. P. Craig, ‘Audience expectations, invective, and proof’ in Cicero the 
advocate (n.11, above) 187-214. A man’s expressions, affectations and physical traits had the 
potential for interpretation and hence ridicule; thus A. Corbeill, Controlling laughter: political 
humor in the late Roman Republic (Princeton 1996) esp. 99-173.   
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a praevaricator (§30, §58). To this end Cicero has argued that Caecilius does not look the 
part (§23), cannot act the part (§§27-47) and is unprepared for the role of prosecutor 
(§§40-3). What is more, Caecilius, who can do no better than recite from the book of set 
speeches given to him by his schoolmaster in §47, is dumbfounded by Cicero’s oratorical 
performance: now, in §52, he hopes to find inspiration for his own impending 
performance, ironically, by turning to the book which his teacher waves before him. 
To sum up the points presented so far: the Divinatio is a meta-rhetorical speech as 
Cicero makes a virtue of his personal training and experience in order to win the right to 
prosecute Verres. Cicero’s speech offers a masterclass in using the situation of the speech 
to inform its substance: he addresses the majority of it to Caecilius directly, and he uses 
his opponent’s reactions to fuel his attack further. But this strategy of presentation in the 
original trial extends with an equally powerful effect over the written text: the reader-
addressee is subconsciously transposed into the physical environment of the trial and 
becomes one of the iudices within it. Like the original audience, the reader has been 
invited to assess the various merits and view the reactions of the individuals performing 
on stage: Caecilius, Cicero, Hortensius, and Caecilius’ subscriptores.  
Moreover, in presenting his blueprint of how to deliver a case successfully, Cicero 
simultaneously invites his audience to consider the demands of delivery upon the orator 
generally; in other words, Cicero initiates a discourse on actio and performance which 
maintains the standard theoretical division of voice (‘vox’), and gesture (‘gestus’ or 
‘motus corporis’). To achieve any success, the speaker must possess ‘diligentia’, and 
‘memoria’, but the rewards were significant. As we saw in Cicero’s critique of 
Hortensius’ oratory, a correctly delivered speech could dazzle the speaker’s opponents 
while exciting strong emotions in his audience, such as pity and anger. Yet we have also 
seen that Cicero extends the body-centered notion of performance to include the 
presentation of the speaker’s own character and to take in his surroundings. His 
performance could be further enlivened still by commenting on his opponent’s reactions 
and behaviour; in this way Cicero brings his opponent on stage to act out the character he 
has created for him. Thus the orator’s performance is not one-sided but involves the full 
array of those present at the trial. Examined closely, then, what emerges from the text is a 
dynamic between the performance and the speech, a kind of dialectical relationship, which 
enhances both in the process of their interaction: Cicero’s speech is adapted to suit the 
performative situation, yet the performative situation in turn contributes to the persuasive 
force of his attack.  
Cicero’s concept of an overall performance in the Divinatio may consequently offer a 
new approach to examining aspects of performance in the Verrines, for we may examine 
how similar aspects of performance are embedded in the published text of the In Verrem, 
and to what extent they mirror – and hence create a dialogue – with Cicero’s discursive 
analysis in the Divinatio.  
 
II. Aspects of Performance in Practice: the In Verrem 
 
On 5 August (‘Sextilis’) 70 BC, the trial of Verres commenced. The opening paragraphs 
of the Actio Prima create the impression of being present at the trial, at a particular point 
in the senatorial order’s struggle to maintain their monopoly over the courts, and at a 
moment of great importance for Cicero personally. In the Divinatio Cicero had alluded to 
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the feelings of anxiety he would experience at this moment, but now he claims those 
particular worries have been superseded by the new challenges facing him (I.4): 
 
Equidem ut de me confitear, iudices, cum multae mihi a C. Verre insidiae terra 
marique factae sint, quas partim mea diligentia devitarim, partim amicorum studio 
officioque reppulerim, numquam tamen neque tantum periculum mihi adire visus 
sum neque tanto opere pertimui ut nunc in ipso iudicio. Neque tantum me exspectatio 
accusationis meae concursusque tantae multitudinis, quibus ego rebus vehement-
issime perturbor, commovet quantum istius insidiae nefariae, quas uno tempore mihi, 
vobis, M. Glabrioni praetori, populo Romano, sociis, exteris nationibus, ordini, 
nomini denique senatorio facere conatur. 
 
Indeed, to make a personal confession, members of the jury, there are many attacks 
that Verres has set upon me, both on land and sea, some of which I have avoided by 
my own diligence, and others I have repelled with the help of energetic and dutiful 
friends. Yet I have never felt myself approaching so great a danger nor feared so a 
great task as I do now in this very trial. It is not the expectation awaiting my 
prosecution speech or the great size of the crowd that worry me (although these too 
deeply disturb me), so much as Verres’ nefarious attacks, which are simultaneously 
directed at me, you, the praetor Manius Glabrio, the Roman people, our allies, the 
foreign nations, and finally to the senatorial order and its good name.  
 
In addressing the targets of Verres’ attacks, Cicero gives a panoramic view of the different 
interest groups present at the trial: Romans, Sicilians, and other foreign nationals had all 
gathered to complain about Verres’ behavior. He portrays an atmosphere of bustling 
excitement (‘expectatio accusationis meae concursusque tantae multitudinis’) and 
describes his own feelings of great fear (‘pertimui’) and anxiety (‘perturbor’); elsewhere 
he adds that the forum was packed with spectators from all parts of Italy (Verr. I.54). But 
the description of the performative backdrop is not purely gratuitous, for it contributes to 
the projection of Cicero’s persona as he presents it throughout the In Verrem in two 
important respects. 
First, Cicero has corrected his earlier statement in the Divinatio to reveal himself as a 
prosecutor who is confident he can handle the case: now he fears the moment of his 
performance and the expectations of the crowd less than he fears the attacks of Verres. 
The personal confession with which this passage opens thus establishes Cicero’s ēthos as 
a competent and careful prosecutor facing a hostile and scheming opponent. Secondly, 
Cicero also has to demonstrate that he is not a malicious or litigious prosecutor; hence he 
needs to put forward a convincing display of support.46 In an important discussion of 
Cicero’s use of written evidence in the Verrines, Butler has pictured the sight of this 
opening day, as the capsae containing the documents were carried into the forum.47 He is 
46 In cases of extortion, the prosecutor needed to demonstrate that he had the support of the 
provincials behind him (cf. Cic. Scaur. 23-30). On Cicero’s self-representation in the Verrines, with 
particular reference to its origins in the Divinatio speech, see K. Tempest, ‘Combating the odium of 
self-praise: the Divinatio in Q. Caecilium’, in Praise and blame in Roman Republican rhetoric, ed. 
C. Smith and R. Corvino (Swansea 2011) 145-63. 
47 Butler, Hand of Cicero (n.26 above) 63-64. 
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surely right to suggest that the piles of documents would have made a staggering first 
impression; we have already seen in the case of Caecilius how an orator’s performance 
started before he even spoke a word. But the parade of witnesses to whom Cicero draws 
attention is equally important. By their very appearance, the populi Romani, socii, and 
exterae nationes all dramatically corroborate Cicero’s self-presentation as a prosecutor 
backed by the victims of Verres’ attacks.  
To be sure, the need to project an honourable character follows a long rhetorical 
tradition: according to Aristotle (Rh. 1356a) the ēthos of the speaker was one of the most 
effective means of persuasion. Yet insofar as the orator needed to create a favourable 
impression on his audience, his personality was an essential component of his 
performance. For that reason, the speaker also needed to appear consistent and 
convincing; otherwise it would seem as if he were acting.48 This consistency is achieved 
in the Actio Prima because the combination of diligence (‘diligentia’) and pure daring 
(‘neque tantum periculum mihi adire visus’) we see in these lines is a recurrent feature of 
Cicero’s self-presentation in his earlier speeches.49 But it is also a central aspect of the 
ēthos Cicero had created for the honourable prosecutor in the Divinatio: one of the marks 
of which was his willingness to face danger (‘ad periculum accedere’) on behalf of 
Rome’s allies.50  
These opening lines of the Actio Prima thus demonstrate that the performative context 
could be exploited to serve Cicero’s larger rhetorical strategy – an ability Cicero had 
found wanting in Caecilius. Yet the diligent reader, too, will have noticed how Cicero has 
created a dialogue between the Divinatio and the In Verrem: in the Divinatio Cicero had 
anticipated his fear at the size of the crowd and their expectations of the trial. And while 
he still fears these same factors in the In Verrem, they cause him less anxiety than the 
attacks of Verres. In this way, Cicero uses the appropriate expressions of modesty with 
which to introduce himself to the court; but he manages to assert himself aggressively 
against Verres and to declare himself the champion of his victims all the same.  
These victims included the senators, the president of the court, and the Senate itself – 
all of whom have been imperilled by Verres’ schemes. Throughout the In Verrem, Cicero 
therefore draws a great advantage from the broader political context of the trial, which is 
48 For the advice to appear sincere, see e.g. Rhet. Her. 3.27, where good delivery is essential ‘so that 
the speech appears to come from the heart’ (‘ut res ex animo agi videatur’); cf. Rhet. Her. 3.26, 
where the author warns that over-gesticulation may give the impression of being mime artists 
(‘histriones’). Cicero draws a similar distinction at De or. 3.215: orators speak the truth (they are 
‘actores veritatis’) while the mime artists (‘histriones’) are the ‘imitatores veritatis’.  
49 See e.g. Cic. Quinct. 1-4, 8-9; Rosc. 1-5, 9-10; on this aspect of Cicero’s self-presentation in his 
earlier career, cf. C. E. W. Steel, Reading Cicero: genre and performance in late Republican Rome 
(London 2005) 25. 
50 For the full quotation, see Cic. Div. Caec. 63: ‘the strongest motive and the mark of the most 
honest prosecution has always been this: to incur hostility, face danger, and put in the commitment, 
energy, and hard work in behalf of our allies, in defence of our provinces, and for the benefit of 
foreign nations’ (‘Semper haec causa plurimum valuit, semper haec ratio accusandi fuit 
honestissima, pro sociis, pro salute provinciae, pro exterarum nationum commodis inimicitias 
suscipere, ad periculum accedere, operam, studium, laborem interponere’). Compare, too, Cicero’s 
well-known list of reasons for undertaking a prosecution at Off. 2.49-50. 
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sandals;  he attends parties, gets drunk and submits himself to acts of lust.  In his 
ats, although he admits that it is sometimes possible (as 
 opinione populi 
 I.36: ‘hoc munus aedilitatis meae populo Romano amplissimum pulcherrimumque 
presented as a god-sent opportunity to recover the reputation and standing of the Senate. 
His warning to the jury is clear (I.2):  
 
Huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa voluntate et exspectatione populi Romani 
actor accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, sed ut infamiae communi 
succurrerem.  
 
In this trial, members of the jury, I appear as a prosecutor with the great approval and 
interest of the Roman people, not so that I may increase the hostility against your 
order, but to help in allaying the discredit we all share.51 
 
He includes the jury in his analysis of the situation and suggests that he and the other 
senators share a common concern, namely to maintain their monopoly over the courts. To do 
this, Cicero and the jurors must demonstrate their commitment to Republican values such as 
‘veritas’, ‘integritas’, ‘fides’, and ‘religio’.52 In other words, their conduct too is on show 
and the jury are ascribed a dual role on Cicero’s stage: they are both the spectators and the 
spectacle of this particular drama. Cicero himself was unable to resist drawing this same 
comparison: the trial of Verres was to be the greatest spectacle he could offer the people of 
Rome during his aedileship.53 
Cicero’s Republican ēthos stands in contrast to that of Verres. According to Cicero, 
Verres was one aristocrat who defied the limits of acceptable Roman behaviour. Wealthy 
and arrogant, he pretends to be a connoisseur of art (Verr. II.4.33). Like an old Bithynian 
king, he travels in a litter resting on a maltese cushion stuffed with rose-petals, dabbing 
his nose with a small bag of potpourri (Verr. II.5.27). He wears Greek robes and 
54 55
 
51 Verr. I.2: Cicero takes care here not to deliver a direct attack on the jurors for their corruption but 
to praise them as the only court honest enough to take thought for their reputation; cf. Quint. Inst. 
4.1.21 for discussion of the various strategies for coping with a prejudiced or impartial jury. 
Quintilian cautions against issuing direct thre
Cicero had, in fact, done at Verr. 1.36, 50).  
52 See in particular Verr. II.1.4: ‘A greater means of ensuring the safety of the res publica cannot 
currently be found than for the Roman people to realize that – due to the prosecutor’s careful 
rejection of jurors – our allies, laws, and res publica are being preserved by a court of senators. Nor 
could there be a more fatal blow to our prosperity than that the Roman people should believe that 
considerations of truth, integrity, honesty and the gods have all been cast aside by this order’ (Neque 
enim salus ulla rei publicae maior hoc tempore reperiri potest quam populum Romanum intellegere, 
diligenter reiectis ab accusatore iudicibus, socios, leges, rem publicam senatorio consilio maxime 
posse defendi; neque tanta fortunis omnium pernicies ulla potest accedere quam
Romani rationem veritatis, integritatis, fidei, religionis ab hoc ordine abiudicari’). 
53 Cic. Verr.
polliceor.’ 
54 For jokes about Verres’ costume and/or the accusation of ‘going Greek’ see: Verr. II.4. 54-55; 
5.31, 40, 86, 137. The accusation was part of a long-standing, anti-Greek tradition. Famously Scipio 
Africanus was accused of exactly this behaviour while at Syracuse in ca. 205 BC (Livy 29.19.11-12; 
Val. Max. 3.6.1; Plut. Vit. Cat. Mai. 3.7; Tac. Ann. 2.59); some discussion in N. Petrochilos, Roman 
attitudes to the Greeks (Athens 1974) 31, A. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘To be Roman, go Greek: thoughts on 
Hellenization at Rome’, in Modus operandi: essays in honour of Geoffrey Rickman, BICS Suppl. 71, 
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stances of performance in the Actio Secunda are included 
me
eged 
rea
eds. M. Austin, J. Harries, and C. Smith (London 1998) 79-91, A. R. Dyck, ‘Dressing to kill: attire 
presentation of Verres’ character, Cicero could draw upon topoi and themes that were 
originally Greek;56 but the physiognomy of the Greek tyrant also played a central part in 
Cicero’s rhetorical strategy in the Verrines.57 One mark of the tyrant was his arrogance 
(‘superbia’), and it is this which leads Verres to think the law does not apply to him – a 
point Cicero seeks to prove by commenting on his countenance. Verres gets his way by 
bribery, threats, and intimidation: ‘you can see that by the look on his face and the 
defiance (‘contumacia’) and arrogance (‘superbia’) in his eyes’, Cicero claims at In 
Verrem II.3.5.58 As he had used the appearance of Caecilius to support his claims of 
inadequacy in the Divinatio, so now Cicero directs his audience’s attention to Verres’ 
alleged reaction to corroborate his character presentation. A similar strategy is used in the 
descriptions of Verres’ associates: Gaius Claudius makes a show of offering Verres legal 
advice (Verr. II.2.108), while Apronius, like Verres, wears an expression of defiance 
(Verr. II.3.22: ‘contumacia’). The caricature of each man is ostensibly directed towards 
proving the accusations against them: Claudius was the man appointed as a sham advocate 
in the trial of Sthenius (Verr. II.2.106-07); Apronius was an irascible tax-collector in 
Sicily (Verr. II.3.22-24) – Verres’ double and his right-hand man. 
One might object that such in
rely to keep up the ‘fiction’ of its delivery. But this line of argument fails to account for 
the inclusion of similar instances in the speeches which we know for certain were 
delivered. As we saw in the Divinatio, references to Caecilius’ reactions were not simply a 
matter of bestowing a spontaneous appearance on the published texts; rather comments on 
his opponent’s envisaged behaviour belong to a repertoire of ‘surprise tactics’ which 
Cicero uses to strengthen his argument.59 Thus ex tempore allusions do not serve solely to 
reproduce or evoke the atmosphere of the court. Rather, if we look at them as 
performative aspects (real or imagined), they show what strategies were considered 
effective and how they could contribute to the development of the orator’s argument. 
This observation may be corroborated by taking a closer look at Verres’ other all
ctions in the Actio Secunda, and it is significant that the extemporization in all of the 
instances under consideration occurs when Cicero presents the evidence against the 
 
as a proof and means of characterization in Cicero’s speeches’, Arethusa 34 (2001) 119-30, C. E. W. 
Steel, Cicero, rhetoric, and empire (Oxford 2001) 30, Tempest, ‘Prosecution techniques’ (n.21, 
above) chapter 6. 
55 Verr. II.1.33, 3.78, 5. 33, 5.80-84, 5.86. 
56 See K. Tempest, ‘Saints and sinners: some thoughts on the presentation of character in Attic 
oratory and Cicero’s Verrines’, in Sicilia nutrix plebis Romanae: rhetoric, law & taxation in 
Cicero’s Verrines, BICS Suppl. 97, ed. J. R. W. Prag (London 2007) 19-36 (27-36). 
57 J. R. Dunkle, ‘The Greek tyrant and Roman political invective of the late Republic’, Transactions 
of the American Philological Association 98 (1967) 151-71, Vasaly, Representations (n.10, above) 
esp. 122-24, 213-15, Steel, Cicero, rhetoric and empire (n.54, above) 30-31, 34-35. 
58 ‘sed etiam oris oculorumque illa contumacia ac superbia quam videtis.’ 
59 This is not the place for a full discussion of improvisation in Cicero’s speeches; good discussions 
include J. Wisse, Ethos & pathos from Aristotle to Cicero (Amsterdam 1989) 257, from whom I 
borrow the phrase ‘surprise tactics’, and Gotoff, ‘Oratory: the art of illusion’ (n.15, above).  
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defendant. For instance, P. Vettius Chilo (Verres’ own brother-in-law) had not been 
produced as a witness in the Actio Prima, but was apparently expected to speak in the 
Actio Secunda. Verres’ surprise at his appearance is written into the speech: ‘Verres is 
amazed and is wondering what Vettius will say’.60 This example highlights the advantage 
to be gained by holding back some of the prosecution witnesses until the second hearing; 
a tactic that was particularly relevant for trials de repetundis. At the same time, Cicero’s 
comments on his opponent’s envisaged reaction, and the fact that Verres seems alarmed, 
serve the obvious rhetorical function of lending his accusations greater weight. 
Earlier, Verres had also objected to the manner in which Cicero reported his edict: ‘He 
says I am not reading all of it; that appears to be what he means by shaking his head.’61 In 
the event, Cicero gratifies Verres by instructing the clerk to read more, only to reveal 
further instances of illegality in Verres’ clauses. This tactic of ‘close reading’ is one that 
Cicero often uses when he presents documentary evidence to the court.62 We can compare 
for example his handling of a letter sent to Verres by Timarchides at Verr. II.3.154-63; 
here Cicero instructs the clerk to read the evidence while continuously interjecting with 
his own subjective comments. We can also imagine that Cicero held some of the 
documents in his hands and referred to them directly to draw attention to the veracity of 
his evidence. Thus at Verr. II.5.113 Cicero appears to read from a defence speech 
composed by Furius of Heraclea, charging Verres with cruelty for inflicting the 
death-penalty upon him: ‘Next, I see that he said another thing …’63 The fact that Cicero 
paraphrases the speech, apparently on the spot, tragically evokes the dead man’s last 
words. More importantly, however, we see how Cicero could use other ‘speakers’ in his 
performance to validate the case against Verres.   
Next we may turn to two passages which demonstrate Verres’ reactions as his hopes of 
defending himself were allegedly deflated. In the first, Cicero recalls how Verres deserted 
Carbo and joined the Sullan cause, he states: ‘I see what I have done: he is lifting his head, 
he is hoping that some defence can be puffed up for him on this charge through the 
goodwill and approval of those who hate the name of the late Gnaeus Carbo.’64 In the 
second passage, Cicero anticipates that Verres might appeal to an argument from 
precedent regarding his valuation of corn (detailed in Verr. II.3.118-225), and asks: ‘Do 
you intend to refer to Marcus Antonius’ valuation of the corn and his exaction of money?’ 
Again, he builds in Verres’ response: ‘“Yes”, he replies, “to Antonius” – this is what his 
nod of assent seems to mean.’65 Again, Cicero’s comments on Verres’ reactions are 
deliberately included to serve Cicero’s immediate rhetorical agenda: to portray Verres as a 
60 Verr. II.3.167: ‘Admiratur et exspectat quidnam Vettius dicturus sit.’ 
61 Verr. II.3.26: ‘Negat me recitare totum; nam id significare nutu videtur.’ 
62 Cf. e.g. Verr. II.1.104-18 (Verres’ urban edict); on the tactic of ‘close reading’, see Butler, Hand 
of Cicero (n.26, above) 52. 
63 Verr. II.5.113: ‘Deinde etiam illud video esse dictum …’ 
64 Verr. II.1.35: ‘Video quid egerim: erigit se, sperat sibi auram posse aliquam adflari in hoc crimine 
voluntatis defensionisque eorum quibus Cn. Carbonis mortui nomen odio sit’. 
65 Verr. II.3.213: ‘An me ad M. Antoni aestimationem frumenti exactionemque pecuniae 
revocaturus es? “Ita,” inquit, “ad Antoni”; hoc enim mihi significasse et adnuisse visus est.’ 
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scheming opponent and to implicate his guilt, for Verres looks for a way out rather than 
denying the charges against him. In so doing Cicero assigns to Verres an active role 
within the performance of the Actio Secunda and it adds to the effectiveness of his case.  
Verres, however, was not the only man against whom Cicero had to contend. Indeed, 
one of the striking features of Cicero’s initial description in the Actio Prima is the absence 
of Hortensius; in fact, he is mentioned on just five occasions in this speech and only once 
by way of direct address.66 In both a performative and literary context, his exclusion 
underscores the essential point of Cicero’s rhetorical strategy at the beginning of the trial, 
namely to alienate Verres and to present a force of men united against him.67 But 
Hortensius was not a man who could be ignored for long. This was one of the caveats 
Cicero had issued to Caecilius in the Divinatio; yet Cicero simultaneously gave advance 
warning that he intended to challenge the authority of this distinguished senator, as well as 
the principles upon which his reputation was founded.68 This threat is arguably realized in 
an extended address to Hortensius at Verr. II.3.6-10, where Cicero delivers an 
emotionally-charged diatribe (paraphrased here for simplicity): 
 
Cicero imagines Hortensius asking him: 
 
What personal hostility or what private wrong has led you to undertake this 
prosecution, Cicero?69 
 
To which Cicero replies: 
 
I shall not mention the fact that my close ties with the Sicilians have forced my 
hand in this matter; I shall respond to you (‘tibi’) directly about my feelings of 
hostility. For what greater enmity do you think can exist between men than those 
arising from different principles and conflicting ambitions and desires?70  
 
The topic of personal differences consequently draws Cicero’s attention back to Verres, to 
whom he directs his next question: 
 
66 Verr. I.18-19, I.25-26, I.33 (in direct address), I. 37, I. 38. 
67 It is perhaps for the same reason that we only rarely hear about Hortensius’ subscriptores: Sisenna 
(Verr. II.2.110, II.4.43) and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica (Verr. II.4.79). 
68 Div. Caec. 25: ‘To this man I give warning in advance, if it is your will that I deliver this case, he 
must change his entire method of defending; and he must change it radically, so that he adopts a far 
better and more honorable position than he desires’ (‘Huic ego homini iam ante denuntio, si a me 
causam hanc vos agi volueritis, rationem illi defendendi totam esse mutandum, et ita mutandum ut, 
meliore et honestiore conditione quam qua ipse esse vult uti’). 
69 Paraphrase of Verr. II.3.6: ‘Et in hoc homine saepe a me quaeris, Hortensi, quibus inimicitiis aut 
qua iniuria adductus ad accusandum descenderim?’ 
70 Paraphrase of Verr. II.3.6: ‘Mitto iam rationem offici mei necessitudinisque Siculorum; de ipsis 
tibi inimicitiis respondeo. An tu maiores ullas inimicitias putas esse quam contrarias hominum 
sententias ac dissimilitudines studiorum ac voluntatum?’ This is followed by further examples of the 
contrasting principles and behaviour of Cicero and Verres. 
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men?73 
 
How can a man who believes in equal justice for all not be your bitter enemy, 
Verres (‘tibi’), when he remembers your (‘tuorum’) ‘ad hoc’ and ‘ad lib.’ 
decrees?71 etc. 
 
Finally, he returns his attention back to Hortensius and attacks his scruples in protecting 
men like Verres:  
 
Yet if Verres had acted against me in some matter and had wronged me in my 
private affairs, you would grant that my hostility against him (‘ei’) was justified. 
But when everything he has done has targeted the possessions, principles, way of 
life, interests, and feelings of all good men, you still ask why I am hostile to a man 
(‘ei’) who is hated by the people of Rome?72 … What else can I say? It may seem 
a fickle point but it is enough to stir a few men’s minds against you: namely, the 
fact that your (‘tuam’) friendship and the friendship of all the important men of 
noble birth are more accessible to Verres, barefaced and brazen as he is, than to 
any of us (‘nostrum’) honest and honorable 
 
The changes in address to Hortensius and Verres – indicated by the shifting personal, 
possessive and deictic pronouns – give the appearance of a lively dialogue between the 
main participants in the trial, while the inclusion of the audience on Cicero’s side is 
suggested by the use of ‘nostrum’ to describe all the honest and principled men. This 
strategy of presentation serves to distance Verres and Hortensius from the jury, as well as 
the larger body of the people of Rome, as it creates the impression that Cicero is voicing 
their opinions as much as his own. The cinematic effect, as Cicero switches his focus 
between the two men, has the added advantage of enabling the reader to feel a part of the 
drama. Dealing with an opposing advocate of Hortensius’ stature was no easy task. In the 
Actio Prima when Cicero wishes to downplay Hortensius’ appearance for the defence, he 
pits the struggle in one of two ways: either he presents himself as a relatively junior 
senator facing a senior one (e.g. Verr. I.37), or he couches the duel as a struggle for 
oratorical supremacy (e.g. Verr. I.35). Yet his actual performance here, in the Actio 
Secunda, is much more closely aligned with his anticipation of the fight in the Divinatio 
(n.68, above): as Cicero imagined how Caecilius would be dazzled by Hortensius, he 
affirmed that, by contrast, he intended to question the very honesty and integrity of 
71 Paraphrase of Verr. II.3.6: ‘Qui iure aequo omnis putat esse oportere, is tibi non infestissimus sit, 
cum cogitet varietatem libidinemque decretorum tuorum?’ This is followed by further examples of 
the contrasting principles and behaviour of Cicero and Verres. 
72 Paraphrase of Verr. II.3.7: ‘An si qua in re contra rem meam decrevisset aliquid iniuria, iure ei me 
inimicum esse arbitrarere: cum omnia contra omnium bonorum rem causam, rationem utilitatem 
voluntatemque fecerit, quaeris cur ei sim inimicus cui populus Romanus infestus est?’  
73 Paraphrase of Verr. II.3.7: ‘Quid? illa quae leviora videntur esse non cuiusvis animum possent 
movere, quod ad tuam ipsius amicitiam ceterorumque hominum magnorum atque nobilium 
faciliorem aditum istius habet nequitia et audacia quam cuiusquam nostrum virtus et integritas?’ 
This is followed by further rhetorical questions and exclamatory phrases denouncing Hortensius’ 
friendship with Verres. 
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Hortensius’ conduct. In the event, this challenge was all dramatically staged as a 
confrontation between the three main characters. 
So far then we have seen how Cicero could represent the dynamics of a live 
performance in the written text, and also how he could successfully and spontaneously 
exploit the moment to corroborate his arguments. As Cicero had suggested in the 
Divinatio, the performance of a speech contributes to the projection of the speaker’s own 
ēthos as well as the presentation of his opponents’ characters. In these important respects, 
then, Cicero’s performance in the In Verrem mirrors both the precepts and strategies he 
had earlier outlined. But it remains to ask what difficulties the prosecutor in particular 
faced in delivering his case. In the Divinatio Cicero had highlighted a number of qualities 
that the orator ought to possess: diligence, a good memory, and the strength of voice and 
body. And in the course of the In Verrem, Cicero’s meta-rhetorical comments continue as 
he reflects on his performance in these areas.74 Yet as he questioned Caecilius’ ability in 
the Divinatio, Cicero alluded to a further challenge faced specifically by the prosecutor: 
‘Do you think you can accomplish what is especially necessary in a case of this sort: make 
all his acts of lust, impiety and cruelty appear as bitter and as unjust to those who will be 
listening as they felt to those who actually witnessed them?’75 In short, the prosecutor 
needed to excite anger and pity for the victims of his opponent’s injustices and a key 
resource in this task was the presentation of evidence. 
 
III. Further Aspects of Performance: The Presentation of Evidence 
 
Cicero had a staggering number of witnesses, whom we know of by name, to present 
during the course of the trial.76 As for deputations, we know that whole groups of men 
stood up at the same time to condemn Verres.77 The testimonies of all these men required 
a great deal of stage management on Cicero’s part: the delivery of their evidence and the 
effect on the original audience must accordingly be included in any analysis of the 
performance of the speech as a whole. That Cicero envisaged the handling of the 
74 Thus, for example, Cicero often stresses his diligence in conducting the evidence (e.g. Verr. I.6; 
cf. Cic. Scaur. 25-26) and arranging it systematically: dispositio (Verr. II.4.87). He refers to the 
challenge of memoria at Verr. II.4.57; as he reaches the climax of the Actio Secunda, the narrative 
of Publius Gavius’ execution, he questions whether he has the strength of voice and eloquence 
(elocutio) to sustain his performance (Verr. II.5.158).  
75 Div. Caec. 38: ‘Putasne posse, id quod in eius modi reo maxime necesarium est, facere ut, quae 
ille libidinose, quae nefarie, quae crudeliter fecerit, ea aeque acerba et indigna videantur esse his qui 
audient atque illis visa sunt qui senserunt?’ 
76 According to my last count, 57 named witnesses testified in the Actio Prima while Cicero 
reserved a further 13 for the Actio Secunda; see Tempest, ‘Prosecution techniques’ (n.21, above) 
242-47. 
77 E.g. Verr. II.2.120 (legati from Catina, Centuripae, Halaesa and Panhormus); Verr. II.2.175 
(decumani); Verr. II.3.73, 120 (legati from Agyrium); Verr. II.3.103 (people from Agrigentum); 
Verr. II.3.105-06, 4.114 (legati from Aetna); Verr. II.4.70 (homines e conventu of Syracuse); Verr. 
II.4.104 (legati from Melita); Verr.  II.5.10 (homines e conventu of Syracuse); Verr. II.5.158 (people 
from Regium and Vibo/Valentia). 
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witnesses as part of the orator’s overall performance may be inferred from his own 
reflective comments on how he succeeded in the Actio Prima (II.1.29): 
 
Etenim sic me ipsum egisse memoria tenetis ut in testibus interrogandis omnia 
crimina proponerem et explicarem, ut, cum rem totam in medio posuissem, tum 
denique testem interrogarem. 
 
You will remember how I myself delivered (‘egisse’) my accusation in such a way 
that I explained and exposed the whole charge during the examination of the 
witnesses, and how I first made the point at issue clear and only then examined my 
witness. 
 
On a procedural level, Cicero here recalls how he cut short the Actio Prima and proceeded 
directly to the examination of the witnesses – a strategy which he elsewhere claims was 
not unprecedented.78 But he also picks up on the advice he had given in the Divinatio79 to 
explain that the charges were not just established and exposed, they were incorporated 
within and integral to the orator’s overall performance: the force of the ‘cum … tum’ 
clause makes this last point especially clear, as does the emphasis on the prosecutor’s 
personal involvement (‘me ipsum’).  
One only needs to read Cicero’s later speeches and rhetorical works to realize that the 
presentation of witnesses notoriously involved a careful degree of ‘stage management’,80 
and that a number of standard tricks had emerged. Cicero could mock such clichés of 
performance when it suited his purpose to do so; hence his contrived amazement at the 
thought that Hortensius might allude to Verres’ scars (Verr. II.5.32).81 Yet we also know 
that he did not shy away from such manipulative performances himself. In a revealing 
autobiographical remark, Cicero observes that he normally delivered the closing oration 
whenever several speakers spoke for the defence (Brut. 190; cf. Orat. 130), precisely 
because he excelled at emotional appeals.82 And he reflects on the success of one such 
78 Verr. I.55; commenting on this passage, pseudo-Asconius provides the details of a precedent: 
L. Lucullus and M. Lucullus in their prosecution of L. Cotta (Stangl, 222).  
79 Compare Cicero’s dictum ‘dicenda, demonstranda, explicanda sunt omnia’ at Div. 39 with the 
reflection here that he had set forth (‘proponerem’) and exposed (‘explicarem’) the charges against 
Verres before introducing the witnesses. 
80 Thus Cicero accused the prosecutors of Fonteius of preparing their witnesses at home (Cic. Font. 
22); Quintilian also preserves a variety of anecdotes about the kind of tricks used (Inst. 6.1.30) and 
suggests a number of defences that could be used against them (Inst. 6.1.46-48). For fuller 
discussion of ‘stage management’, see Hall ‘Oratorical delivery’ (n.35, above) 229-32. 
81 This was a strategy that Marcus Antonius had used to great effect in the trial of Manlius Aquilius 
by dramatically revealing his client’s scarred chest, as Cicero tells us at Verr. II.5.3. The technique 
was part of a broader appeal regarding the defendant’s military achievements, used by Cicero 
elsewhere in his speeches (e.g. Rab. Post. 36); cf. Quintilian’s claim that the ‘defendant gains credit 
from his bravery, scars received in battle, and the ancestry and deeds of his elders’ (Quint. Inst. 
6.1.21: ‘Periclitantem vero commendat dignitas et studia fortia et susceptae cicatrices et nobilitas et 
merita maiorum’). 
82 For a survey of Cicero’s tactics in the perorations, see the discussion by M. Winterbottom, 
‘Perorations’ in Cicero the advocate (n.11, above) 215-32. 
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appeal in the presentation of his evidence against Verres during the Actio Prima: 
Hortensius had allegedly denounced Cicero’s production in court of the young boy Iunius, 
who stood beside his uncle in his praetexta toga as the latter gave evidence testifying to 
Verres’ cruelty (Verr. II.1.151-2). The performance was intensified by the fact that the 
poverty-stricken Iunius was no longer wearing his bulla, the childhood locket that 
symbolized his free-birth: ‘the people wept as much as I did, as did you Hortensius, and as 
did these men who are about to deliver their verdict.’83  
This first stage of the trial was particularly dramatic to judge from Cicero’s version of 
events. Verres had leapt to his feet when Marcus Annius gave evidence against him (Verr. 
II.2.73). Hortensius had complained that Artemo, the official witness of Centuripa, was 
behaving more like a prosecutor than a witness (Verr. II.2.156). The audience had laughed 
and the jury was amazed when Cicero cross-examined Heius of Messana (Verr. II.4.27); 
Heius was responsible for delivering Messana’s official eulogy of Verres yet Cicero had 
nevertheless called him as a witness against his former governor: a not altogether risky 
strategy, Cicero admits, as he had done his research (Verr. II.4.16). Finally, a particularly 
heated moment seems to have occurred while the audience was listening to the evidence 
of Gaius Numitorius, who testified against Verres on the charge of having crucified 
Gavius of Consa: the audience was so enraged that the presiding praetor, M. Glabrio, had 
to adjourn the trial while the witness was still speaking.84 Cicero insists that he had 
refrained from speaking with his usual vehemence for precisely the same reason: for fear 
of generating further hostility.85  
Anecdotes in the Actio Secunda thus provide a valuable insight into how Cicero may 
have presented the evidence against Verres in the Actio Prima. Even if we cannot know 
for sure that these events happened as Cicero describes, nevertheless the published 
speeches lead us towards a fuller appreciation of the techniques used in oratorical 
performances, and the kinds of emotions the orator could trigger in his audience. For this 
reason, we can include instances of emotional appeals in the Actio Secunda which furnish 
further proof of the theatricality and skill involved in an oratorical performance.  
83 Verr. II.1.153: ‘Neque erant hae lacrimae populares magis quam nostrae, quam tuae, Q. Hortensi, 
quam horum qui sententiam laturi sunt.’ The reference to tears was a common and persuasive 
feature in emotional appeals. Other examples include: Cic. Font. 46 (the defendant’s family); Cic. 
Cluent. 201 (the defendant’s); Cic. Planc. 104 (the tears of the court-magistrate, the jury, and 
Cicero’s); Cic. Mil. 92 (Cicero’s); Quint. Inst. 6.1.30-2 (the audience’s). For further discussion of 
emotional appeals and the use of tears, see Winterbottom, ‘Perorations’ (n.82, above) 217-27.  
84 Verr. II.5.163: ‘repente consilium in medio testimonio dimitteret.’ 
85Verr. II.1.163:‘Nolui tam vehementer agere hoc prima actione, iudices, nolui.’ Perhaps it was the 
tendency of the less-skilled prosecutor to deliver unyielding attacks against his opponent and that 
Cicero’s own guidance to steer clear of them should be inferred from his own practice in the 
Verrines. Compare, for example, Cicero’s remark at Verr. II.5.19: ‘I shall not deal with him so 
bitterly, nor shall I adopt that habit among prosecutors and charge him with having acted negligently 
if he has acted with clemency, or arouse ill-will and say he has acted with cruelty if he has punished 
a man rather severely.’ (‘Non agam tam acerbe, non utar ista accusatoria consuetudine, si quid est 
factum clementer, ut dissolute factum criminer, si quid vindicatum est severe, ut ex eo crudelitatis 
invidiam colligam.’) 
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 A good example occurs at Verr. II.1.90-5, when Cicero denounces Verres’ treatment of 
his own ward, the son of Malleolus. Pity and anger are simultaneously exploited as Cicero 
apostrophizes Verres directly, asking (II.1.93): 
 
Cum tibi se tota Asia spoliandum ac vexandam praebuisset, cum tibi exposita esset 
omnis ad praedandum Pamphylia, contentus his tam opimis rebus non fuisti? manus 
a tutela, manus a pupillo, manus a sodalis filio abstinere non potuisti? 
 
With all Asia offered you to harry and plunder, Verres, and all Pamphylia at the 
mercy of your piratical raids, did such riches as that not satisfy you? Could you not 
keep your hands from outraging your guardian’s duty, your ward, your friend’s son? 
  
Cicero’s use of anaphora (‘manus...manus...manus’) and the ascending tricolon 
(‘tutela...pupillo...sodalis filio’) mark the beginning of an elaborate emotional plea.  Present 
at the trial were the young Malleolus, his mother and grandmother, who had presumably 
been coached so that Cicero could point to the women as they wept with sorrow (Verr. 
II.1.94: ‘miserae flentes’). Immediately before Cicero presents their evidence to the court, 
the plea climaxes with a prosopopoeia in which Cicero imagines the elder Malleolus rising 
from the dead to rebuke Verres (II.1.94):  
  
Ipsum putato adesse. Homo avarissime et spurcissime, redde bona sodalis filio, si 
non quae abstulisti, at quae confessus es! Cur cogis sodalis filium hanc primam in 
foro vocem cum dolore et querimonia emittere? cur sodalis uxorem, sodalis socrum, 
domum denique totam sodalis mortui contra te testimonium dicere? cur 
pudentissimas lectissimasque feminas in tantum virorum conventum insolitas 
invitasque prodire cogis? Recita omnium testimonia. 
 
Imagine Malleolus is here in person. ‘O most greedy and filthiest man, return the 
property to your friend’s son, if not all of what you have stolen then at least that part 
to which you confess!  Why do you make the first words that this boy utters in the 
forum be full of grief and complaint? Why do you force a friend’s wife, mother-in-
law, a dead friend’s entire household to give evidence against you? Why do you 
force these chaste and excellent women to come in the midst of such a gathering of 
men to which they are unwilling and unaccustomed?’ Recite all their evidence. 
  
The prosopopoeia required great vocal powers and is itself a powerful example of 
Cicero’s command of the forensic stage.86 But more impressive, perhaps, are the shifting 
visuals as the audience’s attention and emotions are directed, through the eyes of 
Malleolus, away from the abominable Verres, past the pitiful image of his son making his 
first appearance in the forum (i.e. what should usually be a joyous occasion), to end 
finally on the modesty of the women as they make an unwillingly entry into the 
male-dominated law courts. ‘Malleolus’ uses the word ‘sodalis’ several times in 
apposition to himself which has the effect of aligning the audience’s perspective with that 
of the assumed speaker. It is tempting to imagine a pregnant pause after the final ‘cogis’, 
before Cicero brings the audience back to the realities of the trial procedure with a sharp 
jolt: ‘Recita omnium testimonia’.  
86 Quint. Inst. 9.2.29 comments on the vocal power necessary to perform such a prosopopeia.  
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Another illustrative example of the ways in which an orator could display his 
witnesses ‘rhetorically’ – i.e. while fully exploiting all the tricks of emotional 
manipulation – can be found in the case of Sthenius: a man who had earlier been 
renowned for his utmost virtue and nobility, but was now famous for his personal ruin and 
the injustices suffered at the hands of Verres (Verr. II.2.83). The downfall of a formerly 
prosperous man is one of the strategies that Cicero recommends as an effective emotional 
appeal in his rhetorical works (Part. or. 57); but it is the dramatization of his reverse in 
fortunes which is particularly relevant here: for Sthenius sat beside Cicero in the trial, and 
we later discover that he appeared ‘sordidus’, with unkempt hair and disheveled 
clothing:87 ‘Look, look, members of the jury, at the squalor and disgrace of our allies!’, 
Cicero exclaims as he turns their attention towards the pitiful state of Verres’ victims 
generally, and pointing out Sthenius specifically.88  
Cicero nowhere mentions in the speech that he has produced, or will produce, Sthenius 
himself as a witness. There is of course a danger in arguing from silence here but, given 
Cicero’s vociferous references to the testimony of his witnesses elsewhere, it seems 
unlikely that he would neglect to mention Sthenius’ testimony had he indeed provided it. 
Roman court procedure also allowed for written statements to be deposited and read out in 
lieu of oral testimony and this effectively spared the witness from cross-examination.89 
Yet Sthenius does not appear to have testified against Verres at all and it may well be that 
he was regarded as disqualified from giving evidence.90 If so, the pathetic image of him 
standing in squalid silence would offer a visual reinforcement to Cicero’s narrative. 
To dramatize Sthenius’ reversal of fortunes effectively, however, Cicero needed to 
present the height from which he had fallen. Sthenius had become Verres’ enemy when he 
successfully opposed Verres’ attempt to remove the public treasures from his city of 
Thermae.  And this aspect of the case is used with great effect by Cicero as he gives a 
précis, in oratio recta, of the speech Sthenius had delivered in the local Senate:  ‘better to 
leave Thermae altogether than for the city to endure losing the ancestral monuments, the 
enemy’s spoils, these gifts of a distinguished man, the tokens of alliance and friendship 
with the people of Rome.’91 The use of asyndeton – whether a feature of Sthenius’ 
original speech or, more likely, Cicero’s own – leads to a sense of heightened 
empassionment, which is further enhanced by ‘das Gesetz der wachsenden Glieder’:92 the 
87 Verr. II.2.83: ‘Sthenius est, hic qui nobis adsidet, Thermitanus’; cf. Verr. II.5.128: ‘Sthenius hic 
Thermitanus cum hoc capillo atque veste …’ For the appeal to pity by appearing ‘squalidus’ cf. 
Quint. Inst. 6.1.30. 
88 Verr. II.5.128: ‘Aspicite, aspicite, iudices, squalorem sordisque sociorum!’ 
89 For this strategy see Cic. Cluent. 166-68 and Cael. 55. 
90 A. W. Lintott, ‘The citadel of the allies’, in Sicilia nutrix plebis Romanae: rhetoric, law & 
taxation in Cicero’s Verrines, BICS Suppl. 97, ed. J. R. W. Prag (London 2007) 5-36 (14 n.38) also 
admits this as a possibility. 
91 Verr. II.2.88: ‘urbem relinquere Thermitanis esse honestius quam pati tolli ex urbe monumenta 
maiorum, spolia hostium, beneficia clarissimi viri, indicia societatis populi Romani atque amicitiae.’ 
92 See O. Behagel, ‘Beziehungen zwischen Umfang und Reihenfolge von Satzgliedern’, 
Indogermanische Forschungen 25 (1909) 110-41, and E. Lindholm, Stilistische Studien zur 
Erweiterung der Satzglieder im Lateinischen (Lund 1931).   
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progressive rhythm produced by the parallelism of clauses of increasing length in a 
sentence.93 This use of language has several effects in the delivery: first, the audience is 
transposed into the original setting of Sthenius’ speech, so that they feel the passion of his 
language and share in the torment as he recalls the importance of these statues. Secondly, 
the speech reminds the jury of Sthenius’ former esteem and influence; for he deeply 
moved all his hearers and everyone agreed that it would be better to die than let Verres 
deprive them of their heritage (Verr. II.2.88). In short, Cicero’s presentation of the case 
evokes Sthenius’ career at both its peak and nadir to excite the audience’s compassion. 
More cynically, however, the performance also directs our attention away from the glaring 
fact that Verres technically seems not to have done anything wrong – a fact that Cicero 
grudgingly admits in an aside: Verres was thwarted in his alleged attempt to remove the 
public statues from Thermae (Verr. II.2.88). 
The story of Verres’ failed ‘crime’, however, only sets the scene for the following 
chain of events in Cicero’s narrative, which will be used to guide the jury’s interpretation 
of the evidence presented. To provide some context first: following Sthenius’ successful 
opposition to his demands, Verres instigated a prosecution against the Sicilian on the 
charge that he had corrupted public documents. Moreover, when Verres announced that he 
would judge the trial himself, Sthenius fled to Rome. The verdict was settled against 
Sthenius in his absence whereupon a capital charge was also filed against him. Sthenius’ 
case was then taken up at Rome, where the consuls Cn. Lentulus and L. Gellius moved the 
resolution that men in the provinces should not be prosecuted on capital charges in 
absentia. A decision was not reached and no further discussion followed. Thus Verres 
proceeded to prosecute Sthenius in his absence for a second time, and on the 1st 
December 72 BC he was found guilty.94 
Technically speaking, Hortensius could argue that Verres had still not done anything 
illegal as prosecutions in absentia were clearly not prohibited at the time of Sthenius’ 
conviction; indeed this seems to have been his first line of defence (Verr. II.2.101). Yet 
the matter appears to have been emotionally charged: the tribune M. Palicanus had 
reopened the case of Sthenius at Rome, when the tribunes had issued an edict banishing 
from Rome anyone who had been convicted on a capital charge. Cicero himself had 
successfully pleaded Sthenius’ case and the tribunes consequently exempted him. Verres 
may have made a dangerous decision at this point: to falsify the records and pretend that 
Sthenius had been present at the second trial. And it is this act of self-contradiction that 
Cicero exploits in his presentation of the evidence. Four witnesses testified in the Actio 
Prima that Verres had publically and officially stated that prosecutions in absentia were 
legal (Verr. II.2.102-03). And as he recalls their testimony, Cicero simultaneously 
presents the jury with Verres’ forged record of the trial: ‘Please present the codex; take it 
round and show it to the court. Do you see how his [Sthenius’] whole name, which says 
he was present when prosecuted, is written over an erasure? What was written there 
before? What lie does that erasure conceal? Are you waiting for us to argue this charge, 
93 Cicero himself recognised this as a technique at De or. 3.186. 
94 For the full details, see Cicero’s long account at Verr. II.2.89-100. 
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members of the jury? We are saying nothing. The documents are among you, and they cry 
out that they have been corrupted and forged.’95 
The use of exhibits and the instructions to the court attendant are both performative 
features that we see preserved elsewhere in the published text of the Verrines.96 But the 
inclusion of the ‘iudices’ also brings into play the role of the jury in Cicero’s performance. 
The case of Sthenius illustrates one way in which the jury could be transformed from a 
passive into an active entity: here their inspection of the evidence and consensus that they 
have been forged obfuscate the fact that Verres had not actually done anything illegal.  
Alternatively, Cicero could make his audience participate in the performance by 
putting them under the metaphorical spotlight. At Verr. II.1.56-57, for instance, Cicero 
draws a positive exemplum from the juror, Publius Servilius, who had successfully 
commanded Roman forces against Olympus seven years earlier. In this passage, Cicero 
establishes a series of contrasts between Verres and Servilius: Servilius was an effective 
commander, whereas Cicero will argue against Verres’ claim to military success in Verr. 
II.5; Servilius had placed the spoils of his success in the public areas of Rome, unlike 
Verres who had used the statues to furnish private estates – either his own or those of his 
friends; Servilius had also kept precise records of the number of statues he brought back, 
even including their size, shape and posture. These accounts, which had been deposited in 
the Aerarium, were subsequently presented to the court as evidence of good account-
keeping (Verr. II.1.57).97 The identification and inclusion of Servilius in this way is a 
tactic by which Cicero manages to make his arguments seem more personal and thus 
effective. At the same time, it forms a part of his wider rhetorical strategy to remind the 
senatorial class that their conduct, too, is on show. 
A more poignant effect, however, is created when Cicero comments on the jury’s 
reaction to the events he narrates. We have already seen how Cicero refers back to the 
Actio Prima to reflect on the emotions he aroused at that stage of the trial. Next, however, 
we may consider a passage in which Cicero meta-rhetorically evokes the atmosphere of 
the court as he narrates the famous pirate episode in the Actio Secunda (II.5.123):   
95 Verr. II.2.104: ‘Cedo, quaeso, codicem, circumfer, ostende. Videtisne totum hoc nomen, coram 
ubi facit delatum, esse in litura? Quid fuit istic antea scriptum? Quod mendum ista litura correxit? 
Quid a nobis, iudices, exspectatis argumenta huius criminis? Nihil dicimus; tabulae sunt in medio, 
quae se corruptas atque interlitas esse clamant.’ 
96 For other props cf. e.g. Verr. II.2.113, where Cicero refers to a bronze inscription recording 
Sthenius’ benefactions, formerly set up in the Senate house at Thermae, which he will use to 
demonstrate his reputation and achievements. At several points in the speech, Cicero asks the court 
attendant to read aloud documentary evidence (e.g. Verr. II.1.36-37, 79, 83-84, 96, 128; II.2.183; 
II.3.26-27, 45, 74, 83, 85, 89, 100, 102, 106, 120, 123-28, 154-57; II.4.12, 143-44; II.5.50, 54, 61). 
A telling example is at Verr. II.3.106, where Cicero instructs the clerk to read the evidence again 
louder so that the larger gathering may hear (‘Dic, dic, quaeso, clarius, ut populus Romanus … 
audiat’). 
97 A similar strategy of isolation can be found at Verr. II.3.210-11, where Cicero points out that 
neither Publius Servilius Isauricus nor Quintus Lutatius Catulus had profited financially from their 
respective corn allowances. Compare, too, Cicero’s treatment of C. Claudius Marcellus: at Verr. 
II.3.212 he is praised for his services as a former governor of Sicily, while the memory of his 
famous ancestor is invoked at Verr. II.4.89-90.  
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Per deos immortalis! quo tandem animo sedetis, iudices, aut haec quem ad modum 
auditis? Vtrum ego desipio et plus quam satis est doleo tanta calamitate miseriaque 
sociorum, an vos quoque hic acerbissimus innocentium cruciatus et maeror pari 
sensu doloris adficit? Ego enim cum Herbitensem, cum Heracliensem securi 
percussum esse dico, versatur mihi ante oculos indignitas calamitatis. 
 
Immortal gods! How do you feel, members of the jury, or how do you react as you 
sit and listen to this story? Am I out of my mind and being overly upset by the 
calamity and misery our allies are suffering? Or does the excruciating and bitter 
grief of innocent men upset you as much as it does me? For my part, when I tell 
you that a man from Herbita or a man from Heraclea has been executed, the 
shameful injustice of their fate flashes before my eyes.  
 
By apostrophizing his jury and asking them to correct him if he is wrong, Cicero simulates a 
common experience of grief which in turn contributes to the performance dynamic. It is 
significant that Cicero claims to have been personally moved by his own performance; in his 
later rhetorical works, Cicero suggests the need for the orator himself to feel the emotions he 
wishes to excite (cf. e.g. Brut. 198; De or. 2.189-96). But we notice here that Cicero was 
even more carried away by his own speech than his audience was. In the De Oratore, 
‘Antonius’ provides a number of reasons for this phenomenon: the orator’s concern with his 
reputation is one, but his loyalty (‘fides’), duty (‘officium’) and diligence (‘diligentia’) all 
feed into his performance (De or. 2.192). In the In Verrem, however, Cicero may even give 
away a rare trick of the trade: that the fate of Verres’ victims flashed before his eyes (‘mihi 
ante oculos’) recalls the rhetorical device of enargeia, or vivid description. And it is clear 
from the context that it was Cicero’s own ability to bring a story to life that had prompted 
him to feel the emotions he desired to impart to his audience.98 
Space does not permit a full examination of Cicero’s presentation of the evidence in 
the In Verrem. But there is enough here from which we may draw a few general 
observations. Perhaps the clearest point arising from this discussion is that Cicero’s 
presentation of the evidence was an integral aspect of his own performance, and that this 
performance needed to be convincing. This statement might seem an obvious one to 
make, yet one train of scholarly thought suggests that truth did not matter in the Roman 
courts; rather it was the winning that counted.99 Conversely, Riggsby has argued that the 
Roman jury did believe in their verdicts, with the implication that the jury needed to be 
convinced by the evidence they saw or heard.100 To be sure, the volume and gravity of the 
evidence against Verres suggests that, for the prosecution at least, the task of proving a 
98 On the role of enargeia in the Verrines more generally, see B. Innocenti, ‘Towards a theory of 
vivid description as practised in Cicero’s Verrine orations’, Rhetorica 12.4 (1994) 355-81. 
99 Thus, e.g. J. E. G. Zetzel, ‘Review of Craig: Form as argument in Cicero’s speeches’, Bryn Mawr 
Classical Review 94-01-05 (1994): ‘Truth is not an issue in a Ciceronian forensic oration: winning 
is’.  And he questions whether ‘the truth of the case made any difference to the judge or the jury or 
either’. 
100 A. M. Riggsby, “Did the Romans believe in their verdicts?”, Rhetorica 15.3 (1997) 235-51.  
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man’s guilt rested heavily upon the evidence presented to the jurors.101 In the Actio Prima, 
when Cicero justifies his strategy of omitting a long opening speech, it serves his purpose 
to suggest that the evidence was all that mattered in a court of law (Verr. I.27). Yet this is 
a far cry from proving that the evidence was in itself the most damning aspect of the trial, 
and there was always the risk that a witness may not be believed. As we have seen from 
Cicero’s own practice, it was rather the presentation of the evidence that was integral to 
the success of the speech.   
For guidance in such matters, it is tempting to resort to the rhetorical literature; 
however, this is centered predominantly on the arguments that can be made for and 
against the so-called ‘non-artificial proofs’, among which witnesses and documents are 
included. Thus the topic is kept quite separate from discussions of actio and the 
emotions.102 Conversely, we have seen that witnesses spoke in the Roman courts, they 
could be cross-examined, and they interacted with the advocates in a manner that called 
for a careful degree of stage management. Only Quintilian hints at the possible 
relationship between such emotional appeals and actio when he comments: ‘there are 
other features that might seem relevant to this part and function [i.e. actio]: calling 
forward the defendant, lifting up his children, introducing his relatives, tearing his clothes, 
but these have already been discussed in their proper place’.103 At the same time, 
however, his emphasis on these actions having a ‘proper place’ within the rhetorical 
tradition maintains the distinction: they belong to a discussion of emotions; that is to say, 
to the ‘artistic’ proofs.
In Ciceronian practice the lines between ‘artistic’ and ‘non-artistic’ proofs are not so 
clear-cut; in fact, they are alike in the sense that they are material the orator needs to draw 
on persuasively. But it is precisely here that we return to the problem with which this 
chapter opened: the rhetorical literature offered very few guidelines on this aspect of 
staging a prosecution. Thus, in publishing the Verrines, Cicero offered a corrective to this 
gap in pedagogical material: he showed his audience exactly how to do it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Cicero draws the In Verrem towards its conclusion, he ends on a note of caution and 
reminds the jury that the eyes of the Roman people are upon them (II.5.176): 
 
Omnium nunc oculi coniecti sunt hoc ipso tempore in unum quemque nostrum, qua 
fide ego accusem, qua religione hi iudicent, qua tu ratione defendas. De omnibus 
nobis, si qui tantulum de recta regione deflexerit, non illa tacita existimatio quam 
antea contemnere solebatis, sed vehemens ac liberum populi Romani iudicium 
consequetur. 
101 See Butler, Hand of Cicero (n.26, above) on written evidence, and Tempest, ‘Prosecution 
techniques’ (n.21, above) chapter 8, on the role of witnesses. 
102 Rh. Al. 1442b33-1443a5, Arist. Rh. 1375a21-1377b12, Rhet. Her. 2.9-11, Cic. Part. or. 48-49, 
117, 133; Top. 73; De or. 2.173. Quint. Inst. 5.3.1-5.7.37.  
103 Quint. Inst. 11.3.174: ‘possunt videri alia quoque huius partis atque officii: reos excitare, pueros 
attollere, propinquos producere, vestes laniare, sed suo loco dicta sunt’ 
104 On this point, see Hall, ‘Oratorical delivery’ (n.35, above) 232. 
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The eyes of all men are now turned, at this very time, upon each and every one of 
us, to see how honestly I prosecute, how reverently these men adjudicate, and by 
what method you will present your defence. As far as each and every one of us is 
concerned, if there is just one who may stray from the right path, the result will not 
be that silent disapproval which you have become used to spurning, but a vehement 
and unrestrained condemnation by the Roman people.  
 
The topos of course is a common one; to the modern reader it may even seem hackneyed. 
But if we remember the performative context for which they were written, these words 
take on a more dramatic function. An uneasy tension mounts as the spectator’s line of 
vision is directed sharply towards the key participants in the trial: at Cicero, the jury, and 
finally the defence team. The watchful eye of the Roman people is adroitly exploited as 
Cicero isolates each of the main parties and puts them under the spotlight of forensic 
attention. We have heard the people’s reactions before, at various stages of the trial: their 
groans, laughter, surprise, or anger. Now it is their verdict of the senatorial jury that is 
feared above all. Whether or not the crowd’s reactions had much influence over the jury’s 
decision in reality is a matter of debate;105 yet we must trust that Cicero had created, or 
envisaged having created, a sufficiently hostile environment in order for his warning in 
these lines to work, so that the jury at least felt that the eyes of the Roman people were 
upon them. The pitch and intonation of Cicero’s voice, the movement of his eyes, body, 
and his gestures would have all contributed to the way in which he delivered this threat. 
And by the end of the speech we must imagine that Cicero’s performance had worked. 
This is precisely how Cicero’s ancient reader would have approached the text of a 
forensic speech, aware that a published text would be unlikely to produce a verbatim 
account of the words delivered in court, or even aware, as Pliny certainly was, of a theory 
suggesting the published text was never even spoken.106 The authenticity of the published 
text was not a problem to the ancient reader, who may have picked up the speech for any 
number of reasons. Many were budding orators, hoping to pick up practical hints and tips 
through study and imitation, and the Verrines rapidly became popular as a model of 
prosecution oratory: an extract of the In Verrem (Verr. II.2.3-4) is among the earliest Latin 
papyri to be found in Egypt.107 Furthermore, writing in the first century AD, Quintilian 
105 The positive case is stated, with reference to the Verrines, by F. Millar, The crowd in Rome in the 
late Republic (Ann Arbor 1998) 14: ‘(paradoxically) these undelivered speeches evoking the year 70 
suggest, more than any other evidence we have, the force of popular opinion as mobilized in the 
forum and the way in which the quaestiones functioned both as representatives of the populus and, 
quite literally, under its gaze.’ Millar’s central thesis, that the crowd played an integral role in the 
political processes of the Roman Republic, has been challenged by H. Mouritsen, Plebs and politics 
in the late Roman Republic (Cambridge 2001). 
106 Thus Pliny claims that extemporaneous figures can be found even ‘in those speeches which we 
know were only ever published’ (Plin. Ep. 1.20.10: ‘in iis etiam quas tantum editas scimus’); he is 
here referring specifically to extemporaneous elements in Verr. II.4. 
107 P. Ianda, V 90; dated to 20 BC by R. Cavenaile, Corpus Papyrus Latinarum (Wiesbaden 1958) 
70-71.  
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comments, as if from experience, on the kinds of mistakes students might make in trying 
to impersonate the delivery of the speeches.108  
Yet despite the attested interest in the Verrines, the collection has not been 
systematically investigated by modern scholars under the guiding principle of ‘oratorical 
performance’. To neglect the Verrines, however, is to leave aside the further evidence 
they offer. This evidence appears first in the Divinatio, where Cicero initiates a discourse 
on delivery via his larger articulation of the criteria necessary in a good prosecutor (as 
discussed in Section I). And, secondly, as I hope to have shown, Cicero’s reflections on 
the art of prosecution oratory in the Divinatio combine with the In Verrem to produce 
what is essentially a meta-rhetorical collection of texts: the precepts Cicero has provided 
in discourse are self-consciously put into practice in the main trial (the subject of sections 
II and III). The student reading Cicero’s Verrines, his ‘accusationis septem libris’, 
consequently received a two-fold advantage: oratorical performance in the Verrines 
occurs both in discourse and in action. 
Cicero thus identifies a number of factors that were considered important for an 
oratorical performance, such as the correct use of voice, appropriate gestures, emotional 
appeals, and the presentation of the orator’s own ēthos. Even if Cicero’s comments seem 
neither new nor surprising to the seasoned reader of his speeches and rhetorical works, it 
is significant that his prescriptions anticipate the topics covered in his later rhetorical 
writings. This means that the Divinatio contains Cicero’s earliest exposition of his views 
on performance; furthermore, they can be used to supplement his treatment of this topic 
more generally. For performative aspects work best when we put them back into their 
original context and imagine how the text might have been delivered. In so doing it is 
possible not only to picture the live performance, we can even understand how the 
performative situation was itself part of the orator’s orchestration: the comments on his 
opponent’s reactions, his handling of the witnesses and documentary evidence, and his 
inclusion of the jury were all integral to the orator’s overall performance.109  
 
University of Roehampton 
108 Thus Quint. Inst. 11.3.90 notes that it would be wrong to deliver the period ‘stetit soleatus 
praetor populi Romani’ (Ver. II.5.86) by mimicking Verres leaning on a mistress, or to act out the 
pain of the scourging described at Ver. II.5.162: ‘caedebatur in medio foro Messanae.’   
109 I am grateful to the editors, Jonathan Powell, Lene Rubinstein, and Christos Kremmydas, for the 
invitation to submit this paper, as well as for their helpful suggestions in the editorial process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYNĒGOROI AS ‘HEALERS’ IN THE SOCIAL 
IMAGINATION OF THE IMPERIAL AGE 
 
DIMITRIS KARAMBELAS 
 
1. Synēgoroi and symbolisms of healing in the Oneirocritic tradition.  
 
In the mid second century AD, most probably in Ephesus, or in some other prominent urban 
centre of the Roman province of Asia, Artemidorus of Daldis explained, in the second book 
of his Oneirocritica, the meaning of dreaming of ‘courts of law’ (dikastēria), ‘judges’ 
(dikastai), ‘lawyers’ (dikologoi) and ‘teachers of law’ (nomodidaktai), and how an 
experienced dream interpreter should handle these dream symbols, taking into account the 
situation of his client – both his physical condition and social status (Oneirocritica ii 29 
Pack):    
 
∆ικαστήρια καὶ δικασταὶ καὶ δικολόγοι καὶ νομοδιδάκται πᾶσι ταραχὰς καὶ 
δυσθυμίας καὶ δαπάνας ἀκαίρους προμαντεύονται καὶ τὰ κρυπτὰ ἐλέγχουσι, τοῖς δὲ 
νοσοῦσι κρισίμους ἡμέρας προαγορεύουσιν, ἐν αἷς, ἐὰν μὲν κατ’ ὄναρ νικῶσιν, ἐπὶ 
τὸ βέλτιον μεταβαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δὲ λειφθῶσι κατ’ ὄναρ, τεθνήξονται. εἰ δέ τις δίκην 
ἔχων ὑπολάβοι ἐν τῇ τοῦ δικαστοῦ χώρᾳ καθέζεσθαι, οὐ λειφθήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ὁ 
δικαστὴς ἑαυτοῦ καταδικάζει, ἀλλ’ ἄλλων. Πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς δίκην ἔχουσιν ἰατροὶ 
ὁρώμενοι τὸν ἴσον τοῖς συνηγόροις ἐπέχουσι λόγον. 
 
Courts of law, judges, lawyers, and teachers of law prophesy disturbances, sorrows, 
untimely expenses, and the revelation of secrets for all men. They indicate days of 
crisis for the sick. If the sick are victorious in the dream, their health will change for 
the better. But if they lose in the dream, it means that they will die. But if anyone 
who is actually engaged in a trial dreams that he is sitting in the judge’s seat, it 
signifies that he will not lose. For a judge passes sentence not upon himself but upon 
other men. Furthermore, for those who are involved in a lawsuit, doctors have the 
same meaning as synēgoroi.1  
 
* I would like to thank Lene Rubinstein and Jonathan Powell, for their kind invitation to deliver a 
first version of this paper to the Colloquim on Oratorical Performance, organized by the Centre for 
Oratory and Rhetoric, Royal Holloway, University of London, on 27 November 2010. I would also 
like to thank Ilias Arnaoutoglou for his careful comments, and Georgy Kantor for making available 
his much awaited thesis, Roman law and local law in Asia Minor (133 BC-AD 212) (DPhil, Oxford 
2009) – forthcoming shortly, in an extended version, from Oxford University Press.  
1 All translations of Artemidorus passages are adapted from R. J. White, The interpretation of 
dreams. Oneirocritica by Artemidoros (New Jersey 1975). Cf. the French translation and 
commentary of A.-J. Festugière, La clef des songes. Onirocriticon d’Artémidore, traduit et annoté 
(Paris 1975). White translates both δικολόγοι and συνήγοροι as ‘lawyers’ (109), while Festugière 
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The visit, in one’s dream, of these eternal protagonists of a court drama was, as in all eras, 
inauspicious: it predicted ‘disturbances, sorrows, untimely expenses’, disclosed ‘the 
secrets’, while especially in the case of the sick, it prophesied ‘days of crisis’ regarding 
the outcome of their disease – their life or death. However, a light of hope shines over this 
bleak scenery of trouble and anxiety: in the conclusion of his account, Artemidorus 
indicates that there may be a doctor who has the power to resolve this depressive judicial 
struggle and prevent the disastrous outcome of a litigant’s ‘crisis’. This healing role is 
attributed to synēgoroi.2 In the fourth book of Oneirocritica, the same symbolism is 
expanded and further enhanced with actual dream material. In the light of the double – 
legal and medical – meaning of krisis,3 if the dreamer is involved in a trial, doctors could 
be interpreted as synēgoroi, benefactors and assistants who have the power to save, 
liberate, betray, or even convict their clients (Oneirocritica iv 45):  
 
Περὶ ἰατρῶν ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐεργέταις καὶ τοῖς ἀμύνουσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχουσι λόγον, 
εἴπομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ καὶ νῦν δὲ πιστώσομαί σοι τὸ δόγμα καὶ δι’ 
ἀποβάσεως ὀνείρου. δίκην τις ἔχων ἔδοξε νοσεῖν καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐκ ἔχειν. συνέβη αὐτῷ 
καταλειφθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν συνηγόρων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ νόσος τὴν δίκην ἐδήλου· κρίνεσθαι 
γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους φαμὲν καὶ τοὺς δικαζομένους καὶ τοὺς νοσοῦντας. οἱ δὲ ἰατροὶ τοὺς 
συνηγόρους ἐδήλουν. 
 
Concerning doctors, that they mean the same as benefactors and all those who help 
us has been already been shown in the second book. I will now confirm this assertion 
by showing you the fulfilment of a dream. A man who was engaged in a lawsuit 
dreamt that he was sick and had no doctors. In real life he was left in the lurch by his 
lawyers. For the disease indicated the lawsuit, since the term crisis is used both in 
regard to those who are involved in a lawsuit and those who are sick. The doctors 
signified the man’s synēgoroi. 
 
The high degree of cathexis transferred to synēgoria in the mental life of Artemidorus’ 
dreamers is revealed in the direct way in which the appearance of Asclepius in a litigant’s 
dream symbolizes his synēgoroi (Oneirocritica ii 37):4 
(137) translates δικολόγοι as ‘jurisconsultes’ and ‘συνήγοροι’ as ‘avocats’. In the light of my 
analysis, I will argue that both translations are inaccurate. A basic bibliography on Artemidorus 
includes: C. Blum, Studies in the dream-book of Artemidorus (Uppsala 1936); R. A Pack, 
‘Artemidorus and his waking world’, TAPA 86 (1955) 280-90; S. R. F. Price, ‘The future of dreams: 
from Freud to Artemidorus’, Past and Present 113 (1986) 3-37; G. Weber, Kaiser, Traume und 
Visionen in Prinzipat und Spätantike (Stuttgart 1999); G. W. Bowersock, Fiction as history: Nero to 
Julian (Berkeley 1994), 79-87; ‘Artemidorus and the Second Sophistic’, in Paideia: the world of the 
Second Sophistic, ed. B. Borg (Berlin 2004) 53-63; W. V. Harris, Dreams and experience in 
classical antiquity (Cambridge MA 2009) 113-15. 
2 ii 29: πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς δίκην ἔχουσιν ἰατροὶ ὁρώμενοι τὸν ἴσον τοῖς συνηγόροις ἐπέχουσι λόγον. 
3 Cf. Festugière, La clef des songes (n.1, above) 241 n.54.  
4 In Oneirocritica ii 37, Hercules’ dream appearance is auspicious for those who are involved in 
trial, but it is not connected to synēgoroi. The appearance of Asclepius in a dream was a possible 
‘epiphany’ with a well-known authoritative force in Greek antiquity, from the incubations of late 
fourth-century Epidauros to the Asklepieion of Pergamon of Artemidorus’ era. ‘Epiphany-dreams’: 
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ἀεὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς χρείαις συλλαμβανομένους καὶ τοὺς οἰκονομοῦντας 
τὸν οἶκον τοῦ ἰδόντος δηλοῖ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δίκαις συνηγόρους σημαίνει. 
 
Asclepius always indicates those who help in time of need and those who manage the 
house of the dreamer. In regard to trials, finally, he signifies synēgoroi. 
 
In which context should this intriguing symbolism be read? The common-sense 
assumption that everyone involved in legal proceedings tends to project onto his lawyer 
his hope of recovering from the ‘malaise’ of the trial – and, consequently, attributes to 
him special, supernatural powers, as if he is the only agent capable of saving or 
condemning the litigant – fails to explain why, following Artemidorus’ own distinctions, 
the same symbolism does not equally include the dikologoi or the nomodidaktai. These, 
on the contrary, foretell – along with the ‘courts’ and the ‘judges’ – the persecuting 
atmosphere of judicial judgment. Artemidorus seems to restrict, in more than one 
instance, the overwhelming power of a ‘doctor’, ‘benefactor’, or even a divine healer, 
only to synēgoroi. In this case, did the different terminology of dikologos or synēgoros 
really make a difference for the dream-interpreter? Artemidorus’ interpretations may serve 
as an ideal starting-point for a brief survey of forensic professionals and their place in the 
legal world of the Greek cities of the Aegean coastline in the age of Antonines.5 In the 
course of my research, I will return to some celebrated, and yet inexhaustible, texts of the 
educated elites of the first and second centuries AD – such as Plutarch’s Political advice, 
Dio of Prusa’s speeches and Flavius Philostratus’ Lives of the sophists – and I will try to 
highlight some connections in the way synēgoroi were represented in the social 
imagination of the imperial age. 
 A preliminary evaluation of the problem lies both on our precise definition of the 
notion of synēgoros and on the character of the operation of local Greek courts in Roman 
Asia Minor. Despite the decline of their popular democratic character since the late 
E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the irrational (Berkeley 1951) 102-34; W. V. Harris, Dreams and 
experience (n.1, above) 23-90. Collected sources: E. J. Edelstein and L. Edelstein, Asclepius: a 
collection and interpretation of the testimonies, 2 vols. (vol. 1: Testimonies, vol.  2: Interpretation) 
(Baltimore 1945, repr. 1998); L. R. LiDonnici, The Epidaurian miracle inscriptions (Atlanta 1995). 
For dream appearances of Asclepius in the second century AD, in the famous example of Aelius 
Aristides’ Hieroi Logoi, see the recent work of A. Petsalis-Diomidis, Truly beyond wonders. Aelius 
Aristides and the cult of Asclepios (Oxford 2010), 122-50 (132 ff.). 
5 Although Artemidorus collected dreams ‘in the different cities of Greece and at great religious 
gatherings in that country, in Asia, in Italy and in the largest and most populous of the islands’ (i, 
prooem.), his writings are, to a great extent, rooted in Asia Minor. For anti-Roman sentiments in 
Artemidorus’ dreams, see G. W. Bowersock, ‘Artemidorus and the Second Sophistic’ (n.1, above) 
57-59. It should be noted that, despite Bowersock’s argumentation, the possibility of a learned (and 
not semi-literate) readership does not contradict the social diversity of Artemidorus’ material.  
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Hellenistic period and their subjection to the members of the local aristocracies,6 exactly 
like in civic offices, there was – at least in the ‘free’ cities (civitates liberae) under Roman 
rule – a continuity well-attested in literary, epigraphical and legal sources. ‘Free’ cities 
retained a high degree of judicial autonomy, along with the much-disputed jurisdiction of 
the Roman governor of the province over non-Roman citizens, and the law applicable to 
these cases was the ‘common’ Hellenistic law and its local variants.7 Legal representation 
before the local courts – or the court of the Roman governor – was exercised by 
professional rhētores, assisted by a number of other legal practitioners such as 
pragmatikoi and nomikoi.8 Following the end of surviving logographical works – which 
actually coincides with the end of the Athenian democracy9 – apart from those members 
6 Ph. Gauthier, ‘Les cités hellénistiques’, in The Greek city in the Roman period. The ancient Greek 
city state. Symposion on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the Royal Danish Academy of 
Sciences and Letters, ed. M. H. Hansen (Copenhagen 1993) 211-31; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The 
class struggle in the ancient world from the archaic age to the Arab conquests (London 1981 [2nd 
corrected impression 1983]) 315-17; S. Mitchell, Anatolia. Land, Men and Gods in Asia Minor. I. 
The Celts in Anatolia and the Impact of Roman Rule (Oxford 1993) 200-201. 
7 L. Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreich 
(Leipzig 1891). Mitteis built his argumentation on the basis of the tension between Reichsrecht 
(imperial law) and Volksrecht (the people’s law, or local law). A. Lintott, Imperium Romanum 
(London 1993) 154-60, despite his criticism on the ‘inevitable’ generalisations of Mitteis, accepts 
the continuing existence of Greek courts and the trying of disputes, at least between Greek, non-
Roman, citizens on the basis of local Greek laws. (Lintott, 60ff.). Cf. also the useful synopsis of 
A. A. Schiller, Roman law, mechanisms of development (The Hague 1978) 537-41; a recent 
discussion of judicial procedure in the Greek east is provided by J. Fournier, Entre tutelle romaine 
et autonomie civique: l'administration judiciaire dans les provinces hellénophones de l'empire 
romain, 129 av. J.-C.–235 ap. J.-C. (Athènes 2010); Kantor’s Roman law and local law in Asia 
Minor (133 BC-AD 212) (Oxford forthcoming) examines the interrelation of the Roman law and the 
legal institutions of Roman Asia Minor, dealing both with the question of jurisdiction and with the 
law of persons, property and obligations. Cf. also: A. Z. Bryen, ‘Judging empire: courts and culture 
in Rome’s eastern provinces’, Law and History Review 30 (2012 forthcoming), who attempts a new 
methodological approach, using mainly papyrological sources from Roman Egypt.  
8 Pragmatikoi exercised practical legal skills, assisted the advocates or the litigants, and provided 
juridical advice; cf. Quintilians’ vivid metaphor (Inst. 12.3.4): ‘Neque ego sum nostri moris ignarus 
oblitusve eorum, qui velut ad arculas sedent et tela agentibus subministrant, neque idem Graecos 
quoque nescio factitasse, unde nomen his pragmaticorum datum est’ (‘I am not ignorant of the 
generally prevailing custom, nor have I forgotten those who sit by our store-chests and provide 
weapons for the pleader: I know too that the Greeks did likewise: hence the name of pragmaticus 
which was bestowed on such persons’: trans. H. E. Butler, Loeb classical library, 1920-1922). 
Nomikoi (from the second century AD) drafted legal documents and also advised either the judges 
or the litigants on the application of the law, its textual meaning, or its interpretation in questions 
probably similar to those known from issue-theory as the legal stasis of ‘letter and intent’ – (On 
issues, 40, ed. Rabe): ‘letter and intent occurs when one party (usually the prosecution) advances the 
letter of the law while the other appeals to its intent’: M. Heath, On issues: strategies of argument in 
later Greek rhetoric (Oxford 1995) 34 – or between laws of different Greek cities. Nomikoi in 
Roman Egypt: A. Z. Bryen, ‘Judging empire’ (n.7, above) 32-34, and 65-66 for papyrological data.  
9 Μ. Lavency, Aspects de la logographie judiciaire attique (Louvain 1964) 110-11. Although it is 
true that we have no surviving logography from the period after 322, there are attestations of 
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of the privileged classes who chose to speak for themselves in court,10 litigants usually 
appeared before the judge after hiring the services of a synēgoros (according to the 
standard scholarly terminology) who – in full contrast with the legal framework of 
synēgoros as supporting speaker in classical Athens – represented the litigant in court in 
return for a fee.11 This form of professional advocacy is already attested in the early third 
century BC, while, from the second century on, it had expanded across the Greek east.12 
However, the vocabulary of advocacy varies. In the Roman period, the term synēgoria 
appears several times in the literary sources and seems to refer to ‘ordinary’ advocacy in 
private cases;13 nevertheless, the use of the term could also be a vague reflection of the 
classical Athenian legal past, which is certainly the case for the presence of synēgoroi in 
Lucian, or in the metaphorical use of the term in the Greek novels.14 Synēgoros as a 
private ‘lawyer’ does not appear in the epigraphical or papyrological sources from the 
Roman period, where the term rhētor is used.15 An overview of honorary inscriptions of 
logography continuing as a practice at least into the first few decades of the third century BC 
(including some now lost works of Deinarchos). 
10 Plin. Ep. 6.22.1-7; Philostr. VS 555, 559, 587, 627.  
11 For the Athenian practice of synēgoria, the fundamental work is now: L. Rubinstein, Litigation 
and co-operation: supporting speakers in the courts of classical Athens (Stuttgart 2000). Law on the 
prohibition of fee: Demosthenes 46.26; L. Rubinstein, Litigation and cooperation, 52-53. 
12 Cf. the curse tablet from Olbia: SEG 37.681, with A. Chaniotis, ‘Watching a lawsuit. a new curse 
tablet from southern Russia’, GRBS 33 (1992) 67–73; however, there is no indication that these 
supporting speakers were actually paid.  
13 For example: Ph. De Agr.13: καὶ ῥητορικῆς τὸ συνηγορικὸν καὶ ἔμμισθον εἶδος; D.Chr. 46.8: ἢ 
περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐποίησα κινδυνεῦσαί τινα, ὡς Καίσαρι προσηκούσης ἢ ἐν συνηγορίᾳ προύδωκα – 
for 7.123, see below; Epict. 1.27.16: εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον εἶχον, ἄλλον ἂν παρεκάλεσα 
τὸν συνηγορήσοντα. J. A. Crook, Legal advocacy in the Roman world (London 1995) 34: 
‘synēgoria, on the other hand, ordinary, straightforward advocacy, became the norm’. It is 
significant that Crook does not collect or discuss the evidence for synēgoroi in the literary sources. 
Rather, after some preliminary remarks (35-36) and footnote comments (cf. 35 n.24, on the use of 
term synēgoria by Plutarch, in his Lives, as the standard term for the Roman law-court speech), he 
turns to the presence of synēgoroi in inter-state disputes, citing the well-known case of Syll3 953 = 
IK Knidos 221, a text which attests an arbitration carried out by Knidos between Kalymnos and 
certain citizens of Kos; synēgoroi act here as city-representatives in a diplomatic mission, although 
it must be noted that the representatives sent out by Knidos are also referred to as synēgoroi ‘for the 
children of Diagoras’ (B lines 34-35). For Egypt: L. Taubenschlag, The law of Greco-Roman Egypt 
in the light of the papyri. 332 B.C.-640 A.D. (Warszawa 1955) 386-88.  
14 Luc. Pseudol. 26: καὶ τὸν πώγωνα συνήγορον ἐπικαλεσαμένη; cf. also Bis Acc. 15. Cf. the 
metaphorical use in Charit. 2.9.1, 5.4.11, 5.5.4, 5.10.9; Heliod. Aeth. 10.11, 10.14. On novelistic 
trials, see two recent contributions: R. Fernández-Garrido, ‘Stasis-theory in judicial speeches of 
Greek novels’, GRBS 49.3 (2009) 453-72; S. Schwartz, ‘Chronotopes of justice in the Greek novel: 
trials in narrative spaces’ in Spaces of justice in the Roman world, ed. F. de Angelis (Leiden-Boston 
2010) 331-56.  
15 Crook, Legal advocacy (n.13, above) 151: ‘For equally plain synēgoros by itself the inscriptional 
harvest, for the Roman period, is almost non-existent’ (for terminology: 151-63); for a late (fifth-
sixth centuries AD) use of the term rhētor as advocate: A. and A. Cameron, ‘The cycle of Agathias’ 
JHS 86 (1966) 10, 15-16. 
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the imperial age reveals that synēgoros signifies the legal representative of a Greek city, 
or a koinon, before the emperor or the governor of the province.16 It thus equates with 
syndikos, the legal representative of the city before the Roman state (defensor civitatis), 
usually elected to plead a particular case.17 It is also used for the advocatus fisci.18 In his 
Legal advocacy in the Roman world, John Crook has demonstrated in detail, examining a 
series of papyri attesting legal proceedings from Roman Egypt, the preference for the term 
rhētor over the term of synēgoros.19 In everyday judicial life, the urban masses, who were 
constantly involved in legal disputes, resorted to another professional group – namely the 
forensic rhētores who were associated with the marketplace (agoraioi; equivalent to the 
latin forensis).20 These obviously lacked the high technical training of the members of the 
upper classes, or their stylistic and linguistic refinement. They were a kind of 
‘second-class’ lawyer selling their services at the agora to those citizens who had neither 
16 Standard terminology in the epigrapical record: IK 3 (Ilion) 106 (v. 10-13: καὶ πολλὰ [καὶ] μεγάλα 
τῆι πόλει κατο[ρθώ]σαντα καὶ π̣αρασχόντ[α ἔν] τε τῇ λογιστ[ε]ίᾳ καὶ συ[νη]γορίαις); IGR III 778 (v. 
11-20: συνήγορον καὶ προήγορον τῆς πατρίδος διηνεκῆ, τετειμημένον πολειτε̣ίαις καὶ ἀνδριᾶσιν καὶ 
προεδρίαις ὑπό τε τῶν ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν Λυκίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ ἐπὶ τε συνηγορίαις 
καὶ σεμνότητι);, IGR IV 783 (v. 11-12: συνήγορον τῆς γερουσίας); IAph. 15.332 (v. 9-11: πολλὰ 
κατορ[θ]ώσαντα τῇ πατρίδι ἐν συνηγορίαις); for Marcus Aurelius Athenaios, rhētor and archiereus 
of Asia, see B. Puech, Orateurs et sophistes grecs dans les inscriptions d’ époque imperial (Paris 
2002) [henceforth: Puech] 51=IEph VII 3057; IEph 614C (v. 7-11: ἀνὴρ ἐν πολλοῖς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν 
πρὸς τὴν πόλιν εὔνοιαν ἐπιδεδειγμένος διά τε συνηγοριῶν καὶ ἐκδικιῶν, ἃς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν διὰ 
παντὸς παρέσχετο); for Tiberius Claudius Aurelius Zelos, sophist, see Puech 260=IAph. 14.18 (v. 7-
10: πολλὰ καὶ διὰ συνηγοριῶν κατορθώσαντα τῇ πατρίδι); cf. also IG II² 3629, FdXanth VII 90. 
However, from the fourth century AD, in the world of Libanius and throughtout the next centuries, 
synēgoros becomes the equivalent of the Roman advocatus. Cf. Puech 118=Les Bas-Waddington 
2031 (v. 7: κτῆμα συνηγορίης); L. Robert, ‘Épitaphes de Syrie’ Hellenica XI/XII (Paris 1960) 302-
305 (305 n.5); for forensic practitioners in late antiquity and the relevant terminology, see now: C. 
Humfress, Orthodoxy and the courts in late antiquity (Oxford 2007) 9-132; cf. also, on 273-84, the 
catalogue of advocates in the eastern empire (fourth-sixth century AD). 
17 D. Magie, Roman rule in Asia Minor: to the end of the third century after Christ, 2 vols (New 
Jersey, 1950) I, 648-49; S. Dmitriev, City government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor (New 
York 2005) 213-16 (also on ekdikos, a yearly magistrate who mediated between the city and the 
governor). According to Dmitriev, it is impossible (215) ‘to draw a fine line between the meanings 
of syndikos and synēgoros’; however, ‘their meanings were probably quite close, as is also 
illustrated by inscriptions from the imperial period.’ In Philostr. VS 540, the two terms are used 
alternatively for the syndikoi/synēgoroi of Smyrna.  
18 Puech 122=IG II² 3704 (Titus Flavius Glaucos); IGR IV 618 (M. Cn. Licinius Rufinus); IC I, 
XVII 27 (Vedius Alkisthenes); IEph 632 (Marcus Fulvius Publicianus Neikephoros); IEph 3053 
(Gaius Laberius Paulus); Philostr. VS 626 (Heliodorus the ‘Arab’). 
19 Discussion of papyri: Crook, Legal advocacy (n.13, above) 58-118; cf. also Taubenschlag, The 
law of Greco-Roman Egypt (n.13, above) 387. Bryen ‘Judging empire’ (n.7, above) ‘brackets here 
the question of the legal expertise of advocates in provincial courts’, as his attention ‘is directed to 
law-making bodies’, referring to Crook’s work for the material for advocates. 
20 As was pointed out by: E. L. Bowie, ‘The importance of sophists’, YCS 27 (1982) 29-60 (39 n. 
38), and discussed more recently by: M. Heath, Menander: a rhētor in context (Oxford 2004) 
322-31. 
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the financial ability to hire a notable advocate, nor the social contacts that would allow 
access to such an advocate. Theorists of rhetoric, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus or 
Quintilian, despised agoraioi, and Galen wrote a whole volume against them.21 Flavius 
Philostratus, the biographer of the highly-esteemed sophists of the era, identifies the 
sophist Theodotus as follows: ‘and indeed he was one of the baser sort’.22 In his Life of 
Apollonius of Tyana, Philostratus speaks with sarcasm of the low-level ‘rhetoric of the 
agoraioi’.23 It is not hard to see how agoraioi can easily be identified with dikologoi.24 
Philostratus refers to the father of the sophist Alexander the ‘Clay-Platon’ as ‘one of the 
agoraioi rhetors’.25 but the Suda describes him as an advocate (dikēgoros).26 According to 
the Suda, the rhētor Sergius of Zeugma was an advocate (dikēgoros) and wrote a defence 
of the dikologoi against Aelius Aristides, who seemed to have launched an attack against 
them.27 In Diocletian’s Edict on maximum prices (301 AD), a clear distinction is made, in 
respect of their fees, between dikologoi and sophists.28 The same distinction can also be 
observed from the judge’s point of view. Ulpian informs us, in an extract from his Duties 
of a proconsul, preserved in the Digest, that ‘[A proconsul] is duty-bound to watch that he 
has some system of ranking applications, and in fact to make sure that everyone’s request 
gets a hearing and that it does not turn out that while the high rank of some applicants gets 
its due and unscrupulousness gets concessions middling people do not put their requests, 
either having quite failed to find advocates or having instructed less well-known ones, 
whose position is not one of any standing’ (my emphasis).29 
21 Gal. Libr. Propr. 19.46.2: πρὸς τοὺς ἀγοραίους ῥήτορας ἕν.  
22 VS 566: καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀγοραίων εἷς οὗτος. Heath, Menander (n.20, above) 324 – with 
reference to S. Rothes’ Kommentar zu ausgewählten Sophistenviten des Philostratos (Heidelberg 
1988) 61 ff. – notes that Philostratus’ characterization of Theodotus expresses ‘moral and political 
disapproval’. Although Philostratus associates Theodotus with Herodes Atticus’ enemies, and 
chiefly with Demostratus (cf. VS 554-55, 559, 563) and criticizes his actions (566), his overall 
critique of Theodotus’ judicial capacity is quite positive (567: τὴν δὲ ἰδέαν τῶν λόγων ἀποχρῶν καὶ 
τοῖς δικανικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὑπερσοφιστεύουσιν). 
23 VA  6.36: ἐστὶ γάρ τι ἐν ἁπάσαις πόλεσιν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων, ὃ σὺ οὔπω μὲν γιγνώσκεις, καλοῦσι δὲ 
αὐτὸ διδασκάλους: τούτοις ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας μικρὰ δοὺς ἀσφαλῶς κεκτήσῃ τὰ πλείω, ῥητορικὴν γάρ 
σε παιδεύσουσι τὴν τῶν ἀγοραίων, ῥᾳδία δ᾽ ἡ τέχνη. For a discussion of this passage, see Heath, 
Menander (n.20, above) 322, 326. 
24 On the variety of terms, see Heath, Menander (n.20, above) 323.  
25 VS 570:  ὁμώνυμος καὶ τοὺς ἀγοραίους λόγους ἱκανώτατος. 
26 Suda A 1128: καὶ ἄλλος Ἀ λ έ ξ α ν δ ρ ο ς ,  Ἀ λ ε ξ ά ν δ ρ ο υ ,  δικηγόρου, Κίλιξ, Σελευκεύς, 
σοφιστής, ὃς ἐπεκλήθη Πηλοπλάτων.  
27 Suda Σ 246: Σ έ ρ γ ι ο ς ,  Ζευγματεύς, Ἀφθονίου υἱός, ἀπὸ δικηγόρων τῶν ὑπάρχων, καὶ αὐτὸς 
ὕπαρχος πραιτωρίων γεγονώς, καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάτων, καὶ πατρίκιος. Ἐπιτάφιον εἰς τὸν σοφιστὴν καὶ 
ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Σαβῖνον. ἔγραψε καὶ ἑτέραν βίβλον ὑπὲρ τῶν δικολόγων πρὸς Ἀριστείδην. 
28 Edict. Diocl.7.72.  
29 Dig. 1.16.9.4 (trans. A. Watson): Observare itaque eum oportet, ut sit ordo aliquis postulationum, 
scilicet ut omnium desideria audiantur, ne forte dum honori postulantium datur vel improbitati 
ceditur, mediocres desideria sua non proferant, qui aut omnino non adhibuerunt, aut minus 
frequentes neque in aliqua dignitate positos advocatos sibi prospexerunt.  
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 However, other important rhētores and philosophers took a different stance. Dio of 
Prusa, writing a few decades before Artemidorus, juxtaposes synēgoroi and agoraioi in 
his list of dishonourable professions, from which he invites the urban poor to abstain, even 
if they are in need (7.123):30  
   
οὔκουν οὐδὲ κήρυκας ὠνίων οὐδὲ κλοπῶν ἢ δρασμῶν μήνυτρα προτιθέντας ἐν 
ὁδοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ φθεγγομένους μετὰ πολλῆς ἐλευθερίας, οὐδὲ συμβολαίων καὶ 
προκλήσεων καὶ καθόλου τῶν περὶ δίκας καὶ ἐγκλήματα συγγραφεῖς, 
προσποιουμένους νόμιμον ἐμπειρίαν, οὐδὲ αὖ τοὺς σοφούς τε καὶ δεινοὺς 
δικορράφους τε καὶ συνηγόρους, μισθοῦ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐπαγγελλομένους 
βοηθήσειν, καὶ ἀδικοῦσι τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ ἀναισχυντήσειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων 
ἀδικημάτων καὶ σχετλιάσειν καὶ βοήσεσθαι καὶ ἱκετεύσειν ὑπὲρ τῶν οὔτε φίλων 
οὔτε συγγενῶν σφίσιν ὄντων, σφόδρα ἐντίμους καὶ λαμπροὺς ἐνίους εἶναι 
δοκοῦντας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐδὲ τοιοῦτον οὐδένα ἀξιοῖμεν ἂν ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι, 
παραχωρεῖν δὲ ἑτέροις. χειροτέχνας μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τινας ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, 
γλωσσοτέχνας δὲ καὶ δικοτέχνας οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη. 
 
Neither should our poor become auctioneers or proclaimers of rewards for the arrest 
of thieves or runaways, shouting in the streets and market-place with great vulgarity, 
or scriveners who draw up contracts and summonses or, in general, documents that 
have to do with trials and complaints, and claim knowledge of legal forms; nor must 
they be learned and clever pettifogging synēgoroi, who pledge their services to all 
alike for a fee, even to the greatest scoundrels, and undertake to defend unblushingly 
other men’s crimes, and to rage and rant and beg mercy for men who are neither their 
friends nor kinsmen, though in some cases these synēgoroi bear a high report among 
their fellow-citizens as most honourable and distinguished men. No, we shall allow 
none of our poor to adopt such professions but shall leave them to the other sort. For 
though some of them must of necessity become handicraftsmen, there is no need that 
they should become tongue-craftsmen and law-craftsmen.31 
 
It is, of course, hard to imagine how such unreliable and ‘vulgar’ advocates could be 
related to ‘doctors’ or ‘benefactors’. Artemidorus’ symbolisms still remain a puzzle and 
call for some kind of interpretation. Was there a discourse which circulated in the social 
imagination of the high empire and attributed to the synēgoros (but not – as now seems 
plausible – to the dikologos or the agoraios) the merits of a doctor? And if this was the 
case, what kind of ‘diseases’ were these social agents responsible for dealing with? Does 
synēgoros have a significance which goes beyond private trials? Logically, an answer to 
the second question should be attempted; however, this task requires a broadening of our 
perspective in order to place the need for and the function of such a ‘healer’ away from 
the narrow judicial sphere, in its political and social context.  
 
 
30 I do not classify Dio’s testimony as a reference to the classical past; for the opposite opinion, see 
D. A. Russell, Dio Chrysostom, orations VII, XII, XXXVI (Cambridge 1992) 147.  
31 Τrans. J. W. Cohoon, Loeb classical library, 1932. 
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2. Nosos and healing in context: Greek political theory in the imperial age. 
 
Our investigation should begin from the commonplace assumption that, in the high 
empire, engagement in legal proceedings constituted, for the urban masses as well as for 
the upper classes, the necessary thermostat of a fragile social balance. Behind the baroque 
façade of honorific decrees and urban prosperity of an era which still survives in our 
cultural beliefs as ‘the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the 
human race was most happy and prosperous’,32 leading historians of the period have 
repeatedly revealed irreducible tensions both between and inside various social groups.33  
Among the leading aristocratic families that monopolized political life, wealthy 
landowners, and the heterogeneous groups of the lower classes (craftsmen and traders, 
small-scale farm tenants, cultivators and labourers of all kinds), as well as among urban 
and rural populations,34 these tensions lurched between economic exploitation, insecurity, 
and dependence, even up to the extreme edge of violence.35 To refer to a classical 
epitome, thirty-five years ago, in his seminal 1976 Carl Newell Jackson lectures on The 
making of late antiquity, Peter Brown masterfully described the tensions which ‘clearly 
pulled the local community out of shape’, while ‘urban elites appear to have strenuously 
mobilized the resources of their traditional culture, their traditional religious life, and for 
those who had good reason to afford it, their traditional standards of generosity in order to 
maintain some sense of communal solidarity.’36 The spectre of continuous lending that 
haunted both prosperous classes and their weak debtors, the claims on land that divided 
local landowners, the never-ending disputes between leading members of the provincial 
urban centres with regard to the control of civic offices, the ambiguous mixture of 
fascination and repulsion towards Rome: these were familiar themes of everyday life in 
the eastern Roman provinces, if the contemporary sources of this era are anything to go 
by, and keep on recurring also in the dream summaries and algorithms of Oneirocritica.37 
32 E. Gibbon, Decline and fall of the Roman Empire, ed. D. Womersley, 6 vols. (London 2005) I 
103. 
33 Bibliography on imperial society is vast; see for example G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The class 
struggle in the ancient Greek world (n.6, above), 300-26, 453-65, 518-37; P. Garnsey and R. Saller, 
The Roman Empire. Economy, society and culture (London 1987) 64-82, 107-25; M. Sartre, L’ 
orient romain (Paris 1991) 176-90. 
34 Str. 13.1.25, Gal. 6.749. The wealth of the towns was due to the exploitation of the country. Cf. 
also S. Said, ‘La société rurale dans le roman grec ou la campagne vue de la ville’ in Sociétés 
urbaines, sociétés rurales dans l’Asie Mineure et la Syrie hellénistiques et romaines, ed. E. Frézouls 
(Strasbourg 1987) 156-62 (149-71).  
35 Key-passages: Plut. Prae. ger. rei. 818a-b. D.Chr. 34.33; 46.6; 46.14; 48.1. Cf. R. McMullen, 
Roman social relations (New Haven 1974). Prae. ger. rei 814f; 823f-825f. A. D. Macro, ‘The cities 
of Asia Minor under the Roman imperium’, A.N.R.W. II 7.2. (1980) 659-97 (690-92). 
36 P. Brown, The making of late antiquity (Cambridge  MA 1978) 33. For the social control exercised 
by the traditional families, see Brown’s analysis on 3-6, 23-26, 30-47. On social stress and its effects 
on the governing educated classes, see the exemplary study of S. Swain, ‘Social stress and political 
pressure. On melancholy in context’, in Rufus of Ephesus, ed. P. E. Porman (Tübingen 2008) 113-38.  
37 Artemidorus is sometimes dismissed as a source for the social anxieties of his age (see, for 
example, S. Swain, Hellenism and empire (Oxford 1996) 262 n.35) on the ground that he is in 
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The persecuting image of the money-lender claiming, over the dreamer’s head, the return 
of his money predicts danger in the case of the sick, or, if the money-lender manages to 
take his money back, death.38 Loans are so associated with day-to-day survival that they 
symbolize, according to Artemidorus, life itself.39 When someone dreams that he loses his 
fingers, if he owes money, it means that he will pay back more than necessary, while if he 
has lent, that he will receive less.40 A dream that would be interpreted in modern 
psychoanalytical terms as a typical expression of castration anxiety (or death anxiety) is 
naturally associated with loans in the Oneirocritica: ‘I know of a man’, writes 
Artemidorus, ‘about to borrow money who dreamt that he had no fingers. This man was 
given credit by the money-lender, even without a promissory note’.41 Similar fears were 
experienced by landowners who had to face endless land disputes.42 If someone dreamt 
that beggars entered his house or property, its ownership was about to be contested.43 
Still, neither did the members of the upper classes have an easy sleep. In the heyday of 
euergetism, to dream that you make public donations from your property predicts ‘death 
for the sick and a squandering and dissolution of their property’ and for the healthy ones 
essence interested only in allegorical dreams and does not include in his work the interpretation of 
common, everyday minor dreams (enhypnia: Oneirocritica i 2), in which one would expect to find, 
centre-stage, the personal worries and fears of the dreamers. We should go the other way round: 
given the fact that Artemidorus is interested in dreams of prophetic pretensions, it is even more 
impressive what a wealth of information on the social climate of his age is contained in his dream 
symbols. In this light, see also the remark of S. R. F. Price, ‘The future of dreams’ (n.1, above) 13: 
‘A web of metaphor connects dream imagery and the real world. The interpretation of dreams was 
based on normative assumptions widespread in Artemidorus’ day, and dreams thus belonged not to 
a baffling private universe but to the public sphere.’ 
38 Oneirocritica iii 41. 
39 Suicide because of debts: Oneirocritica v 31. 
40 Oneirocritica i 42. 
41 Oneirocritica i 42: οἶδα δέ τινα, ὃς μέλλων δανείζεσθαι ἔδοξε δακτύλους οὐκ ἔχειν. τούτῳ ὁ 
δανειστὴς καὶ μὴ γράψαντι ἐπίστευσεν. Cf. Creditors and debtors: Oneirocritica i 17, 26, 34, 44, 79, 
ii 3, iv 1 (an actual dream), 41, 80. Procedure in the Athenian courts of the second century AD: VS 
541. Loans of the elites: D.Chr. 46.5-6. Dio himself seems to disclaim the charge, made by citizens 
of his native city Prusa, of money-lending: see 46.8. On loans and interest: T. R. S. Broughton and 
J. A. O. Larsen, in An economic survey of ancient Rome, ed. T. Frank, 6 vols. (Baltimore 1938) IV, 
491-92, 888-900; R. Saller, ‘Status and patronage’ in Cambridge ancient history, ΧΙ, the high 
empire, A.D. 70-192, ed. A. K. Bowman, P. Garnsey and D. Rathbone, (Cambridge 2000) 817-54 
(822-38). For wealthy landowners, see M. I. Finley, The ancient economy (London 1973) 56-57, 
141-45 and for a case-study on estates in Roman Asia Minor, see now T. Corsten, ‘Estates in 
Roman Asia Minor. The case of Kibyratis’ in Patterns in the economy of Roman Asia Minor, ed. 
S. Mitchell and C. Katsari (Swansea 2005) 1-51. On economic change in late antiquity: 
R. P. Duncan-Jones, ‘Economic change and the transition to late antiquity’ in S. Swain and M. 
Edwards ed., Approaching late antiquity. The transformation from early to late empire (Oxford 
2004) 20-52. 
42 Oneirocritica i 34, 57, ii 49, iii 53.  
43 Oneirocritica iii 53. 
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reek-educated elites describe almost 
lite 47
αἴτια καθίσταται 
 are overlooked and 
do not in the beginning receive treatment or soothing counsel. 
 
 
‘disturbances and scandals’.44 The undertaking of civic offices invariably means 
‘anxieties and scandals’.45 Even the acquisition of Roman citizenship had ambivalent 
effects: ‘I know of someone’, writes Artemidorus, ‘who dreamt that he was beheaded. He 
was a Greek and obtained Roman citizenship. In this way, he lost his former name and 
status.’46 
 In this suffocating social climate, it is another strong belief among modern historians 
of the era that compliance and the repression of social antagonisms was one of the 
primary tasks of local aristocracies, through all their political and cultural means. 
Conflicts had to be suppressed, integrated into the social body and never allowed to 
surface. Well-known political treatises of the G
rally this task (Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 825a-b):  
 
ἐπεὶ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐμπρησμὸς οὐ πολλάκις ἐκ τόπων ἱερῶν ἄρχεται καὶ δημοσίων, 
ἀλλὰ λύχνος τις ἐν οἰκίᾳ παραμεληθεὶς ἢ συρφετὸς διακαεὶς ἀνῆκε φλόγα πολλὴν 
καὶ δημοσίαν φθορὰν ἀπεργασαμένην, οὕτως οὐκ ἀεὶ στάσιν πόλεως αἱ περὶ τὰ 
κοινὰ φιλονεικίαι διακάουσιν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουμάτων 
ἰδίων εἰς δημόσιον αἱ διαφοραὶ προελθοῦσαι συνετάραξαν ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν· 
οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτ’ ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν, ὅπως τὰ 
μὲν οὐδ’ ὅλως ἔσται τὰ δὲ παύσεται ταχέως, τὰ δ’ οὐ λήψεται μέγεθος οὐδ’ ἅψεται 
τῶν δημοσίων, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς μενεῖ τοῖς διαφερομένοις, αὐτόν τε προσέχοντα καὶ 
φράζοντα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἴδια κοινῶν καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλων 
παροφθέντα καὶ μὴ τυχόντα θεραπείας ἐν ἀρχῇ μηδὲ παρηγορίας. 
 
But just as a conflagration does not often begin in sacred or public places, but some 
lamp left neglected in a house or some burnt rubbish causes a great flame and 
works public destruction, so disorder in a State is not always kindled by 
contentions about public matters, but frequently differences arising from private 
affairs and offences pass thence into public life and throw the whole State into 
confusion. Therefore it behoves the statesman above all things to remedy or 
prevent these, that some of them may not arise at all and some may be quickly 
ended and others may not grow great and extend to public interests, but may 
remain merely among the persons who are at odds with one another. He should do 
this by noticing himself and pointing out to others that private troubles become the 
causes of public ones and small troubles of great ones, if they
44 Oneirocritica ii 30: ἐπιδόσεις δὲ δημοσίας ἐπιδιδόναι παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς μὲν νοσοῦσι θάνατον 
προαγορεύει καὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκορπισμὸν καὶ διάλυσιν, τοῖς δὲ ἐρρωμένοις ταραχὰς καὶ περιβοησίας. 
Cf. Praec. ger. reip. 825e.  
45 Oneirocritica ii 30: τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ταραχὰς καὶ περιβοησίας σημαίνει. 
46 Oneirocritica i 35: οἶδα δέ τινα, ὃς ἔδοξε τετραχηλοκοπῆσθαι καὶ ὢν Ἕλλην ἔτυχε τῆς Ῥωμαίων 
πολιτείας καὶ οὕτως ἀφῃρέθη τοῦ προτέρου ὀνόματός τε καὶ ἀξιώματος. 
47 This work was written, most probably, between 96 and 114 A.D.: C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome 
(Oxford 1971) 110-21; P. Desideri, ‘La vita politica cittadina nell’ impero: lettura dei praecepta 
gerendae rei publicae e nell’ an seni res publica gerenda sit’, Atheneaum 74 (1986) 371-81. Swain, 
Hellenism and empire (n.37, above) 162-83.  
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According to Plutarch’s famous passages, addressing his young friend Menemachus from 
Sardeis, who aspired to enter the political arena, the statesman had to prevent and suppress 
the outbreak of conflicts – incipient stasis – by managing the needs and interests of the 
masses and those of the elite in different ways. Sometimes, the upper classes did not 
hesitate to wave, on top, the fear of Rome, or suggest that internal Greek disputes were 
futile, since the prevalence of one or the other side no longer reserved any glory or prize 
for the winner (Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 824e-f):48 
 
ποία δύναμις, ἣν μικρὸν ἀνθυπάτου διάταγμα κατέλυσεν ἢ μετέστησεν εἰς ἄλλον, 
οὐδὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν παραμένῃ σπουδῆς ἄξιον ἔχουσαν. 
 
For what dominion, what glory is there for those who are victorious? What sort of 
power is it which a small edict of a proconsul may annul or transfer to another man 
and which, even if it last, has nothing in it seriously worthwhile? 
 
Leading traditional families supported the oligarchic structures of the political and judicial 
system and propagandized them as natural; in the same way, they repelled instability and 
antagonism by using the catalytic metaphor of nosos – disease. In the same context, when 
divided between conflicting ‘private’ interests, the body of the citizens was considered sick, 
and was in need of a cure. Internal tensions were compared to bodily diseases, which the 
statesman had to restrain and resolve ‘as if they were diseases’, using some sort of ‘secret 
political cure’.49 The medical metaphor is unambiguous (Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 815b):  
 
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰατροὶ τῶν νοσημάτων ὅσα μὴ δύνανται παντάπασιν ἀνελεῖν ἔξω 
τρέπουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος· ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἂν μὴ δύνηται τὴν 
πόλιν ἀπράγμονα παντελῶς διαφυλάττειν, ἐν αὐτῇ γε πειράσεται τὸ ταρασσόμενον 
αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζον ἀποκρύπτων ἰᾶσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν. 
 
For when physicians cannot entirely eradicate diseases, they turn them outwards to 
the surface of the body; but the statesman, if he cannot keep the State entirely free 
from troubles, will at any rate try to cure and control whatever disturbs it and 
causes sedition, keeping it hidden within the State. 
 
Although differences would have to be settled in time through ‘honourable and gracious 
compromises’,50 in reality they were referred for resolution to forensic rhētores and 
pragmatikoi.51 A statesman’s duty is to act as the physician of his city; otherwise, the 
‘physicians and medicine’ needed will be ‘drawn from outside’.52 
48 Cf. the exact tone of the threat in Praec. ger. reip. 824b. 
49 Praec. ger. reip. 815a-b: ὥσπερ νοσημάτων ἀπόρρητον ἰατρείαν. Cf. Praec. ger. reip. 824a. 
50 Praec. ger. reip. 815b : ... ἀνθυπείξωσι μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος .... 
51 Praec. ger. reip. 815b  νῦν δ’ ὅπως μὴ πολίταις καὶ φυλέταις οἴκοι καὶ γείτοσι καὶ συνάρχουσιν 
ἀνθυπείξωσι μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος, ἐπὶ ῥητόρων θύρας καὶ πραγματικῶν χεῖρας ἐκφέρουσι σὺν 
πολλῇ βλάβῃ καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τὰς διαφοράς. 
52 Praec. ger. reip. 815b: τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ φαρμάκων δέοιτο. 
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 The same vocabulary of civil strife (stasis) and disease (nosos) is used by Dio of 
Prusa, in his effort to establish concord (homonoia) between Nicaea and Nicomedia 
(38.13-14):53 
 
εἰ μὲν οὖν τις ἐρωτήσειεν ἕνα ἄνδρα ἢ πολλοὺς ὁμοῦ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων αἰτῶν, ἐν 
ποίῳ δὴ μέρει τὰ τοιαῦτα κατατάττεται, πόλεμοι καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ 
τούτοις ὁμότροπα, οὐδὲν ἂν μελλήσας ἀποκρίναιτο οὐδεὶς ὅτι ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς 
τάττεται καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἔχει καὶ νενόμισται καὶ καλεῖται κακά. τὰ δὲ ἐναντία 
τούτοις, εἰρήνη καὶ ὁμόνοια καὶ ὑγεία, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀντείποι μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγαθὰ 
καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι. φανερᾶς δὲ οὕτως οὔσης τῆς μάχης τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν, ὅμως εἰσί τινες, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλοί, οἵτινες τῶν κακῶν τοῖς 
ὁμολογουμένοις χαίρομεν. καὶ περὶ δὲ τῆς νεὼς πάντες οἱ πλέοντες ἐπιστάμενοι 
διότι μία αὕτη ἐστὶ σωτηρία, τὸ τοὺς ναύτας ὁμονοεῖν καὶ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ πείθεσθαι, 
γενομένης δὲ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπειθείας διότι καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ πολλάκις τῶν 
πνευμάτων εἰς ἐναντίον τῇ νηὶ περιίσταται καὶ τῶν λιμένων ἀποτυγχάνουσιν ἐγγὺς 
ὄντων, ὅμως στασιάζουσιν ἔστιν ὅτε ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης οἱ ναῦται, καὶ τοῦτο 
ἀπόλλυσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπισταμένους τοῦ ὀλέθρου τὴν αἰτίαν.  
 
At any rate, if one were to question a single person, or a company of persons, about 
the terms themselves, asking in what category are to be placed such terms as wars, 
factions, diseases, and the like, no one would hesitate a moment to reply that these 
are classed among the evils, and that they not only are so but have been so 
considered and are called evils. And as for their opposites, peace and concord and 
health, no one would deny that they likewise both are and are called good. But 
though the conflict between the evil things and the good is so manifest, yet there 
are some among us – or rather a good many – who delight in the things which are 
admittedly evil. And take, for example, a ship – though all on board are well aware 
that the one hope of reaching port in safety lies in having the sailors on good terms 
with one another and obedient to the skipper, but that when strife and mutiny arise 
in it, even the favourable winds often veer round to oppose the ship’s course and 
they fail to make their harbours, even when close at hand, still the sailors 
sometimes foolishly quarrel, and this works their ruin, though they know the cause 
of their destruction. 
 
In the symbolic vocabulary of the city aristocracies, the metaphor of nosos came back 
even more violently, when it became clear that internal conflicts were impossible to settle 
through the traditional religious or family networks, as is obvious in another Plutarchean 
treatise, contrasting the passions of the body and soul (Animine 501e-f):   
 
53 L. Robert, ‘La titulature de Nicée et de Nicomédie: la gloire et la haine’, in Opera minora selecta 
6 (Amsterdam 1989) 211-49. On concord, see C. P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom  
(Cambridge Mass. 1978) 83-94; Swain, Hellenism and empire (n.37, above) 219-25; P. Veyne, 
‘L'identité grecque devant Rome et l' Empereur’, REG 112 (1999) 554-57. On the vocabulary of 
disease in Aelius Aristides, see now K. Buraselis, ‘Insolence and servility. Aelius Aristides as critic 
of Greek civic policies in the Provincia Asia’, Palamedes 5 (2010) 160: ‘stasis is compared with 
tuberculosis (phthe) gradually consuming all powers of an organism’.  
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ὁρᾶτε τὸν πολὺν τοῦτον καὶ παμμιγῆ, τὸν ἐνταῦθα συνηραγμένον καὶ κυκώμενον 
ὄχλον περὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὴν ἀγοράν; οὐ θύσοντες οὗτοι συνεληλύθασι πατρίοις 
θεοῖς οὐδ’ ὁμογνίων μεθέξοντες ἱερῶν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ Ἀσκραίῳ ∆ιὶ Λυδίων 
καρπῶν ἀπαρχὰς φέροντες οὐδὲ ∆ιονύσῳ βεβακχευμένον θύσθλον ἱεραῖς νυξὶ καὶ 
κοινοῖς ὀργιάσοντες κώμοις· ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐτησίοις περιόδοις ἀκμὴ νοσήματος 
ἐκτραχύνουσα τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπὶ δίκας καὶ ἀγῶνας ἐμπροθέσμους ἥκουσαν ἐνταῦθα 
συμβάλλει καὶ πλῆθος ὥσπερ ῥευμάτων ἀθρόον εἰς μίαν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἀγορὰν καὶ 
φλεγμαίνει καὶ συνέρρωγεν ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων. ποίων ταῦτα πυρετῶν 
ἔργα, ποίων ἠπιάλων; τίνες ἐνστάσεις ἢ παρεμπτώσεις ἢ δυσκρασία θερμῶν ἢ 
ὑπέρχυσις ὑγρῶν; ἂν ἑκάστην δίκην ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπον ἀνακρίνῃς πόθεν πέφυκε 
πόθεν ἥκει, τὴν μὲν θυμὸς αὐθάδης γεγέννηκε τὴν δὲ μανιώδης φιλονεικία τὴν δ’ 
ἄδικος ἐπιθυμία. 
 
Do you see this vast and promiscuous crowd which jostles and surges in confusion 
here about the tribunal and the market-place? These persons have come together, 
not to sacrifice to their country's gods, not to share in each other's family rites, not 
bringing ‘to Ascraean Zeus the first-fruits of Lydian harvests’ nor, in honour of 
Dionysus, to celebrate his mystic festival on sacred nights with common revellings, 
but, as it were, a mighty pestilence drives them together here with yearly 
visitations stirring up Asia, which must come for law-suits and litigation at certain 
stated times; and the overwhelming multitude, like streams flowing together, has 
inundated this one market-place and boils with fury and dashes together in a tumult 
“of destroyers and destroyed”. What fevers, what agues, have brought this about? 
What stoppages, or irruptions of blood, or distemperature of heat, or overflow of 
humours, have caused this? If you examine every law-suit, as though it were a 
person, to discover what gave rise to it and whence it came, you will find that 
obstinate anger begat one, frantic ambition another, unjust desire a third . . .54 
 
The image of the statesman as a doctor not only runs throughout Plutarch’s work,55 but it 
is a common theme of classical Greek imagination and thought. We owe to G. E. R. Lloyd 
a thorough discussion of the ‘medicalization of the city’ and its anthropological 
consequences.56 This is a treatise on how the vocabulary of sickness was applied to the 
city-state as a whole, and on how the true politician, or the expert in moral and political 
matters, was modelled upon the image of a doctor who can prescribe the right cure for 
54 Trans. W. C. Helmbold, Loeb classical library 1939; this passage describes the judicial conventus 
of Smyrna: Jones, Plutarch and Rome (n.47, above) 14-15; R. Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians 
(London 1986) 484-85; Kantor, Roman law and local law (n.7, above) 190.  
55 See Swain’s discussion in Hellenism and empire (n.37, above) 177-79 (177, n.130); F. Fuhrmann, 
Les images de Plutarque (Paris 1964) 238-40; M.-H. Quet, ‘Rhétorique, culture et politique: le 
fonctionnement du discours idéologique chez Dion de Pruse et dans les Moralia de Plutarque’, DHA 
4 (1978) 51-118 (64-65).  
56 G. E. R. Lloyd, In the grip of disease. Studies in the Greek imagination (Oxford 2003), who 
collects and discusses all relevant sources. See also K. Kalimtzis, Aristotle on political enmity and 
disease: an inquiry into stasis (Albany 2000) 1-13, 193 n.19.  
4  DIMITRIS KARAMBELAS: SYNĒGOROI AS ‘HEALERS’                              87 
 
 
 
civil strife, the stasis which attacks the body politic, most notably in Plato and Aristotle.57 
The genealogy of these powerful metaphors perhaps goes back to the political and social 
struggles of the seventh century BC between leading aristocratic families, wealthy 
landowners, and rural masses or regional groups. In this period members of the upper 
classes, invested with authority and wisdom – lawgivers, tyrants, aisymnētai and 
diallaktai – assumed the difficult task of ending, through written legislation, social and 
economic uncertainty and civil strife.58 
 Finally, it is again Plutarch’s thought which offers us, in another set of famous 
passages, an insight into how the educated members of the ruling classes viewed the role 
of the synēgoros. He was construed essentially as a public figure, or a future politician, in 
a manner consistent with the use of the term in epigraphical sources. After emphasizing 
the usefulness of rhetoric for everyone who wants to acquire power and prevail over the 
mass of citizens,59 Plutarch proposes, in more than one instance, synēgoria as one of the 
very few ways of pursuing a successful public career left to a Greek member of the upper 
classes in the early empire (Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 805a-b):  
  
νῦν οὖν ὅτε τὰ πράγματα τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἔχει πολέμων ἡγεμονίας οὐδὲ 
τυραννίδων καταλύσεις οὐδὲ συμμαχικὰς πράξεις, τίν’ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν ἐπιφανοῦς 
λάβοι καὶ λαμπρᾶς πολιτείας; αἱ δίκαι τε λείπονται αἱ δημόσιαι καὶ πρεσβεῖαι πρὸς 
αὐτοκράτορα ἀνδρὸς διαπύρου καὶ θάρσος ἅμα καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντος δεόμεναι. πολλὰ 
δ’ ἔστι καὶ τῶν παρειμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καλῶν ἀναλαμβάνοντα καὶ τινὶ τῆς 
πόλεως ἢ βλάβῃ μεθιστάντα πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐπιστρέφειν. ἤδη δὲ καὶ δίκη μεγάλη 
καλῶς δικασθεῖσα καὶ πίστις ἐν συνηγορίᾳ πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἰσχυρὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσθενοῦς 
καὶ παρρησία πρὸς ἡγεμόνα μοχθηρὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου κατέστησεν ἐνίους εἰς 
ἀρχὴν πολιτείας ἔνδοξον. 
 
Nowadays, then, when the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, 
nor the overthrowing of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a 
conspicuous and brilliant public career could a young man find? There remain the 
public lawsuits and embassies to the emperor, which demand a man of ardent 
temperament and one who possesses both courage and intellect. But there are many 
excellent lines of endeavour that are neglected in our cities which a man may take 
57 On Plato, G. E. R. Lloyd, In the grip of disease (n.56, above) 142-57 (for the differences between 
medicine and politics: 148-9), and on Aristotle, 176-93; on nosos as the basic concept governing 
Aristotle’s stasis, and stasis as a ‘wound’ over the body politic, see K. Kalimtzis, Aristotle on 
political enmity and disease (n.56, above) passim. 
58 On stasis as it emerges from Solon’s poetry: J. Lewis, Solon the thinker (London 2006); on 
aisymnētai and diallaktai (cf. Arist. Ath.Pol. 5.2; Plutarch, Solon 14.2): K.-J. Hölkeskamp, 
Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland (Stuttgart 1999); 
M. Faraguna, ‘La figura dell’ aisymnetes tra realtà storica e teoria politica’, in Symposion 2001: 
Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. M. Gagarin and R. W. Wallace 
(Vienna 2005) 321-38; G. Anderson, ‘Before tyrannoi were tyrants: rethinking a chapter of early Greek 
history’, Class. Ant. 24.2 (2005) 173-222; on diallaktai (‘conciliators’), see IG XII.7.3 (Amorgos, late 
fourth century), where diallaktai were appointed and left written instructions about the resolution of 
disputes. Cf. also Arist. Ath.Pol. 38.4.  
59 Praec. ger. reip. 801e. 
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up, and also many practices resulting from evil custom, that have insinuated 
themselves to the shame or injury of the city, which a man may remove, and thus 
turn them to account for himself. Indeed in past times a just verdict gained in a 
great suit, or good faith in acting as advocate for a weak client against a powerful 
opponent, or boldness of speech in behalf of the right against a wicked ruler, has 
opened to some men an entrance into public life. 
 
The ambitious politician may participate in ‘public trials’ or ‘embassies before the 
emperor’, or as a synēgoros in private trials – the use of the term here is a clear reference 
to the notorious trials of the classical past. The politician may also mediate and offer to 
one friend ‘a case at law which will bring in a good fee as advocate in a just cause, to 
another introduce a rich man who needs legal oversight and protection, and help another 
to get some profitable contract or lease’.60 Here, again, the application of the term is 
linked to the prospect of a successful political career. Synēgoria may also take on a wider, 
non-professional sense: the politician exercises the role of a mediator, who ‘shows himself 
a kindly counsellor, an advocate who accepts no fee, and a kind-hearted conciliator when 
husbands are at variance with their wives or friends with one another’.61 
 An overall examination of our sources corroborates the hypothesis that the synēgoros 
in the imperial age was primarily a public figure, active as a public advocate rather than a 
lawyer in everyday judicial life – a role reserved for the second-rate dikologoi or agoraioi 
– and that he was also linked, as the epigraphical data indicates, to the syndikos of the city. 
Given that, in the ideological trend of the ruling classes, politicians were equated to 
‘doctors’ and ‘benefactors’ of their cities, who prevented the coming of civil strife by 
‘healing’ the intense social conflicts, it is not hard to imagine how the synēgoros was 
elevated too, in the social imagination, to a powerful ‘doctor’ or ‘healer’. The synēgoros 
could ‘save’ (or condemn) a litigant in court, in the same way as he could ‘save’ his native 
city in an inter-state dispute or before the emperor, or play the role of a social mediator 
between mass and elite. Of course, he could also easily be contrasted with other forensic 
professionals who took advantage of the legal troubles of the masses. From this point of 
view, Artemidorus’ dream interpretations can themselves be interpreted as a manifestation 
of a symbolism running deep into the structures of social life in the Greek east and 
engaging both political and legal representations.  
 But to further support my survey, I shall now examine some examples of elite figures, 
politicians and advocates, who acted in accordance with the symbolic role of synēgoros, 
on the one hand as a public figure, on the other hand as ‘doctor’ and ‘conciliator’. But to 
do so, I must turn to the one field where local politics, rhetoric and advocacy coincide in 
the heyday of the high empire: the Second Sophistic. 
 
3. ‘Healers’ in action. Synēgoria and the Second Sophistic. 
60 Praec. ger. reip. 809a: τῷ μὲν ἐγχείρισον συνηγορίαν ἔμμισθον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, τῷ δὲ 
σύστησον πλούσιον ἐπιμελείας καὶ προστασίας δεόμενον· ἄλλῳ δ’ εἰς ἐργολαβίαν τινὰ σύμπραξον ἢ 
μίσθωσιν ὠφελείας ἔχουσαν. 
61 Praec. ger. reip. 823b: σύμβουλον εὔνουν καὶ συνήγορον ἄμισθον καὶ διαλλακτὴν εὐμενῆ πρὸς 
γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν καὶ φίλων πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρέχων ἑαυτὸν. Cf. also the lost Plutarchean works in 
the so-called Catalogue of Lamprias, nos. 156 and 198.  
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Although many of the leading sophists of the first and second centuries AD were actually 
active in legal advocacy, the protagonists in the revival of Second Sophistic studies during 
the 1960s and 1970s did not devote much attention to their presence in the Greek courts or 
in the judicial conventus of the Roman governor. Glen Bowersock offered a passing 
remark on the forensic activity of rhētores, while unfolding, in a seminal study, the 
sophists’ connections with imperial power and the Roman upper classes, following their 
paths to the higher Roman offices and placing them once and for all at the centre of 
Roman history.62 E. L. Bowie argued, surprisingly, and in an aphoristic way, that 
‘law-court oratory [was] usually looked upon with contempt by sophists’63 and 
B. P. Reardon associated the Second Sophistic with the literary and intellectual tendencies 
of its era.64 This attitude started to change in the early 1980s, when Donald Russell 
provided a synopsis of the sophists’ forensic activity in his important work on the Greek 
declamation.65 A few years later, Graham Anderson observed that the ‘very influential, 
politically-involved sophists seem to have been involved in practice in the courts’, 
emphasizing the role that Nicetes, Scopelian or Polemo played in the courts and their link 
‘[with] the web of civic patronage that links the courts with wealthy satisfied clients’.66 In 
recent years, Malcolm Heath has offered a new evaluation of the sophists’ competence in 
legal advocacy, in his monograph on Menander of Laodicea.67  
 In his Lives of the Sophists, Philostratus records a number of sophists who acted as 
advocates,68 including some of the most successful rhētores and public figures of the day, 
most of whom had also acquired Roman citizenship: Nicetes of Smyrna,69 Scopelian of 
62 G. W. Bowersock, Greek sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969) 56-57. 
63 Ε. L. Bowie, ‘Greeks and their past in the Second Sophistic’, in Studies in ancient society, ed. 
M. I. Finley (London 1974) 166-209 (169-70).  
64 B. P. Reardon, Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C. (Paris 1971). 
65 D. A. Russell, Greek declamation (Cambridge 1983) 12-13.  
66 G. Anderson, ‘The Second Sophistic: some problems of perspective’, in Antonine literature, ed. 
D. A. Russell (Oxford 1990) 101; cf. also Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht (n.7, above) 191-96; 
Crook, Legal advocacy (n.13, above) 186-87.  
67 Heath, Menander (n.20, above) 289 ff.  
68 Other testimonies, independent of Philostratus, on sophistic advocacy are ambiguous.  In a turn of 
phrase often cited by scholars on the Second Sophistic, Sextus Empiricus – writing some years 
before Philostratus – makes the accusation against the sophists that, despite their elevated theoretical 
and technical training in rhetoric, they are left more speechless than fish in the courtroom (S.E. M. 
2.17-19: ἀδυνατοῦσι ῥητορεύειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίων καὶ ἀγορᾶς […] οἱ σοφιστεύοντες […] ἰχθύων δὲ 
ἀφωνότεροι. Aelius Aristides considered forensic advocacy a standard feature of a sophist’s career: 
(ἐπὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀγωνίσματα τῷ λόγῳ χρώμεθα, […] κἀν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνιζόμεθα: 
45.4). Cf. also Luc. Rh.Pr. 25-26. Sophists other than those attested by Philostratus acted also as 
advocates or syndikoi of their cities in the imperial court. Apart from Lollianus (see n.68 below), see 
also Puech 35=SEG 17.759 (Caius Sallius Aristaenetus of Byzantium, transcripts of court 
proceedings before Caracalla on 27 May 216 AD; cf. VS 591). Recent discussion and bibliography 
on the ‘Dmeir inscription’: M. Heath, ‘Metalepsis, paragraphe and the scholia to Hermogenes’, 
Leeds International Classical Studies, 2.2 (2003) 19-20; Menander (n.20, above) 309-11.  
69 VS 511. 
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Clazomenae,70 Marcus Antonius Polemo of Laodicea,71 Iulius Theodotus of Athens,72 
Ptolemy of Naucratis,73 Publius Aelius Apollonius of Athens,74 Titus Flavius Damianus 
of Ephesus,75 and Lucius Flavius Philostratus the Lemnian.76 Perhaps four more could 
also be added to this list. First, Quirinus of Nicomedia, since he was named advocatus 
fisci because ‘he seemed better adapted by nature for making speeches for the prosecution 
in the courts’.77 Second, Tiberius Claudius Aristocles of Pergamum, if Philostratus’ 
statement that he was more competent in διαλέγεσθαι (‘lecturing’) than in ἀγωνίζεσθαι 
(‘fighting cases in court’) refers to his actual presence in the courts – which, according to 
this interpretation, proved to be less effective than his proper sophistic declamations – and 
not to imaginary forensic speeches (controversiae).78 Thirdly, Hadrian of Tyre, who is 
also attested as powerful ‘in forensic pleading’;79 and Heracleides of Lycia.80 
 The Severan biographer usually compares the ‘forensic’ (dikanikon) and the 
‘sophistic’ (sophistikon) style of oratory, but it is not certain whether he is referring to the 
‘judicial’ style of actual or imaginary court-speeches. Nicetes of Smyrna, the so-called 
‘founder’ of the Second Sophistic, was very successful as a forensic rhētor in court.81 His 
style is described as a mixture of sophistic and judicial style (VS 511):82  
 
τὸ μὲν γὰρ σοφιστικῇ περιβολῇ ἐκόσμησεν, τὸ δὲ κέντρῳ δικανικῷ ἐπέρρωσεν. ἡ 
δὲ ἰδέα τῶν λόγων τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἀποβέβηκεν, ὑπόβακχος δὲ καὶ 
διθυραμβώδης, τὰς δ’ ἐννοίας ἰδίας τε καὶ παραδόξους ἐκδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ 
βακχεῖοι θύρσοι τὸ μέλι καὶ τοὺς ἑσμοὺς τοῦ γάλακτος. 
 
For he adorned the legal style with sophistic amplification, while he reinforced the 
sophistic style with the sting of legal argument. His type of eloquence forsook the 
antique political convention and is almost bacchic and like a dithyramb, and he 
produces phrases that are peculiar and surprise by their daring, like ‘the thyrsi of 
Dionysus’ in reference to honey, and ‘swarms of milk’. 
 
70 VS 517, 519. 
71 VS 524-25. 
72 VS 566. 
73 VS 595. 
74 VS 600. 
75 VS 606. 
76 VS 628. 
77 VS 621: προσφυέστερος δὲ ταῖς κατηγορίαις δοκῶν ἐπιστεύθη ἐκ βασιλέως τὴν τοῦ ταμιείου 
γλῶτταν. 
78 VS 568: ἡ δὲ ἰδέα τοῦ λόγου διαυγὴς μὲν καὶ ἀττικίζουσα, διαλέγεσθαι δὲ ἐπιτηδεία μᾶλλον ἢ 
ἀγωνίζεσθαι. On Greek controversiae: Russell, Greek declamation (n.65, above) 21-39.  
79 VS 588: διὰ τὸ ἐρρῶσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας. 
80 VS 613: καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀπέριττος. 
81 VS 516: πολλῷ δὲ μεῖζον ἐν δικαστηρίοις πνεύσαντα. 
82 Trans. W. C. Wright, Loeb classical library, 1921. 
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Commenting on another famous advocate, Damianus of Ephesus, Philostratus describes 
his style as ‘more sophistic than is usual in a legal orator and more judicial than is usual in 
a sophist’.83 But when Philostratus reproduces the same characterization of the sophist 
Antiochus of Aegae,84 he immediately supports it by referring to his rhetorical technique 
and, subsequently, to his famous imaginary court-speeches.85 Antiochus handled some 
standard themes of Roman and Greek declamation, preserved, among others, by Seneca 
the Elder and Quintilian, and especially a variation of ‘the double rapist’.86 According to 
the law, the victim of a rape gets to choose between having the rapist put to death or 
making him marry her (VS 569): 
 
ὡς ἔκ τε τῶν ἄλλων ὑποθέσεων δηλοῦται καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τῶνδε· κόρη βιασθεῖσα 
θάνατον ᾕρηται τοῦ βιασαμένου· μετὰ ταῦτα γέγονε παιδίον ἐκ τῆς βίας καὶ 
διαμιλλῶνται ταῦτα οἱ πάπποι, παρ’ ὁποτέρῳ τρέφοιτο τὸ παιδίον. ἀγωνιζόμενος 
οὖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρὸς πατρὸς πάππου, ‘ἀπόδος’ ἔφη ‘τὸ παιδίον, ἀπόδος ἤδη, πρὶν 
γεύσηται μητρῴου γάλακτος’. 
 
A girl has been ravished, and has chosen that her ravisher shall be put to death; 
later a child is born of this rape, and the grandfathers dispute as to which one of 
them shall bring up the child. Antiochus was pleading on behalf of its paternal 
grandfather, and exclaimed: ‘Give up the child! Give it up this instant before it can 
taste its mother’s milk!’ 
 
Other famous sophists also appeared in court on their own account, such as Herodes 
Atticus,87 Hadrian of Tyre,88 Quirinus of Nicomedia,89 and Heliodorus ‘the Arab’.90 It is 
83 VS 606: δὲ δικανικοῦ μὲν σοφιστικώτερος, σοφιστικοῦ δὲ δικανικώτερος. Cf. also VS 511.  
84 VS 569: καὶ καθάπαξ τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ λόγου δικανικῆς μὲν σοφιστικώτερος, σοφιστικῆς δὲ 
δικανικώτερος. 
85 VS 569: καὶ τὰ πάθη ἄριστα σοφιστῶν μετεχειρίσατο, οὐ γὰρ μονῳδίας ἀπεμήκυνεν, οὐδὲ 
θρήνους ὑποκειμένους, ἀλλ’ ἐβραχυλόγει αὐτὰ ξὺν διανοίαις λόγου κρείττοσιν. 
86 On this well-known theme, see Sen. Controv. 1.5; Quint. Inst. 7.7.3; H. Βornecque, Les 
déclamations et les déclamateurs d'après Sénèque Le Père (Lille 1902) 60-61; S. F. Bonner, Roman 
declamation in the late Republic and the early empire (Liverpool 1949) 89-91; M. Heath, On issues, 
148-149; Menander (n.20, above) 10-16. 
87 VS 555, 559. 
88 VS 588-89. 
89 VS 621. 
90 VS 627. P. A. Brunt’s list in ‘The bubble of the Second Sophistic’, BICS 39 (1994) 25-52 (31) is 
inconsistent: he omits Theodotus (566) and Ptolemy of Naucratis (595), while, on the other hand, he 
includes Hadrian of Tyre (erroneously referring to VS 579, instead of 588) and Heracleides of Lycia 
(613) – without considering the possibility that they excelled in controversiae and not in real 
court-cases – and also the sophist Athenodorus (citing VS 595), who died in early manhood and was 
never active as advocate. He also speculates that ‘presumably’ Hippodromus of Larissa acted as 
advocate ‘as he became advocatus fisci’ (621), but it is clear that he confuses him with Quirinus of 
Nicomedia (621), advocatus fisci in the province of Asia in the late second century AD. Cf. also the 
catalogues in M. Heath, ‘The family of Minucianus?’, ZPE 113 (1996) 66-70 (68) and esp. in his 
Menander (n.20, above) 289-90. 
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significant that only Theodotus is listed by Philostratus as agoraios; however, Theodotus 
was an enemy of Herodes Atticus and his treatment is possibly a product of prejudice, or 
even conscious slander.91 As far as Theodotus’ high rhetorical skills are concerned, it is well 
known that, after studying with Lollianus of Ephesus, who excelled both as advocate and 
declaimer,92 he was the first holder of the imperial chair of rhetoric in Athens in 174-76 AD, 
appointed by Marcus Aurelius himself.93 The biographer clearly connects the 
characterization agoraios with Theodotus’ attitude towards Herodes, and tries to diminish 
his status, commenting that the holding of the rhetorical chair alone ‘would not be worth 
mentioning; for not all who ascend this chair are worthy of mention’.94 However, when he 
concludes Theodotus’ biography, his critique of his judicial capacity is quite positive.95 In 
general, Philostratus carefully distinguishes sophistic rhetoric from the ‘vulgar’ oratory of 
the forensic agoraioi. He makes it clear that Heracleides, during an extempore declamation, 
broke down before the emperor, ‘abashed by the court and the imperial bodyguard’, exactly 
because a sophist could not be ‘audacious and self-confident’ like the agoraioi orators.96 
However, the biographer uses hardly anywhere the term synēgoros; in fact, synēgoros is 
applied, apart from Aeschines,97 to the syndikoi of Smyrna before the emperor,98 to the 
advocatus fisci Heliodorus,99 and only once, in the case of Marcus Antonius Polemo, to a 
man who pleaded as the synēgoros of a fellow aristocrat before a court in Lydia.100 
 According to this lengthy anecdote, a wealthy Lydian, who was in danger of losing his 
property, most probably on account of debts, invited Polemo to Sardeis, in order to 
represent him before a local court, consisting of ‘the hundred men who had jurisdiction 
91 VS 566. 
92 IG II2 4211 line 7. Lollianus of Ephesus is not recorded by Philostratus as forensic rhētor, but for 
a well-known inscription which attests the opposite, see Puech 149=IG II² 4211, lines 6-7 (Publius 
Hordeonius Lollianus): ἀμφότερον ῥητῆρα δικῶν μελέτῃσί τε ἄριστον. 
93 I. Avotins, ‘The holders of the chairs of rhetoric at Athens’ HSCP 79 (1975) 313-24 (314, 316, 
324). 
94 VS 566: καὶ οὐ τοῦτό πω λόγου ἄξιον, οὐδὲ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐπιβατεύοντες τοῦ θρόνου τούτου 
λόγου ἄξιοι .... 
95 VS 567: τὴν δὲ ἰδέαν τῶν λόγων ἀποχρῶν καὶ τοῖς δικανικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὑπερσοφιστεύουσιν. 
96 VS 614: Ἐπὶ Σεβήρου δὲ αὐτοκράτορός φασιν αὐτὸν σχεδίου λόγου ἐκπεσεῖν αὐλὴν καὶ 
δορυφόρους δείσαντα. τουτὶ δὲ ἀγοραῖος μέν τις παθὼν κἂν αἰτίαν λάβοι, τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀγοραίων 
ἔθνος ἰταμοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς, σοφιστὴς δὲ ξυσπουδάζων μειρακίοις τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἡμέρας πῶς ἂν ἀντίσχοι 
ἐκπλήξει; 
97 VS 482. 
98 VS 540: ἐγένετο μὲν ἐπ’ ἄλλοις ξυνδίκοις ἡ πόλις, πονηρῶς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ βασιλείῳ δικαστηρίῳ 
διατιθεμένων τὸν λόγον βλέψας ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐς τοὺς τῶν Σμυρναίων ξυνηγόρους ‘οὐ Πολέμων’ 
εἶπεν ‘τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ξύνδικος ὑμῖν ἀπεδέδεικτο. 
99 VS 626: καὶ μὴν καὶ προὐστήσατο αὐτὸν τῆς μεγίστης τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην συνηγοριῶν ὡς 
ἐπιτηδειότερον δικαστηρίοις καὶ δίκαις. 
100 VS 525. 
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over Lydia’; Polemo’s fee was set at two talents.101 To paraphrase Philostratus’ account, 
Dionysius of Miletus, an ageing sophist, was visiting Sardeis and was anxious to hear 
Polemo declaim, having heard about his high sophistic qualities and fearing for his own 
status and reputation (VS 524-25): 
 
ἐγήρασκε μὲν ὁ ∆ιονύσιος ἐν δόξῃ λαμπρᾷ, παρῄει δ’ ἐς ἀκμὴν ὁ Πολέμων οὔπω 
γιγνωσκόμενος τῷ ∆ιονυσίῳ καὶ ἐπεδήμει ταῖς Σάρδεσι ἀγορεύων δίκην ἐν τοῖς 
ἑκατὸν ἀνδράσιν, ὑφ’ ὧν ἐδικαιοῦτο ἡ Λυδία. […] “ἀνὴρ’ […] “πλουσιώτατος τῶν 
ἐν Λυδίᾳ κινδυνεύων περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἄγει συνήγορον τὸν Πολέμωνα ἀπὸ τῆς 
Σμύρνης πείσας διταλάντῳ μισθῷ, καὶ ἀγωνιεῖται τὴν δίκην αὔριον.” καὶ ὁ 
∆ιονύσιος ‘οἷον’ ἔφη ‘ἕρμαιον εἴρηκας, εἰ καὶ ἀκοῦσαί μοι ἔσται Πολέμωνος οὔπω 
ἐς πεῖραν αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένῳ.’ ‘ἔοικεν’ εἶπεν ὁ ∆ωρίων ‘στρέφειν σε ὁ νεανίας ἐς 
ὄνομα ἤδη προβαίνων μέγα.’ ‘καὶ καθεύδειν γε οὐκ ἐᾷ, μὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν,’ ἦ δ’ ὁ 
∆ιονύσιος ‘ἀλλ’ ἐς πήδησιν ἄγει τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὴν γνώμην ἐνθυμουμένῳ, ὡς 
πολλοὶ οἱ ἐπαινέται αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δωδεκάκρουνος δοκεῖ τὸ στόμα, οἱ δὲ καὶ 
πήχεσι διαμετροῦσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν γλῶτταν, ὥσπερ τὰς τοῦ Νείλου ἀναβάσεις’. 
 
When Dionysus was beginning to grow old and enjoyed the most distinguished 
reputation, and Polemo, on the other, was attaining to the height of his career, though 
he was not yet personally known to Dionysius, Polemo paid a visit to Sardis to plead 
a case before the Centumviri who had jurisdiction over Lydia. […] ‘A very wealthy 
man, a Lydian, is in danger of losing his property, and hence he has brought Polemo 
from Smyrna to be his advocate by the inducement of a fee of two talents, and he will 
defend the suit to-morrow’. ‘What a stroke of luck is this!’ cried Dionysius, ‘that I 
shall actually be able to hear Polemo, for I have never yet had a chance to judge of 
him.’ Dorion remarked: ‘The young man seems to make you uneasy by his rapid 
advance to a great reputation.’ ‘Yes, by Athene’, said Dionysius, ‘he does not even 
allow me to sleep. He makes my heart palpitate, and my mind too, when I think how 
many admirers he has. For some think that from his lips flow twelve springs, others 
measure his tongue by cubits, like the risings of the Nile’. 
 
However, after attending the trial and listening to Polemo’s speech, Dionysius commented 
that ‘this athlete possesses strength, but it does not come from the wrestling’.102 After 
hearing this ambiguous remark, Polemo challenged Dionysius by coming to his door and 
asking to deliver a declamation before him. From the above story, it becomes obvious that 
sophistic advocacy has to be placed in the general framework of sophistic declamation. 
Polemo’s court-speech was considered a sophistic performance,103 as is clear from the fact 
101 On ‘one hundred men who had jurisdiction over Lydia’: Mitteis, Reichsrecht und Volksrecht 
(n.7, above) 91; C. Habicht, ‘New evidence on the province of Asia’, JRS 65 (1975) 64-91; 
Fournier, Entre tutelle romaine et autonomie civique (n.7, above) 35 n.12.  
102 VS 525: ‘ἰσχὺν’ ἔφη ‘ὁ ἀθλητὴς ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ παλαίστρας’. 
103 As recent scholarship has repeatedly pointed out – following the path-breaking work of 
M. W. Gleason, Making men. Sophists and self-presentation in ancient Rome (New Jersey 1995) – 
the core of sophistic declamation was ‘performance’. As Tim Whitmarsh has put it, in his elegant 
summary of the place of the Second Sophistic in imperial culture, performance was ‘the stuff of the 
sophistic mission’ [The Second Sophistic (Oxford 2005) 24; on this topic, 23-40]. Cf. also 
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that Dionysius attended Polemo’s court appearance in order to ascertain whether the 
younger sophist deserved his ‘rapid advance in to a great reputation’, while the older 
sophist’s place in the sophistic canon seemed to be in danger.104 Dionysius’ remark 
possibly meant that Polemo’s strength came ‘from another source’, and not from proper 
sophistic charisma. The unique Philostratean use of synēgoros in a private case is perhaps 
linked to Polemo’s own status as a conspicuous public figure who acted, possibly many 
times, as syndikos of Smyrna,105 even if this anecdote actually goes back to the very 
beginning of his career.  
 What was the symbolic role of the sophists as synēgoroi and, also, as political figures 
in the life of the Greek cities during the Principate? Notable members of the local elites,106 
most sophists were constantly involved in civic politics, and their biographer feels obliged 
to explain why some of his subjects abstained from internal affairs.107 If one returns to 
Plutarch’s advice to the young Menemachus, it appears that the sophists followed all three 
recommendations for a successful political career: apart from participating in ‘public 
trials’, they served as ambassadors to the emperor,108 and acted as advocates and 
mediators in private cases. Although current research is more concerned with the ‘politics’ 
of sophistic language and style, or the sophists’ ideological construction of a ‘Hellenic’ 
identity, through the practice of strict Atticism and the uses of the classical Greek political 
past,109 in order to work out their ambiguity towards Rome, it is worth bearing in mind 
M. Korenjak, Publikum und Redner: ihre Interaktion in der sophistischen Rhetorik der Kaiserzeit 
(Munich 2000); T. A. Schmitz, ‘The Second Sophistic’, in M. Peachin ed., The Oxford handbook of 
social relations in the Roman world (Oxford 2011) 304-16 (308); J. Connolly, ‘Reclaiming the 
theatrical in the Second Sophistic’, Helios 28 (2001) 75-96, (84-92). On sophistic performance as a 
source of rivalry and hostility, see G. W. Bowersock, ‘Artemidorus and the Second Sophistic’, 
59-60. Artemidorus attacks performers as ‘liars’ (iii 4), and sophists are equated to performers: 
‘Actors and players who mount the stage are obviously not to be believed by anyone, since they 
play parts. Sophists, poor men, priests of Cybele, castrated men, and eunuchs are also 
untrustworthy’ (ii 69). Rhētores, in general, are considered frauds and deceivers; Artemidorus casts 
them among adulterers and forgers (i 51). Performance was, of course, an essential characteristic of 
public life and politics, especially in the Hellenistic age (see A. Chaniotis, Theatricality and public 
life in the Hellenistic world [Θεατρικότητα καὶ δημόσιος βίος στὸν ἑλληνιστικὸ κόσμο] (Iraklion 
2009) 41-139, 171-197], and the image of politician as performer and actor from the very moment 
of his entrance into politics (Praec. ger. reip. 805d) is another well-known Plutarchean metaphor: 
Swain, Hellenism and empire (n.37, above) 177-78. Fuhrmann, Les images de Plutarche (n.55 
above) 241-44. Quet, ‘Rhétorique, culture et politique’ (n.55, above) 65-66. 
104 VS 525: καὶ ὁ ∆ιονύσιος “οἷον” ἔφη “ἕρμαιον εἴρηκας, εἰ καὶ ἀκοῦσαί μοι ἔσται Πολέμωνος 
οὔπω ἐς πεῖραν αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένῳ.” “ἔοικεν” εἶπεν ὁ ∆ωρίων “στρέφειν σε ὁ νεανίας ἐς ὄνομα ἤδη 
προβαίνων μέγα”. 
105 VS 540. 
106 Bowersock, Greek sophists (n.62, above) 21-23. 
107 VS 511, 568, 600. 
108 Bowersock, Greek sophists (n.62, above) 46-47; Bowie, ‘Greeks and their past’ (n.63, above) 
36-37, 55-57.  
109 Cf. the works of Swain and Whitmarsh cited earlier (n.37 and 103, above) On the view that the 
cultural activities of the civic elites symbolically mirror and justify the real power structures by 
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that the sophists were ‘practically’ involved in politics through the holding of civic 
offices, richly attested in the Lives of the sophists and the epigraphical record.110 But here, 
my primary interest is the symbolic function of the sophists’ political and forensic 
activities, as illustrated in some interesting anecdotes preserved in Philostratus’ narrative. 
 It is worth turning, first, to the life of the Flavian sophist Scopelian of Clazomenae. He 
was a student of Nicetes and himself a famous teacher of rhetoric in Smyrna, where he 
taught numerous students from all over Asia, ‘Ionians, Lydians, Carians, Maeonians, 
Aeolians also and Greeks from Mysia and Phrygia (...) Cappadocians and Assyrians (...) 
Egyptians and Phoenicians, the most illustrious of the Achaeans, and all the youth of 
Athens’,111 having refused the proposal made by his home city Clazomenae to open a 
school there, since ‘the nightingale does not sing in the cave’.112 Scopelian had been a 
very successful advocate, and perhaps the only way to win a case against him was by 
bribing the jury, as had happened in a trial over the will of his own father (VS 517):  
 
καὶ τῆς τοῦ Σκοπελιανοῦ δεινότητος τε καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀκμῆς 
κρείττων ἔδοξεν ἀγωνισάμενος μὲν περὶ τῶν διαθηκῶν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀντεκτείνας δὲ 
τῇ ἐκείνου δεινότητι τὸν ἐκείνου πλοῦτον· ἀπαντλῶν γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ 
μισθούμενος ὑπερβολαῖς χρημάτων γλώττας ὁμοῦ πάσας καὶ δικαστῶν ψήφους 
πανταχοῦ τὴν νικῶσαν ἀπηνέγκατο. 
 
The surprising thing is that he showed himself more than a match for the oratorical 
talent of Scopelian, and his high reputation, in the law courts; for he went to law 
with him over the will, and used Scopelian’s own fortune to counteract the latter’s 
talent. For by drawing deeply on the estate and bribing with extravagant sums the 
tongues of all men, and at the same time the votes of the jury, he won a complete 
victory on every point. 
controlling the classical past and elaborating complex forms of public speech: T. Schmitz, Bildung 
und Macht: zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt 
der Kaiserzeit (Munich 1997).  
110 Eponymous archon, Athens: Herodes Atticus (126/7 AD: VS 550; IG II² 3190); Theodotus 
(Puech 252-53); Apollonius of Athens (205-10 AD; VS 600; Puech 21-24). Hoplite general, Athens: 
Lollianus of Ephesus (twice: 117, 138 AD. Philostratus knows only one service: 526. Puech 
149-50); Apollonius of Athens (VS 601; Puech, 149-50); Philostratus himself (200/1 AD; J. S.Trail, 
‘Greek inscriptions honoring Prytaneis’, Hesperia 40 (1971) 324); agoranomos, Athens: Herodes 
Atticus (125 AD; IG II² 3602); stephanephoros, Smyrna: Heracleides (VS 613); archiereus of Asia: 
Scopelian (VS 515); archiereus of Lycia: Heracleides (VS 613). On the many sophists who served as 
stephanephoroi, agonothetai, tamiai, etc, see the catalogue in Puech 23-27, and also the collection 
of epigraphical sources in Puech 60-61, 131-32, 138, 167, 173, 205, 226, 227, 252-53, 260. 
111 VS 518: Σκοπελιανοῦ δὲ σπουδάζοντος ἐν τῇ Σμύρνῃ ξυμφοιτᾶν μὲν ἐς αὐτὴν Ἴωνάς τε καὶ 
Λυδοὺς καὶ Κᾶρας καὶ Μαίονας Αἰολέας τε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Μυσῶν Ἕλληνας καὶ Φρυγῶν οὔπω μέγα, 
ἀγχίθυρος γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσι τούτοις ἡ Σμύρνα καιρίως ἔχουσα τῶν γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πυλῶν, ὁ δὲ ἦγε 
μὲν Καππαδόκας τε καὶ Ἀσσυρίους, ἦγε δὲ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Φοίνικας Ἀχαιῶν τε τοὺς 
εὐδοκιμωτέρους καὶ νεότητα τὴν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἅπασαν.    
112 VS 516: δεομένων δὲ τῶν Κλαζομενίων τὰς μελέτας αὐτὸν οἴκοι ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προβήσεσθαι τὰς 
Κλαζομενὰς ἐπὶ μέγα ἡγουμένων, εἰ τοιοῦτος δὴ ἀνὴρ ἐμπαιδεύσοι σφίσιν, τουτὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀμούσως 
παρῃτήσατο τὴν ἀηδόνα φήσας ἐν οἰκίσκῳ μὴ ᾄδειν.... 
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How does Philostratus describe Scopelian’s practice of advocacy? The biographer 
explains that Scopelian was a generous advocate and notes that he supported without a fee 
those who were facing the death penalty (probably in the court of the Roman governor). 
Scopelian not only defended his clients for free, but also confronted those who delivered 
‘abusive’ speeches, in order to restrain social antagonisms. Thus, his role as a social 
mediator worked both towards Rome, and internally in the Greek cities (VS 519):  
 
τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἦθος οὔτε φιλοχρήματος οὔτε φιλολοίδορος· προῖκα μὲν 
γὰρ ξυνέταττεν ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσι, τοὺς δὲ λοιδορουμένους ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θυμοῦ τινα ἐπίδειξιν ἡγουμένους ποιεῖσθαι γραίδια ἐκάλει 
μεθύοντα καὶ λυττῶντα. 
 
In the law courts he displayed a temper neither avaricious nor malevolent. For 
without a fee he would champion the cause of those who were in danger of their 
lives, and when men became abusive in their speeches, and thought fit to make a 
great display of indignation, he used to call them tipsy and frenzied old hags. 
 
Scopelian was constantly co-operating with the political elite in the government of 
Smyrna: ‘during the period before a declamation he was generally in the company of the 
magistrates of Smyrna transacting public business’.113 He used his sophistic charisma to 
control and suppress the political conflicts which arose in the popular assembly, a field 
where conflicts between the elite and the masses could burst at any time (VS 519):  
 
παρῄει δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς δήμους ἀνειμένῳ τε καὶ διακεχυμένῳ τῷ προσώπῳ, καὶ 
πολλῷ πλέον, ὅτε ξὺν ὀργῇ ἐκκλησιάζοιεν, ἀνιεὶς αὐτοὺς καὶ διαπραύνων τῇ τοῦ 
εἴδους εὐθυμίᾳ. 
 
Even when he appeared in the public assembly it was with a cheerful and lively 
countenance, and all the more when the meeting was excited by anger, for then he 
relaxed the tension and calmed their minds. 
 
Another famous advocate, Damianus of Ephesus, acted in the same way as a social mediator 
who helped those who were in need, also by defending them without a fee (VS 606):  
 
ἔπειτα αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἦθος οὐ πᾶν ἀσπαζομένου κέρδος, οὐδὲ 
ἐπαινοῦντος τὸ ἐξ ἅπαντος λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ’ οὓς αἴσθοιτο ἀποροῦντας προῖκα 
τούτοις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φωνὴν διδόντος. 
 
The man’s own disposition, as he showed it in legal affairs, was that of one who 
did not embrace every chance of making a profit or approve of taking what he 
could get from any and every one. On the contrary, whenever he saw that people 
were in difficulties, he would offer to speak for them himself without payment. 
 
However, the most revealing case is that of Marcus Antonius Polemo – the eminent sophist, 
amicus of the emperors Trajan, Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, synēgoros for members of the 
upper classes, and also famous benefactor of Smyrna – a man of whom it was thought that 
113 VS 518: πρὸ τῆς μελέτης καιρὸν ξυνῆν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ τοῖς τῶν Σμυρναίων τέλεσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν 
πολιτικῶν. 
4  DIMITRIS KARAMBELAS: SYNĒGOROI AS ‘HEALERS’                              97 
 
 
 
‘he conversed with cities as his inferiors, emperors as not his superiors and the gods as his 
equals’.114 According to his biographer, Polemo used the powerful medical metaphor of 
nosos and the threat of punishment in order to control the political and social equilibrium in 
Smyrna, and he also interfered directly in the administration of its legal affairs. Polemo 
repressed the social conflicts in Smyrna by imposing ‘concord’, especially between the 
urban and rural population (VS 531):  
 
ἔπειτα ὁμονοοῦσαν καὶ ἀστασίαστον πολιτεύειν, τὸν γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον 
ἐστασίαζεν ἡ Σμύρνα καὶ διεστήκεσαν οἱ ἄνω πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ. 
 
He brought about a harmonious government free from faction. For, before that, 
Smyrna was rent by factions, and the inhabitants of the upper district were at 
variance with those on the sea-shore. 
 
Polemo accused in public of the most severe moral disease (hybris) anyone surpassing the 
measure of political ‘balance’.115 Furthermore, according to Philostratus, Polemo ‘did not 
allow’ the Smyrneans to have their private disputes judged ‘outside’ their city, and saw to 
it that they were ‘settled’ there – i.e. he did not allow them to file an appeal before the 
court of the Roman governor.116 Polemo attempted, on the one hand, to prevent the 
intervention of Rome in the ‘private’ affairs of the Smyrneans, while he ensured, at the 
same time, that jurisdiction in private disputes would remain in the local courts which 
were controlled by the leading aristocratic families of the city. It is possible that citizens 
of the lower classes often preferred to be judged before the Roman governor rather than 
by the courts of their cities, fearing that they would probably be judged by fellows of their 
socially-powerful opposing litigants. Polemo’s authoritative command reflects the desire 
of the ruling classes to keep the masses under their jurisdiction.  
 By contrast, Polemo urged the citizens of Smyrna to ‘take out of the city’, as we can 
read in the Greek text below, and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Roman governor who 
held the ius gladii the power to enforce capital punishment in disputes such as those 
concerning ‘acts of adultery, sacrileges and homicides’, which constitute the most 
dangerous nosos for the city – ἄγoς, ‘pollution’ (VS 532): 
 
... τὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ μοιχοὺς καὶ ἱεροσύλους καὶ σφαγέας, ὧν ἀμελουμένων ἄγη φύεται, 
οὐκ ἐξάγειν παρεκελεύετο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξωθεῖν τῆς Σμύρνης, δικαστοῦ γὰρ 
δεῖσθαι αὐτὰς ξίφος ἔχοντος. 
 
... for those against adulterers, sacrilegious persons and murderers, the neglect of 
which breeds pollution, he not only urged them to carry them out of Smyrna but even 
to drive them out. For he said that they needed a judge with a sword in his hand. 
 
114 VS 535: ὡς πόλεσι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ προὔχοντος, δυνασταῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὑφειμένου, θεοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἴσου διαλέγεσθαι. 
115 VS 531: καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις δημοσίᾳ ἐπιπλήττων καὶ κατὰ σοφίαν πλεῖστα 
νουθετῶν ὠφέλει, ὕβριν τε ὁμοίως ἐξῄρει καὶ ἀγερωχίαν πᾶσαν. 
116 VS 532. 
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Polemo’s second command can be read in two ways: on the one hand, as a defensive 
denial of reality, if Rome retained anyway jurisdiction on capital crimes;117 on the other 
hand, as another instance of elite politics. The ruling classes opted for the expulsion of all 
social or legal conflicts which risked destabilizing the political status quo – hence the 
threat of miasma. If social or legal disturbances – symbolised as ‘pollution’ – could be 
transmitted and expanded, affecting the political equilibrium, it is obvious that local elites 
– as already seen in Plutarch’s view of internal politics – preferred to have them expelled 
from their cities by referring them to Roman judgment.  
 In the light of the above extract, it is not hard to understand how many of the prolific 
rhētores and sophists of the first and second centuries AD, acting as politicians, 
synēgoroi, advocates and, above all, social mediators and diallaktai – in addition to their 
various public offices and benefactions – could be elevated to the status of ‘doctors’ or 
‘healers’ in the social imagination of the urban masses, manifested in Artemidorus’ dream 
interpretations. They protected in the courts those who were in need, or indeed ‘cured’ 
civil strife and social antagonism by interfering directly in the administration of justice 
and by ‘taking out’ of their cities the ‘pollution’ which threatened their fragile political 
and social balance. 
 
University of Athens 
117 Fournier, Entre tutelle romaine et autonomie civique (n.7, above) 71, 331-33. Kantor, Roman 
Law and Local Law (n.7, above) 273-74 does not exclude the possibility that Smyrna still had 
jurisdiction in capital trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
THE EXPLOITS OF HONORIUS: 
EVIDENCE FOR ROMAN ADVOCACY 
IN THE TIME OF JUSTINIAN1 
 
J. G. F. POWELL 
 
This chapter will move into a period in the history of Roman oratory which is comparatively 
little known: the sixth century AD. The most distinguished legacy of that period to the 
modern world was doubtless the codification of Roman law under Justinian. We can emerge 
from a reading of the Institutes and the Digest with a highly detailed knowledge of the rules 
of the Roman legal procedure of that time; and yet from those sources we get hardly any 
idea of what day-to-day life in the Roman courts was like at this period. This contrasts with 
the state of our knowledge in regard to the Ciceronian period, where the legal framework 
under which the courts worked must be reconstructed as far as it can be from scattered 
evidence, but there is (comparatively speaking) a good deal of historical information about 
cases in court and the behaviour of advocates.  
 The limitations of the evidence make it difficult to test or refute what I suspect has still 
tended to be the common assumption, that in the Republic what mattered in the courts was 
oratorical performance, whereas in later times advocacy became more workaday and 
businesslike and bore a greater resemblance to what we largely find in our own courts 
today (whether in Britain, Europe, or America). The two complementary narratives of the 
decline of oratory and the rise of Roman ‘legal science’ do, of course, have some basis in 
the evidence, but an oversimplified view of them has been encouraged by the accident of 
what happens to have survived.  
 The texts which I shall present in this chapter cast an admittedly all too brief light on 
the actual practice of advocacy in late antiquity. One possible objection should be dealt 
with immediately at the beginning. The texts in question are fictional narratives with more 
than a dash of comedy. Can such writings be used as a historical source at all? The answer 
to this is reasonably simple. If by a historical source one means a source of precise 
information about real persons, institutions or events, the answer is evidently that at the 
very least one must be extremely careful and the enquiry may, in the end, yield nothing at 
all. But if one means a source which may contribute to our understanding of the habits and 
ethos of a particular society or of a sub-culture within it, such as that of the legal or 
oratorical profession, then the answer is at least potentially much more positive. The 
usefulness of any literary (especially comic) source is naturally a good deal greater when 
it is possible to compare it with other kinds of evidence. But even where such evidence is 
 
1 I am grateful to James Garlick for allowing me to make use of his MA dissertation (MA Classics, 
Royal Holloway 2006) and to Jaap Wisse for raising the question which I discuss in this chapter. 
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missing, one can still attempt to assess, on grounds of probability, when such a source is 
exaggerating or fantasizing and when it is reflecting some real feature of its background; 
and one should also remember that every culture or profession has its own recurrent 
fantasies which are just as much part of its ethos as are the everyday facts of its existence. 
An authority on the ethos of the English bar, David Pannick, comments with reference to 
Horace Rumpole, the fictional hero of John Mortimer’s stories: ‘… on a visit to the robing 
room of any Crown Court in south-east England it is impossible to tell whether the 
barristers to be found there served as the raw material for this work of supposed fiction or 
whether they have modelled their professional performance on Rumpole’s example.’2 As 
a matter of general probability, it is at least possible that the ancient stories which form 
the material of this chapter are to be read in the same spirit. Certainly, their hero – an 
advocate named Honorius – bears more than a passing resemblance to Mortimer’s 
creation in the unorthodox methods he sometimes uses to obtain a verdict. 
 These texts, published for the first time in 1862,3 are still not at all widely known. They 
do not figure at all in the otherwise excellent account of the history of Roman advocacy by 
J. Crook, although they would have provided some corroboration for Crook’s argument that 
advocacy remained important in the Roman courts.4 They were published again by 
L. Mondin in the proceedings of a conference on Late and Vulgar Latin where they were 
unlikely to be read by anyone except specialists on Latin linguistics.5 The present chapter 
attempts to explore their interest for historians of law and rhetoric. 
 Their central character Honorius appears in them as an advocate, as a judge, and as one 
to whom others turn for advice when in a tricky legal situation. He is explicitly designated as 
an orator, and at one point he is addressed by another character as scholastice, this being a 
word applied in late antiquity to those who were trained as advocates in the courts, rather as 
the word ‘learned’ is formally applied to barristers in England today. 
 The text as we have it comprises five short stories, preserved in just one manuscript of 
the eighth century AD (the so-called Salmasianus, which is among other things our main 
witness for the text of the Latin Anthology).6 Unluckily, a page has dropped out of the 
manuscript before our text of the stories begins; so the first of our stories has lost its 
beginning. The items in the manuscript are numbered, and from the numeration it appears 
that there was at least one other item on the missing page, which may or may not have 
been another Honorius story. The text is written in a clear and attractive script of the kind 
called ‘half-uncial’, which is thought by some palaeographers to have originated in the 
2 D. Pannick, Advocates (Oxford 1992) 230. 
3 Reprinted in M. Haupt, Opuscula, 3 vols, Leipzig 1875-76, iii 150-55. 
4 J. Crook, Legal advocacy in the Roman world (London 1995). 
5 L. Mondin, ‘Quelques textes peu connus du Codex Salmasianus (Par. Lat. 10318, VIIIe–IXe s., pp. 
207-211’ in Latin vulgaire – latin tardif V: Actes du Ve Colloque international sur le latin vulgaire 
et tardif, Heidelberg, 5–8 septembre 1997, ed. H. Petersmann, R. Kettemann (Heidelberg 1999) 
459-68. 
6 M. Spallone, ‘Il Par. lat. 10318 (Salmasiano): dal manoscritto alto-medioevale ad una raccolta 
enciclopedica tardo-antica’, Italia Medioevale e Umanistica 25 (1982) 1-71. 
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late-antique law schools, especially that of Berytus (Beirut).7 I do not venture to assert, 
though am tempted to believe, that the stories also originated in some such milieu. 
 The content of at least three of the stories is paralleled elsewhere. The first story is a 
version of a widely diffused, mainly Jewish and Oriental folktale.8 Although the other 
attestations are mainly early modern, it is most unlikely that they derive from the 
Honorius story itself, and the evidence points to a common source in the late-antique Near 
East.9 The second of the stories is barely altered from the anecdote of an encounter 
between Alexander the Great and one of his tutors, Anaximenes of Lampsacus. The fourth 
is of a type familiar in the world of Roman law: a missing son turns up to claim his 
inheritance and his identity is disputed.10 For the other two I have not yet been able to find 
any direct parallel. 
 Two items of evidence suggest that Honorius was based on a real person. First, in the 
manuscripts of Iordanes the sixth-century Greek historian, there survives an elegant Latin 
epigram, attributed to ‘Honorius scholasticus’ and addressed to ‘Iordanes episcopus’, 
asking for instruction in the Christian religion, and comparing it with Seneca’s moral 
teachings to the latter’s disadvantage.11 The appearance of the poem in a manuscript of 
the historian Iordanes seems to support the notion that the Iordanes addressed in the poem 
was the same man. 
 Secondly, next to the Honorius anecdotes in the Salmasianus, we find, hiding under 
the clearly false name of the ‘chronicles of Julius Caesar’, a geographical work,12 whose 
subscription advertises it as a version (seemingly a pirate version) of an exposition by 
someone called ‘Julius Honorius’, taken down and circulated by one of his pupils. 
Cassiodorus (Inst. 1.25.1) refers to the author of this same treatise as ‘Iulius orator’; and 
the same work is referred to also in the Getica of the historian Iordanes (sect. 6–7). 
7 B. Bischoff, trans. D. Ó Cróinín and D. Ganz, Latin palaeography: antiquity and the middle ages 
(Cambridge 1990) 74. 
8 A version of it occurs notably in Voltaire’s Oriental novel Zadig, chapter 10; commentators on 
Voltaire (e.g. G. Ascoli, revised by J. Fabre, Paris 1962, 80-81) mention a number of possible 
sources, including a seventeenth-century French collection of Indian (Muslim) stories; Mondin (n.5, 
above) refers to Arabic versions, and it figures also as a Jewish story in which the stone is replaced 
by a tree and Honorius’ role is taken by a rabbi: see M. Gaster, The exempla of the Rabbis (London 
and Leipzig 1924) 133, no. 358. There is some similarity also to the story of Susanna in the Old 
Testament Apocrypha. 
9 The story itself contains an indication that its setting was in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
peculiar rock formation on which the story hinges is described as ‘the remains of the fallen feather’, 
which exactly mirrors Juvenal’s paraphrase for Egnatius Celer’s origin ‘ripa nutritus in illa / ad 
quam Gorgonei delapsa est pinna caballi’ (Juv. 3.118). The legend of Pegasus’ feather falling to 
earth was associated with Tarsus, although Egnatius was born at Beirut; perhaps he was educated at 
Tarsus, or else the legend may have been associated with both places. 
10 There was a well-known Augustan case of this kind, in which Asinius Pollio appeared for the 
testamentary heirs of a lady called Urbinia against a man who claimed to be her son (Quint. Inst. 
7.2.26, Tac. Dial. 38); see C. Steel, ‘Lost orators of Rome’ in A companion to Roman rhetoric, ed. 
W. Dominik and J. Hall (Oxford and Malden, MA 2007) 246. 
11 F. Buecheler ed., rev. A. Riese, Anthologia Latina (Leipzig 1984-1897) no. 666. 
12 A. Riese ed., Geographi Latini minores (Leipzig 1978). 
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 Unless some or all of these indications are erroneous, this could add up to a coherent 
picture: an orator called Julius Honorius, living in the sixth century AD, and acquainted 
with Iordanes, bishop of Croton and historian.13 He would have been known principally as 
an advocate, hence the tendency for courtroom stories to gather round him. But the 
interests of such a man could well also have extended to literature, moral philosophy, and 
general knowledge, enabling him to lecture on geography, to study the teachings of 
Seneca, and to write accomplished Latin elegiacs to the bishop at a time when he turned to 
religion. Incidentally the Salmasianus manuscript also contains, after the Honorius stories 
and the geographical work, two items on moral philosophy, one of which is a collection of 
‘sententiae sci. Syxti episcopi e filosophi’, and the other is the oldest extant source for the 
rehash of Senecan material which became popular in the Middle Ages under the title ‘De 
Remediis Fortuitorum’. These are not explicitly linked with Honorius, but might also 
reflect his interests. 
 This, however, is all we can know or guess about him. If it is accepted that the 
Honorius of the stories was indeed based on a sixth-century orator and advocate, then at 
any rate the stories in their current form are not earlier than that. We have no terminus 
ante quem, other than the date of the manuscript itself (eighth or ninth century). But still, 
with some caution, we can take them as (on the face of it) providing evidence for attitudes 
to orators, advocates and advocacy in or just after the sixth century AD. 
 That is enough by way of introduction, and it is time to turn to the stories themselves. 
The first concerns a merchant who is joined on a journey by a parasitus or con-man. At a 
certain point on his journey, marked by a boulder of peculiar size and shape, the merchant 
falls ill and is left for dead, after first handing over his baggage to his companion, who 
makes off with it. Then the merchant, restored to health, successfully pursues his former 
companion and sues him for the return of his property – a straightforward claim under 
Roman law, provided it was proved that the goods were entrusted for safe keeping and 
intended to be returned on demand (the story uses the correct legal term depositum). 
However, he has a hard time of it, as there were no witnesses to the handing over of the 
goods: the con-man simply pretended not to know him. I continue in the words of the 
original story (my translation): 
 
The dispute between the two came before Honorius. The rich man, with no 
witnesses to support him, demanded the deposited goods back from his companion 
the trickster; on the other side the claim was vigorously denied. The rich man, as a 
sign of his truthfulness, described with the accurate memory that goes with 
reliability14 the rock lying on the road, and his sudden pain; but no evidence could 
by any means make the bandit confess. But his treacherous spirit was taken aback 
when the clever judge examined him and said to him: ‘Go quickly post-haste, and 
bring into court that rock you two companions met on the road. I would like to ask 
the stone a few questions in private; you understand that I can get confessions even 
13 W. Kroll, RE Suppl. iii s.v. Honorius 6 and 7. 
14 Latin credulitatis: but it is clear from the occurrence of this word in the fifth story that credulitas 
for the writer of the manuscript (if not for the composer of the stories)  meant ‘credibility’, not 
‘credulity’. 
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from inanimate objects.’ This confident and unexpected question threw the guilty 
man’s mind into confusion. He forgot to keep his knowledge secret,15 and blurted 
out that the rock was too large to be brought there even by a team of four horses. In 
that way he gave open testimony of his guilt, which he had stubbornly denied, and 
condemned himself out of his own mouth. 
 
The other stories are short enough to be told as they were written. 
 
2.  A certain person who had been proved guilty of a capital crime and convicted on clear 
evidence, before sentence of death was passed by the severe judge, as his fate hung in the 
balance for a short time, bethought himself of the assistance of Honorius, and persuaded 
him to help in his extremity. The judge, seeing Honorius sitting in front of the tribunal and 
about to burst out into speech, thought he was about to beg for mercy for the defendant, 
and swore by the safety of the State and the prosperity of the empire that whatever 
Honorius asked for would be refused. Then Honorius, taking the opportunity he had 
desired, pleaded that the defendant should be executed, so far as that was consistent with 
the terms of the oath. By that device the defendant was saved from capital punishment and 
was allowed to go free. 
 
3.  A certain very noble Roman lady had been caught in public washing away her 
menstrual blood in the public water supply at the Claudian spring. Being guilty of the 
grave charge of having polluted the spring waters with the uncleanness of her blood, she 
was being led out to be stoned to death. Bound hand and foot, she suddenly caught sight 
of Honorius through the columns of the accusing crowd, and cried out to him, ‘Help me, 
learned man (scholastice), and come to the defence of my family! Say anything you can!’ 
Honorius, in response to this final appeal for help, replied to her: ‘You had better confess 
that you washed away your blood in the Claudian spring, so that the whole Roman people 
will be liable to be held guilty of pollution.’ At this unexpected pronouncement, the mood 
of the crowd went to the other extreme: they were afraid that the news of this disgrace 
might reach neighbouring nations. The lady was saved, and a shout went up from her 
accusers that she had not done it after all. 
 
4. A certain man on his death left a surviving wife and infant son. The wife, so that she 
might enjoy alone and with greater freedom the possession of his great wealth and 
resources, trampled family affection underfoot and ordered her attendants to cut the throat 
of her son. But by the kindness of the servants he was left alive in the forest, and in due 
course arrived at the mature strength of a young man, without the knowledge of his 
mother. The fact that he was the noble offspring of that family could not remain 
concealed, and the young man summoned into court his mother, who in her greed for 
wealth pretended that she did not recognize the child of her body. While the whole court 
and assembled ranks of the Bar were applauding counsel for the rich woman,16 the only 
representation left to the boy was that of Honorius. On the day when the case was due to 
15 This is the meaning of the Latin conscientiam suam tenere non potuit; it does not refer to 
‘conscience’ in the modern sense. Honorius’ question does nothing to excite the con-man’s moral 
sense, but merely tricks him into revealing his knowledge of the place. 
16 Reading divitis for divitiis. 
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come on, the mother attended court, the courtroom was crowded with barristers, but the 
boy’s advocate alone was absent – clearly on purpose. The search for him went on for a 
long time, and eventually because of his absence a verdict in favour of the woman was 
hanging on the judge’s lips. What, indeed, could the eloquent tongue of an advocate have 
done for the boy, when his mother denied him? However, the good orator hid himself only 
for a short time, and at last he came in through the door of the court, bathed in sweat. 
Everyone asked the reason for his prolonged absence. He replied that he had been 
spending a long time looking for the mother of the boy, and, so far, was still looking. At 
once the woman forgot herself because of this surprise attack. She gave away the truth 
which she had been trying to hide, and said that she, the mother of the boy, had been in 
court all the time. In this way she unintentionally admitted that the young man, whom she 
pretended was not hers, was in fact her son. 
 
5. A very noble lady had woven by the arts of Pallas two fine linen shawls from one roll of 
cloth with delicate embroidery. The fine subtlety with which the valuable work had been 
finished was such that those who came to admire them appeared like a stream of spectators 
coming to see a famous wonder.17 But while the lady was appearing at public gatherings 
wearing this notable piece of haute couture, a certain other woman of good family, who 
could not bear such beauty in another’s clothes, imitated the ethereal artistry of the threads, 
got the pattern by eye, and made one piece of work woven exactly like it. Then (in the way 
chance has of keeping a malevolent eye on anything of high quality) it happened that by a 
stroke of ill luck the lady who had two had one somehow snatched away from her. But after 
she had lost the garment, she saw the other lady, her rival, wearing the spitting image of her 
own shawl, transparently woven with very similar skill. This she took with great ill-will; she 
accused the other woman – who was, in fact, a model of chastity – of having acquired the 
famous shawl as the price of adultery with her husband, and to enhance her credibility she 
showed her the companion-piece of the one she had lost through mischance. The lady who 
had made the one shawl in honest envy asked Honorius for his opinion. While the case stood 
on a knife-edge, and the other lady averred that her husband had taken that one of the pair as 
a reward for his new mistress, Honorius advised that the threads should be counted in the 
two pieces of cloth that were held to be a pair. The inspection was duly carried out, and 
revealed that the arrangement of the threads was different; so because of the numerical 
discrepancy the dispute was resolved. 
 
*    *    * 
 
A striking feature of all these stories is that although Honorius is characterized in one 
place as bonus orator, none of his effects is achieved by oratory as such (i.e. the making 
of continuous speeches). The unwary might, therefore, be inclined to take the stories as 
evidence that the role of oratory in court proceedings had declined by the relevant period, 
and that its place had been taken by quick-fire cross-examination and other non-oratorical 
methods, more similar to the kind of thing that happens in a modern court in one of the 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. It might be that the word orator applied to advocates was by 
this time no more than a convention. 
17 With some hesitation I have followed Mondin’s interpretation of this clause (see n.5, above, 462). 
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 For example, in the first story, although Honorius is here playing the role of the judge, 
he displays what in modern times is often considered pre-eminently the advocate’s gift – 
the art of eliciting a confession by deft cross-examination. One may think of modern 
stories like the one told of F. E. Smith (Lord Birkenhead), defending a bus company 
against a claim for compensation after a road accident. The young claimant said that as a 
result of the accident he could only lift his arm up to a certain height, and gave an 
apparently painful demonstration of this to the court. Smith asked him to show how far he 
could lift his arm before the accident. The boy’s arm shot up and the case was over.18 
 However, I do not think the stories can be made to support any such thesis. Rather 
what they illustrate – and illustrate very neatly – is the fact that, in virtually all times and 
places, an advocate’s performance in court includes a good deal more than just 
speechmaking. To be successful, an advocate needs both to be able to make continuous 
presentations of a case and to be able to seize the opportunities of the moment.  
 I have suggested elsewhere that this may have been true even in the Ciceronian period, 
but that our evidence has given a possibly exaggerated view of the importance of 
speechmaking, for a number of related reasons:19 
 (a) The speeches of Cicero and a few others were published after the event as literary 
artefacts; most of those that have survived into modern times are Cicero’s. In these cases, 
the speeches have outlasted all or most of the evidence for whatever else went on in court, 
and we tend to assume by default that they were the decisive factor in winning the case; 
whereas, in fact, the speeches represented by the written versions constitute only a part of 
the actual court proceedings, and we have no means of knowing whether they were the 
most decisive part, however proud of them their author may have been. 
 (b) Much of our evidence for Roman court practice comes from spokesmen for 
rhetorical education. It is more than likely that these authors tended to exaggerate the 
importance of what they could teach, i.e. the composition and delivery of speeches, 
relative to what they could not reasonably expect to teach, i.e. practical experience of 
conducting cases and the ability to think on one’s feet.  
 (c) The fact that we happen to have no written versions of Latin courtroom speeches 
from any time after Apuleius certainly does not in itself indicate that speeches were not 
made or that those that were made were less important. Most of the speeches made by 
Republican and early imperial orators have also failed to be preserved. 
 That oratory in the classical manner does, in fact, still form the backdrop to the 
Honorius stories is illustrated by one particular passage in them. In the fourth of the 
stories, as is typical of Roman civil procedure, the trial is divided into two halves, in both 
of which there was scope for advocacy. In the first of these, the boy summons his mother 
to court; and ‘the whole court and the assembled ranks of the Bar were applauding 
counsel for the rich woman’ – ‘cumque divitis patrocinio mulieris tota forensis curia et 
toga plauderet’. What, then, were they applauding? It is difficult to think that they were 
not applauding an oratorical performance by the woman’s advocate, doubtless the best 
available. Then, when the case comes on again apud iudicem, there is an authorial 
18 L. Page, First steps in advocacy (London 1943) 101. 
19 J. G. F. Powell, ‘Court procedure and rhetorical strategy in Cicero’, in Form and function in 
Roman oratory, ed. D. Berry and A. Erskine (Cambridge 2010) 21-36. 
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comment: ‘what could the eloquent tongue of an advocate have done for the boy?’. The 
implication is that oratory would have been expected from Honorius too and that he would 
have been capable of providing it. The point of the story, however, is that oratory does not 
necessarily carry the day. The advocates on the other side had made an impressive case by 
means of oratory, which Honorius was able to subvert by alternative means.20 
 To return now to the first of the Honorius stories (the stone as witness): Honorius here 
is a judge, and it was never the judge’s job to make speeches. Nothing can therefore be 
deduced from it about the importance or unimportance of speechmaking. What it does 
show is a judge who takes an active role in asking questions and is not just a passive 
listener and arbitrator; but this is a rather different issue. 
 The second story is borrowed from one of the founding fathers of Greek rhetoric. After 
his victory against the Persians, Alexander determined to punish the town of Lampsacus 
which had been on the ‘wrong’ side. The rhetorician Anaximenes was detailed to plead 
the cause of the town, relying on his influence as one of the king’s former tutors. 
Alexander opened the discussion with the discouraging remark that he would refuse 
whatever Anaximenes asked for; Anaximenes replied by asking Alexander to destroy 
Lampsacus, thus saving the town. The sources for this story (Pausanias 6.18.2; Valerius 
Maximus 7.3 ext. 4) quote Anaximenes himself as the source. Whether or not he had 
actually done what he claimed, it clearly indicates that from a Hellenistic rhetorician’s 
point of view as well, an effective one-liner could be worth any amount of speech-making. 
The very persistence of the story over time tends to cast doubt on the idea that it is 
evidence for a change in attitudes. It could, in fact, have been told at any time; any time, 
that is, at which decisions of life and death were customarily made by a single person. It 
could not work in a system of jury courts, such as that of classical Athens, Republican 
Rome, or modern England. And this suggests that what is really at issue may not be 
primarily a change in the role of oratory in advocacy, but rather a change in the nature of 
the tribunals before which the advocates appeared, which in turn affected their manner of 
performance. 
 In the third story, Honorius achieves his effect by playing on the public’s fear of 
pollution. Put like that, the story seems at first sight alien to modern ways of thought, but 
translate it into more modern terms as a matter of public hygiene and its point becomes 
immediately apparent. One needs only to read Ibsen’s An enemy of the people to realize 
that when the economy or reputation of a region depends on a clean water supply, people 
may even in modern times be only too happy to cover up untoward happenings upstream. 
Honorius’ psychology may not be so antiquated after all. And here his training as an 
orator must have come into play in another way: voice projection and crowd control. Even 
a brief intervention of this kind needed to be heard clearly by at least some of the crowd, 
and the words chosen to maximize the psychological effect. 
 The fifth story introduces a different point: Honorius’ intervention involves detailed 
inspection of material evidence. Now this procedure would be routine in a modern court; 
any modern defence lawyer of any competence would demand an inspection of the cloth 
to establish whether it actually was the item it was alleged to be (indeed, the inspection 
20 If the speech of Pollio for Urbinia (n.10, above) was still known in Honorius’ time – as it may 
have been –  the anecdote gains an extra point, but this is only a speculation. 
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would surely have taken place at the stage of police investigation and the case might never 
have come to court in the first place). But the drift of the story is that such an inspection is 
something unusual in the context in which Honorius is working. If anything, this could be 
taken not as an indication of a shift towards modern forensic methods, but rather as 
support for the opposite thesis, that the legal system of Honorius’ time was still firmly 
ancient in its general tendency to underestimate the value of material evidence. 
 However, one should be wary of constructing such a conclusion on the basis of this 
piece of evidence. Probably the real point is to be found elsewhere. The case turns on a 
discrimen numerorum, a numerical discrepancy of the kind one would normally expect to 
find in an account-book and which would usually be a ground for suspicion. But here it 
occurs in an area which a Roman advocate never normally had to deal with, i.e. the 
technique of weaving, which was so much associated with female identity that it could 
certainly be assumed to be a closed book to most Roman males. (The idea of an advocate 
taking up spinning or weaving, as a sign of latent effeminacy, is a satirical fantasy in 
Juvenal’s second satire.) Any Roman advocate would no doubt be perfectly happy to deal 
with material evidence, for example, in the form of documents: Cicero in the Verrines has 
no trouble in unmasking forgeries and alterations in Verres’ accounts. The novelty comes 
in Honorius’ application of a familiar principle – do the numbers match or not? – in an 
area that was unfamiliar to most of the male denizens of a Roman court. One of the 
advocate’s perennial skills is the ability to gather knowledge of out-of-the-way subjects in 
order to outwit the opponent: in modern times often specialist scientific knowledge, as in 
Norman Birkett’s famous question about the coefficient of expansion of brass.21  
 The Honorius of the stories is evidently not in all respects presented as a typical 
advocate of his time, and can hardly be used as evidence for the generality of forensic 
practice. He attracts attention, in fact, precisely because of his unorthodox methods. 
Evidently, he is a well-known figure, and has a reputation for being able to help where 
nobody else can. So much is implied by the appeal to him by the lady who is about to be 
lynched in the third story. Furthermore, in the second story it is clear that the judge knows 
Honorius well: he has only to see him ‘sitting in front of the tribunal and apparently about 
to break into speech’ to know that something is afoot.  
 In the fourth story Honorius appears alone for the young man claiming his inheritance. 
The phrasing ‘sola puero est Honori defensio derelicta’ seems to imply that Honorius was 
a last resort when no respectable advocate was available.22 In point of fact, taking cases 
that nobody else would touch was not necessarily the prerogative of the maverick or 
unsuccessful advocate: Cicero takes pride in it for example in the Pro Roscio, and Pliny 
the Younger laid down that cases of this sort were especially likely to enhance one’s 
reputation as a patronus. But there was a narrative advantage in pretending that the boy’s 
engagement of Honorius as his counsel did not at first appear to improve his chances; so it 
had to be suggested that Honorius’ unorthodox methods had perhaps led to some loss of 
reputation, although an advocate of that level of ingenuity could be expected in any real 
21 H. M. Hyde, Norman Birkett (1964) 307-09. 
22 It should be noted that the word defensio in Latin can be applied to either side of a case, not just 
the defence; in fact the boy is the plaintiff, hence my translation ‘representation’ above. 
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situation to be very much in demand. The same point is made in a modern context by 
Pannick23 in connection with the fictional Horace Rumpole. 
 Apart from their pure entertainment value, one may ask whether there are any ulterior 
points or morals to be drawn from the Honorius stories. In the first story, Honorius’ job as 
judge is to elicit the truth in order to decide the case, while in the second and third stories 
his intervention ends unambiguously in a victory for his client, without regard to 
considerations of justice. In the second, he obtains acquittal for a defendant clearly guilty; 
in the third, he saves the noble lady from a lynching, but leaves the city of Rome with an 
apparently polluted water supply.24 In the fourth, however, Honorius has justice on his 
side. The fifth story is perhaps the most interesting. At first, one is tempted to sympathize 
with the opposition. Honorius’ client is envious of the other lady’s finely woven garment, 
and at first seems to suffer a sort of poetic justice, because her envy leads to the charge of 
adultery. In the same way, we are disposed to regard the other lady’s suspicions as 
reasonable in the light of what she knows of the facts at the time: how else is she to 
explain the appearance of what she thinks is her shawl on the shoulders of the other 
woman? But legally Honorius’ client is absolutely blameless. This fact is stressed in the 
phrase ‘honesto livore’ (honest envy). Such a comment may well have a didactic aim. At 
least, in modern times it is very much part of the advocate’s ethos that one must look to 
the rights and wrongs of the case regardless of whether one finds one’s client’s behaviour 
morally attractive. This attitude is to such an extent a logical consequence of the nature of 
advocacy that it would be surprising if it did not figure at least some of the time in the 
ancient world as well. This story can be taken to suggest not only that a similar attitude 
obtained, but that the author of the story was concerned to inculcate it. It is true that (as 
we learn from Cicero and Quintilian) some Roman advocates were fastidious about taking 
on cases and liked to satisfy themselves beforehand of the respectability of their clients 
and the soundness of their cases; but this clearly was not true of all.25 
 Honorius’ title scholasticus may put us in mind of a standard type of joke in Greek, of 
which no fewer than 103 are preserved in the collection called Philogelos, attributed to 
Hierocles and Philagrius.26 In these jokes, the scholastikos is generally a butt, not a hero, 
and his howlers have had a long afterlife as stories about abstracted academics such as 
Dr. Spooner, or, in a Middle Eastern context, the Mulla Nasrudin, a ‘wise fool’ whose 
general character in some ways resembles that of Honorius (he too sometimes figures as a 
legal official).27 The word scholasticus / scholastikos means one who frequents the 
schools of rhetoric (and later, no doubt, also those of law) as teacher or student, and this 
23 See n.2, above, 230-4. 
24 It can be assumed without difficulty that the story is set in Rome and that the fons Claudius is the 
source of the Aqua Claudia; I do not follow the arguments of Kroll (see n.13, above) and Mondin 
(see n.5, above) against this interpretation. The fact that lapidatio is not a Roman legal penalty is 
irrelevant, since no legal process is in question: Honorius in this story is merely a bystander who is 
called upon to intervene to save the lady from an angry crowd. 
25 J. Powell and J. Paterson ed., Cicero the advocate (Oxford 2004) 24. 
26 B. Baldwin trans., comm., The philogelos or laughter-lover, London Studies in Classical 
Philology 10 (Amsterdam 1983). 
27 I. Shah, The exploits of the incomparable Mulla Nasrudin (London 1966). 
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academic status could be viewed either positively, as a qualification to practise advocacy 
in the courts, or negatively, as a sign of lack of experience of the world outside, leading to 
absorption in trivialities and deficiency in common sense. It is mostly of course the latter 
aspect which appears in the joke-book. 
 In fact, in two of the Philogelos items the scholastikos is specifically an advocate. One 
of them concerns a young scholastikos, a student of rhetoric, writing home to his father – 
‘P.S. I hope you will be on trial when I get back, so that I can show you how good an 
advocate I am’. Another presents the scholastikos as an advocate who insists on 
rehearsing his speech in public before the trial, thus apparently giving away his line of 
argument to the opposition (although this turns out to have been a deliberate deception). 
Honorius the ‘scholasticus’ clearly has something in common with the scholastikos of the 
joke-book, in his fondness for unexpected twists of logic. Calling a stone as a witness, for 
example, may be conceived to be precisely the sort of thing that the copybook 
scholastikos would try to do. One may be tempted to wonder whether the Honorius 
anecdotes might have been devised against a general background of mockery of 
scholastikoi. The legal and rhetorical mind sometimes appears twisted to the outsider; the 
Honorius stories, in showing how its agility can be turned to advantage, may have served 
to some extent as propaganda for the advocate’s profession. 
 Despite the temptations of literary fame and academic prestige which awaited a Cicero 
or a Quintilian, the orator’s profession was and is ultimately a practical one, and the art of 
persuasion has always comprised more than just making speeches. Even in great ages of 
oratory, where published speeches are read and admired, we may underestimate the extent 
to which a sharp question, an adroit piece of play-acting, or a sudden appeal to crowd 
psychology, can sway the outcome of a trial or debate. No treatment of the methods of 
ancient or modern speakers can be complete without paying at least some attention to 
these aspects as well. If the Honorius stories can do nothing else for historians of oratory 
and advocacy, they can at least remind us of this principle, and caution us against an 
approach which elevates the set speech above other aspects of the orator’s performance. 
Furthermore, they can indicate that even in the world that produced the Digest, there were 
still advocates whose success in their profession depended as much on rhetorical skill in 
the widest sense as on expertise in the law. 
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THE RHETORIC OF THE COMMON LAW 
 
SIR JOHN LAWS 
 
What is rhetoric? A working definition is ‘the art of persuasion by means of speech’. I will 
speak of different styles of rhetoric. Rhetoric may of course be practised in different spheres.  
There are two principal spheres: law and politics, but we should not forget religion. Not only 
fire and brimstone in the pulpit, but also, and much more important, those quiet sermons in 
time of grief, and others that capture a moment of joy. They go to show that our working 
definition – the art of persuasion by means of speech – is only a paradigm. Rhetoric’s aim 
may also be to comfort, or simply to give pleasure.   
 I will not say very much about political or religious rhetoric. My comfort zone is in the 
law courts. It is true however that both in ancient Rome and in nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century England (though I think more in Rome than in London) there were 
speakers – rhetoricians – who excelled in politics and law alike: Cicero of course in Rome in 
the first century BC; in England, F. E. Smith, first Earl of Birkenhead, is as good an example 
as any. He bestrode the forensic stage in the first quarter of the twentieth century, but he was 
also an important politician as Lord Chancellor, and then as Secretary of State for India, in 
the years immediately following the First World War.   
 In the later years of the last century, however, the glittering pathway from legal practice 
to high political office became a less and less frequent cursus honorum here in Britain. No 
doubt the reason was – at least this is I think the received wisdom – that the professions of 
law and politics had become too complicated for anyone to excel in both at the highest level.   
 As regards politics and religion, there is a very interesting instance from the fourth 
century AD of a rhetorician who was concerned with both: Themistius, the pagan orator 
who advised Christian emperors. He first came to prominence in the time of Constantius II, 
who was of course son of Constantine the Great; and we last hear of him in the time of 
Theodosius I, after the battle of Adrianople in 378 when the Roman arms succumbed to the 
Goths and the Emperor Valens fell. Themistius, I think, served all the emperors between 
Constantius and Theodosius, thus including Julian the Apostate, the only non-Christian. 
Quite a number of his speeches survive. They are a curious mixture of flattery and sound 
advice to the emperor, and are an interesting record of a time (at least before Theodosius) 
when the relationship between Christianity and paganism, as we would now call the ancient 
religion, was not firmly shaped. 
 But I shall very largely confine myself to the comfort zone: rhetoric in the law courts. I 
have not the scholarship to say very much about ancient models of practice and precept, 
though I shall plough into Pliny the Younger in a minute. It is to my mind a great misfortune 
that most of our advocates today, certainly in this jurisdiction, are not exposed to any such 
ancient models, for they have lacked either the good sense or more often the opportunity to 
study the classics. In introducing the little I have to offer you I should first say, quite firmly, 
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that I prefer the term rhetoric to oratory. No doubt the two are close to being the same thing.  
But oratory has a whiff of being more about the speaker than the subject. The other day I 
was watching that great movie, The man who shot Liberty Valance, with James Stewart and 
John Wayne. There is a very lively scene of an election meeting, at which attempts are made 
to persuade the James Stewart character to run for the Senate. They are opposed by a local 
dignitary who addresses the assembled throng in tones of indescribable self-satisfaction, his 
thumbs in the lapels of his frock coat, the orotund phrases rolling from his lips, false 
compliments to the audience in abundance, false points in the argument even more so. It gets 
him nowhere; James Stewart runs for the Senate, and as we learn at the end of the movie, he 
is three times elected Governor of the State, and serves as Ambassador to the Court of St. 
James into the bargain.     
 The local dignitary’s pomp and circumstance was of course a caricature. But like many 
caricatures it has something to teach. It was the worst sort of oratory – over-the-top, and 
therefore deeply subject to the law of diminishing returns. In the movie the context was 
political rather than forensic: on the face of it, outside my comfort zone. But putting your 
case too high is a rhetorical sin in any context. Principally, however, the scene in the film 
(the movies are great educators) illustrates why I prefer the term rhetoric to oratory. Rhetoric 
is less self-regarding.   
 I said I would speak of different styles of rhetoric, and within the comfort zone of the 
law I shall do so. I will tell you about the nature of rhetoric in the common law tradition; 
what is the essence of it. 
 But first – and if it is an eccentric introduction you will forgive me – I will start with 
Pliny the Younger, to my mind the ancient world’s champion nerd. I cannot resist this 
quotation (which also appeared in my concluding chapter in Cicero the advocate):1 Pliny is 
writing to Tacitus,2 considering the difference between a speech as delivered and its written 
version. The letter has some interesting observations about the nature of advocacy – and 
therefore rhetoric – which I will look at in considering the common law tradition. Pliny says 
this: 
 
... I feel convinced... that, though some speeches may sound better than they read, if 
the written speech is good it must also be good when delivered, for it is the model 
and prototype for the spoken version. That is why we find so many rhetorical figures, 
apparently spontaneous, in any good written speech, even in those which we know 
were published without being delivered [and he gives an example from Cicero]. It 
follows then that the perfect speech when delivered is that which keeps most closely 
to the written version, so long as the speaker is allowed the full time due to him; if he 
is cut short, it is no fault of his, but a serious error on the part of the judge. The law 
supports my view, for it allows speakers any amount of time and recommends not 
brevity but the full exposition and precision which brevity cannot permit, except in 
very restricted cases. 
1 Sir John Laws (Lord Justice Laws), ‘Epilogue: Cicero and the modern advocate’, in Cicero the 
advocate, ed. J. G. F. Powell and J. J. Paterson (Oxford 2004) 401-16. 
2 Pliny, Letters I. 20.  The translation is by Betty Radice, published in the Penguin Classics series.  
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What, one wonders, would Pliny have thought of the practice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, which generally allows counsel half an hour and no more? The Court of 
Justice of the European Union at Luxembourg does the same. It is said that there is one 
Supreme Court Justice at Washington who will cut counsel off not merely at the end of a 
sentence, but in the middle of a word: and a word of one syllable at that. 
 The truth is that had he come before a modern English judge Pliny would have been a 
complete nightmare. Not only because he would stick doggedly to a prepared text, and 
consider himself wronged if he were cut short – and no doubt equally wronged if he were 
interrupted, perhaps by a sharp question digging at the heart of his argument – but because 
that very attitude stifles or denies the dialogue between Bar and Bench that is the stuff of 
modern advocacy in the common law world.3   
 From Pliny there is more to come. But first, in order to focus what I am going to tell you, 
I should say a word about the different traditions of the common law and the civil law in 
connection with the conduct of court proceedings. For it is of course the civil law tradition 
that is the direct descendant of Roman law jurisprudence, or at least the descendant of the 
codification and reforms of the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century.  
 As is well known, the method of the common law, born in England but exported 
wherever the British flag went, is adversarial: that is, it settles disputes by requiring one side 
to prove its case over the other, with the judge acting (I summarize it crudely) as a kind of 
referee. And despite the greatly increased use in recent years of written procedures, this 
process still essentially takes place in the public courtroom with advocates on either side. It 
applies not only in first instance trials, civil and criminal, where the facts have to be 
established; but also in appeals, where sometimes there are factual issues but, more often 
than not, the issues are issues of law. The common law’s received wisdom is that decisions 
of fact or of law are likely to be firmer, better, or more reliable if the rival contentions have 
been tested on the anvil of live face-to-face dispute: argued law is tough law. Thus the 
principle of our common law procedures is the principle of contest. 
 The civil law system, on the other hand, is inquisitorial: the proceedings take the form of 
an enquiry conducted by the judge. The judge is much more than a referee. In first instance 
trials he decides what witnesses should be called, what documents are relevant, and so forth. 
There might or might not be a jury – systems differ. On appeal, and generally in cases where 
the issues are legal rather than factual, the scope for oral advocacy is quite severely 
curtailed, and the advocates themselves, the lawyers instructed for the parties, have an 
altogether more anodyne, more bloodless role. In some jurisdictions they make set speeches 
with little or no interruption from the Bench. Pliny, I think, would have got on much better 
in such a courtroom. 
 I am a child of the common law, so it will be no surprise that the common law is 
where my loyalties are. This is of course not the place to debate the two systems’ 
respective merits – itself a subtle debate, since many of the more rigid differences 
between the two are in different jurisdictions breaking down. My purpose in describing 
3 And also in the Roman courts in, or even before, Pliny’s time. The speaker Maternus in Tacitus’ 
Dialogus (39) complains that the judge often asks questions almost before the advocate has started. 
Such conditions, Maternus argues, do not make for great oratory. [Eds.] 
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the contrast is to show that the rhetoric of the common law involves distinct and separate 
values, or faculties, because it is in the nature of a dialectical, argumentative exchange. Of 
course in both civil and common law systems the ultimate goal of the lawyer/advocate is 
to persuade the tribunal of the correctness of his client’s case. As Cicero said: ‘The best of 
orators is one who by his speech informs, entertains, and persuades the minds of his 
audience.  It is his duty to educate; and of necessity he must persuade.’4 That obiter 
dictum fits the common law very well.  Note the reference to entertainment. If as an 
advocate you can entertain the judge or jury, you may be well on the way to persuading 
them too. It is, however, unlikely that such an outcome blessed the efforts of one member 
of the Bar appearing in a claim for damages for personal injuries, who called a doctor as 
an expert witness. The doctor was utterly destroyed in cross-examination by the other 
side. The contest went very badly for him. His expert testimony as to the claimant’s 
medical condition was completely blown apart. After the cross-examination counsel for 
the claimant had only one question for the witness in re-examination: ‘Doctor, do you 
think you can find your way back to the railway station?’ Entertaining, certainly, but 
rueful rather than persuasive; the battle to persuade had been lost. 
 Pliny, then, would have been a nightmare in a common law court; but it gets worse. In 
the same letter to Tacitus he says: 
 
Regulus once said to me when we were appearing in the same case: ‘You think you 
should follow up every point, but I make straight for the throat and hang on to that’...  
I pointed out that it might be the knee or the heel he seized when he thought he had 
the throat. ‘I can’t see the throat,’ I said, ‘so my method is to feel my way and try 
everything – in fact I “leave no stone unturned”.’ On my farms I cultivate my fruit 
trees and fields as carefully as my vineyards, and in the fields I sow barley, beans and 
other legumes as well as corn and wheat; so when I am making a speech I scatter 
various arguments around like seeds in order to reap whatever crop comes up. There 
are as many unforeseen hazards and uncertainties to surmount in working on the 
minds of judges as in dealing with the problems of weather and soil. 
 
This is quite dreadful. A common law judge hearing such an advocate would at once 
conclude that the advocate did not know the difference between a good point and a bad 
one – in a word, that the advocate had no judgment. Pliny’s scattergun approach, far from 
being an advantage, is a serious drawback. The judge will have to find the good points for 
himself – if there are any, and faced with the scattergun he will suspect there are none. 
But the common law dialectic requires co-operation between Bar and Bench. That is how 
the contest works. The referee can only judge wisely, or accurately, if each side puts his 
case clear and spare.     
 I suffered a Pliny experience myself shortly before giving this talk. I was hearing an 
application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a High 
Court judge. Such applications are typically heard by a single Lord Justice of Appeal with 
a time estimate of thirty minutes. Counsel appearing for the applicant before me produced 
a skeleton argument – spectacularly misnamed, for it ran to well over one hundred 
4 De optimo genere oratorum, 1.3.  
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paragraphs and was sixty or seventy pages long. The case had some complexities and the 
judge at first instance had produced a detailed careful judgment. It was criticized in this 
supposedly skeleton argument at every turn. Complaints, large and small, of what the judge 
had said poured from every paragraph. I said to counsel for the applicant that I could hardly 
believe that someone who had reached the rank of High Court judge could make so many 
mistakes in a single case. It was pure Pliny: the appellant ‘scatter[ed] various arguments 
around like seeds in order to reap whatever crop comes up’. The law of diminishing returns 
is very powerful.      
 But Pliny got one thing very right – and in the same letter to Tacitus. Here is my last 
quotation from it: 
 
[E]veryone is prejudiced in favour of his own powers of discernment, and will 
always find an argument most convincing if it leads to the conclusion he has 
reached for himself; everyone must then be given something he can grasp and 
recognize as his own idea. 
 
There is a deep truth here. If you want to sell an argument to a judge, you may do very 
well if somehow you can get him to believe that it was his own idea. Amour propre is no 
less powerful than the law of diminishing returns. Pliny, nerd though he was, got this 
piece of psychology dead right. 
 Now, all these aspects – take only the good points; be sensitive to the tribunal and 
adjust what you have to say accordingly; a judicious use of humour; attribute your 
argument as if it were the judge’s own – are all tips for modern day advocacy in the 
common law courts. They are good tips because of the nature of modern advocacy – a 
dialectic, requiring co-operation between Bar and Bench. Because it is a dialectic, the 
process has an intellectual rigour which is not demanded of every form of rhetoric. Indeed 
it has not always been demanded of rhetoric in the common law courts, at least at first 
instance trials: or at least, other factors have been in play. In particular in some eras, some 
situations, emotion has played a much greater part in the rhetoric of the common law than 
it does today. I said at the outset that I would speak of different styles of rhetoric within 
the common law tradition. The differences, I think, tend to illuminate the subtleties of the 
contest. They will also bring us a little closer to something I have not so far mentioned – 
the ethics of the advocate’s profession. 
 Many of the great common law advocates of the first half of the twentieth century 
made great play with emotional effects. This was by no means entirely spurious. The idea 
that rhetoric might properly appeal to the listener’s feelings is an old one, and is by no 
means of necessity tawdry, or superficial, or dishonourable. Let me give you a flavour of 
this era of the English courts. One of its greatest advocates was Sir Edward Marshall Hall 
KC, who died in 1927, and was at the height of his powers from the Edwardian decade 
onwards. It is difficult now, in these more antiseptic days, to grasp the colour and bustle 
of the courts at that time. A biography of Marshall Hall by Nina Warner Hooke and Gil 
Thomas and published in 1966 makes a fair stab at it.5 Here is one passage:   
  
5 Marshall Hall: A Biography (London 1966). 
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The day-to-day course of those forensic battles was followed with breathless interest.  
Press reports were snatched from bawling newsboys, heads wagged over the latest 
skirmish in a cross-examination and bets were laid on the outcome of the case. 
Intricate points were argued as fiercely in clubs and pubs as they were in court. There 
was public rejoicing when the verdict was a popular one, angry demonstrations when 
it was not. The closing speeches for the prosecution and defence, with their 
emotional exordiums and thundering perorations, were read and quoted everywhere. 
Those times are past. The law has become a dull dog so far as the general public is 
concerned. There are still many fine lawyers but no advocates of the stature of 
Marshall Hall, of whom it could have been said – as it was once said of his 
eighteenth-century prototype Lord Erskine – ‘When he rose to speak every look was 
fixed on him, breathing was suspended, and as often as he paused a flake of snow 
would have been heard to fall’.6  
 
Over-the-top, no doubt; but so was the subject-matter. It is perhaps interesting that this 
earlier era of forensic rhetoric was described in quite such glowing terms in 1966, when 
these romantic ideas of advocacy were probably regarded in many quarters with an even 
more cynical eye than they are today. However that may be, a comparison between those 
heady days, when famous barristers like Marshall Hall were the celebs of the time, and 
our more clinical practices of today illuminates, I think, what I proposed to describe: the 
nature of rhetoric in the common law tradition; what is the essence of it. 
 For however devoted we are to the objective dissection of evidence and the patient 
analysis of legal principle, we cannot, I think, deny that the best advocacy has a 
quickening effect. It engages the spirit as well as the mind. The words you choose can lift 
an argument from the merely persuasive to the inspiring. The ancients well understood 
this. At least Cicero did – I am not sure about Pliny. Quintilian (and I am no expert on the 
Institutio Oratoria) might have been suspicious of such an idea, given that his great book 
can be seen as a reaction against the ‘silver Latin’ style, which favoured ornate 
embellishment over clarity and precision. 
 So we have something of a tension in the common law, a tension perhaps replicated in 
many rhetorical contexts. It is between cold and hot rhetoric; between the head and the 
heart; between what makes you think, and what makes you laugh or cry. Most law cases, 
nowadays at least, only need cold rhetoric. But sometimes a fact – in a murder case, it 
may be the uncertainty of a relationship – or just an idea – in a public law case, the 
freedom of the citizen from government’s received wisdom – can take wing, and demand 
that the advocate should not merely persuade, but create an empathy with his audience. 
 It means that forensic rhetoric requires not only judgment, but imagination; not only 
intelligence, but a sense of other – even a moral sense. This itself is an ancient idea, and it 
brings us closer to the ethics of the advocate’s profession. It is very much a theme of 
Quintilian, who believed that only a good man could be an orator: which is rather more 
extreme than Cicero’s injunction that an orator should be a good man. While I think both 
of these are a jump much too far, the advocate – the rhetorician – needs to understand 
what people regard as good – and bad. He needs an ethical insight. If he lacks it, he will 
6 Warner Hooke and Thomas, Marshall Hall (n.5, above) 2. 
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lack judgment: he will ‘scatter various arguments around like seeds in order to reap 
whatever crop comes up’. And he may lose the case in consequence. 
 There is another sense in which ethics has a critical part to play in the adversarial 
contest that is the rhetoric of the common law. The contest is conducted according to strict 
professional rules, to ensure that its outcome is directed to the doing of justice. The most 
important rule is that you should never deceive the court. But another rule is the 
advocate’s duty of disclosure – the disclosure of relevant documents and materials by one 
side to the other. In his column in the Times on 4 November 2010, David Pannick told a 
very striking story.7 He had recently met Gabriel Bach, who had been a Justice of the 
Israeli Supreme Court. Many years before, Bach had been the deputy prosecutor of Adolf 
Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem in 1961 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Eichmann had been right-hand man to SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, a 
principal architect of the holocaust. He – Eichmann – had been captured in Argentina in 
1960 and returned to Israel for trial. In the course of preparing the case Bach came across 
some documents which might be thought helpful to the defence case. Bach handed over 
the documents to Eichmann’s lawyers. Eichmann was astonished; but Bach had studied 
law here, and as David Pannick says, ‘Bach’s training at Lincoln’s Inn had taught him that 
the rule of law so required’. 
 High principles like this make the profession of advocate a high calling. There are 
other precepts and principles no less important: chief among them, perhaps, the need for 
fearless independence, in particular, independence from the State. I like to think that 
Cicero, not a naturally courageous man, stood up for this value in magnificent style at the 
beginning and at the end of his career: in his defence of Sextus Roscius of Ameria, when 
you can picture Sulla’s thugs skulking in every Roman doorway, and in his wonderful 
polemic against Mark Antony, followed not long after by his murder. 
 These then are the precepts of the rhetoric of the common law: take only the good 
points; be sensitive to the tribunal and adjust what you have to say accordingly; a 
judicious use of humour; attribute your argument as if it were the judge’s own; above all 
honour the rules of the contest, and always be stoutly independent. The lines between 
these precepts and the injunctions of the ancients are blurred, and sometimes rubbed 
away; but sometimes they are clear and continuous: then as now, rhetoric is the alchemy 
of persuasion.  
7 http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/columnists/article2792372.ece [Eds.] 
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